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INTRODUCTION
Lawyers hold a unique position in American society, because they
must simultaneously serve two demanding masters-their client and
the court.' Like double-agents, lawyers must keep both masters
1. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. 1 (1994) ("A lawyer is a repre-
sentative of clients, an officer of the legal system, and a public citizen having special re-
sponsibility for the quality of justice."); id. 1 8 ("In the nature of law practice,...
conflicting responsibilities are encountered. Virtually all difficult ethical problems arise
from conflict between a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system, and to the
lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory living.");
Cf MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY pmbl. 3 (1982) ("In fulfilling his profes-
sional responsibilities, a lawyer necessarily assumes various roles that require the perform-
ance of many difficult tasks."). Compare Malautea v. Suzuki Motor Co., 987 F.2d 1536, 1546
(11th Cir. 1993) ("All attorneys, as 'officers of the court,' owe duties of complete candor
and primary loyalty to the court before which they practice. An attorney's duty to a client
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happy, while trying to convince each that their loyalties are undivided.
This task is difficult, because the rules governing lawyers' conduct do
not always clearly indicate whether duties to clients outweigh those
owed to the court.' Moreover, some rules seemingly conflict and
leave lawyers in a Catch-22: One master cannot be served without be-
traying the other.
This tension between duties to client and court is nowhere more
obvious than in the deposition setting.' Civil discovery, including dep-
ositions, occurs largely outside of the judge's supervision.4 Thus, law-
yers are expected to self-regulate their conduct.5 However, self-
regulation can be difficult in a system that expects lawyers to repre-
sent their clients' interests zealously while serving as quasi-official judi-
cial officers.6 Moreover, often neither the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, nor the Federal
can never outweigh his or her responsibility to see that our system of justice functions
smoothly.") with MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 ("While serving as
advocate, a lawyer should resolve in favor of his client doubts as to the bounds of the law.")
and L. Ray Patterson, Legal Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY LJ. 909, 909
(1980) ("'An advocate ... knows .. . but one person in the world, that client and none
other. To save that client at all expedient means-to protect that client at all hazards and
costs to all others, and among others to himself-is the highest and most unquestioned of
his duties. . . .'" (quoting Lord Brougham)). See generally Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as
Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REv. 39 (1989) (discussing lawyers' obligations to court and
client).
Lawyers also have a third duty: the duty of fairness to others. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL REsPONsmITv DR 7-104 ("Communicating with One of Adverse Interest");
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 ("Fairness to Opposing Party and Coun-
sel"); id. Rule 4.4 ("Respect for Rights of Third Persons").
2. See William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform,
50 U. Prrr. L. REv. 703, 714 (1989) ("[Ethical] rules impose on lawyers a heavy burden of
having to accommodate conflicting expectations of the litigation process."). See generally
Patterson, supra note I (tracing the historical shifts in attitudes and rules concerning law-
yers' duties to clients and to the court).
3. See W. Bradley Wendel, Rediscovering Discovery Ethics, 79 MARQ. L. REv. 895, 896
(1996) ("Discovery practice provides the setting in which these conflicting roles are drawn
into the most severe conflict for litigators.").
4. See Kramer v. Boeing Co., 126 F.R.D. 690, 692 (D. Minn. 1989) (explaining that the
spirit of the Federal Rules "is that discovery [should] be self-effectuating, without need to
resort to the court").
5. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. 9 ("The legal profession is
largely self-governing."); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS 2 (1990)
("With the exception of occasional statutes that deal with specific issues, the rules that
govern lawyers' professional conduct have been drafted into comprehensive codes by a
private organization, the American Bar Association, and these codifications ordinarily have
been adopted by state courts rather than by legislatures.").
6. One practitioner observed:
I share my clients' general amazement at how lawyers can be perfectly congenial
over drinks and then absolutely rude and vicious once they work themselves into
the role of "advocate." Nowhere is thisJekyll-Hyde transformation so apparent as
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Rules of Civil Procedure provide clear guidance for lawyers faced with
the ethical dilemmas associated with taking a civil deposition.
For instance, Model Rule 3.4(d) provides that "[a lawyer shall
not] in pretrial procedure . . .fail to make [a] reasonably diligent
effort to comply with a legally proper discovery request by an oppos-
ing party."7 On the other hand, Model Rule 1.3 imposes on an attor-
ney the general duty to represent his or her client with "reasonable
diligence" or zeal.' Thus, the tension between a lawyer's duty as an
officer of the court and as a client representative is replicated in the
Model Rules.9
Moreover, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure frequently com-
plicate, not ease, the problem. They do not provide ethical guidance,
and they tend to refer only to "good faith" efforts to comply with dis-
covery requests.10 Although some individual courts have adopted lo-
cal rules that address deposition conduct, they, too, typically omit
instructions about how to reconcile attorneys' conflicting duties."
Also thrown into the equation are attorney civility or courtesy codes,
which frequently do address discovery, including deposition conduct.
These codes, however, are usually aspirational and contain no en-
forcement mechanisms.12
at a deposition, where the presence of neither a stern judge nor a scrutinizing
jury assures lawyers will stay within the bounds of civility.
Larry G. Johnson, The 10 Deadly Deposition Sins, A.B.A. J., Sept. 1984, at 62, 63.
7. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(d).
8. Id. Rule 1.3. Professor David Luban observed:
[T] he law is inherently double-edged: any rule imposed to limit zealous advocacy
* . .may be used by an adversary as an offensive weapon.... The rules of discov-
ery, for example, initiated to enable one side to find out crucial facts from the
other, are used nowadays to delay trial or impose added expense on the other
side ....
David Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 88 (David Luban ed.,
1983).
9. Wendel, supra note 3, at 919. But see MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT
pmbl. 8 (explaining that "the Rules of Professional Conduct prescribe terms for resolving
... conflicts" between "a lawyer's responsibilities to clients, to the legal system and to the
lawyer's own interest in remaining an upright person while earning a satisfactory living").
10. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c) ("Upon motion .. .accompanied by a certification
that the movant has in good faith conferred or attempted to confer with other affected
parties in an effort to resolve the dispute without court action .... the court... may make
any order which justice requires to protect a party or person .... " (emphasis added)).
11. See infta Part I.A. 1.b.
12. See infra Part I.C. However, some courts have announced that they will enforce
local aspirational creeds by sanctioning offending attorneys. See, e.g., Dondi Properties
Corp. v. Commerce Say. & Loan Ass'n, 121 F.R.D. 284, 287 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (en banc)
(per curiam) (adopting, in part, the Dallas Bar Association's "sensible and pertinent"
guidelines "as standards of practice to be observed by attorneys appearing in civil actions in
this district" (footnote omitted)); see also M.D. ALA. GUIDELINES CIv. DIscoVERY PRAc. guide.
276 [VOL. 57:273
THE LAW AND ETHics OF CIVIL DEPOSITIONS
What, then, are attorneys in depositions to do when faced with a
situation that places their obligations to the court at odds with their
obligations to their clients? What are their legal and ethical obliga-
tions? Where should they look when neither the discovery rules nor
the ethical rules provides clear guidance?
This Article will focus on the tension between ethics and advocacy
in the deposition setting. It will discuss applicable court rules, case
law, ethical rules, and civility codes. The discussion takes place in the
context of a hypothetical case concerning Ovar-X, a contraceptive sim-
ilar to Norplant. i3 Specifically, this Article will analyze different forms
of discovery abuse. It will assess scenarios in which the deponent and
her attorney hold several private conferences during the deposition;
the deponent's attorney continuously objects and instructs the depo-
nent not to answer questions; the questioning attorney asks potentially
embarrassing questions that may or may not be relevant; and the at-
torneys engage in colloquy and hurl personal attacks at each other.14
When the rules are silent, this Article will propose solutions that
might help attorneys and courts deal with these common forms of
deposition abuse.
I. THE BALANCING ACT: RuLEs AFFECTING DEPOSITION CONDUCT
A deposition can be the most powerful and productive device
available during discovery.15 Depositions provide virtually the only op-
I(A) (incorporating courtesy standards into local rules and informing practitioners that
"discovery in this district is normally practiced with a spirit of ordinary civil courtesy and
honesty"); E.D. OKLA- L.R. 1.3(B) ("The Court may deal with unprofessional conduct in
any manner deemed appropriate that is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the
United States.").
13. Available since February 1991, Norplant is a long-term contraceptive that consists
of six match-like silicone rods. The rods are surgically inserted into a woman's upper arm,
and they release a synthetic hormone to prevent pregnancy. Laura Duncan, Norplant: The
Next Mass Tort: State and Federal Suits Allege Birth Control Device Is Defective, A.B.A. J., Nov.
1995, at 16, 16. Each implant is designed to last for about five years. Susan Borreson,
Norplant's Fate on Trial in Beaumont, TEX. LAW., Feb. 24, 1997, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, Txlawr File; Group Asks FDA to Take Norplant off Market, DAILY REC., June
28, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Dlyrec File; American Civil Liberties
Union, ACLU Norplant Fact Sheet: Norplant: A New Contraceptive with the Potential for Abuse
(visited Sept. 5, 1997) <http://www.choice.org/2.norplant.aclu.html>. Currently,
thousands of women have cases pending against companies that manufactured and distrib-
uted Norplant and against doctors who prescribed the contraceptive. Duncan, supra, at 17.
14. This Article is limited to situations in which the deponent is a party to the litiga-
tion. Different considerations may apply when the deponent is merely a witness.
15. See DAVID M. MALONE & PETER T. HoFvMAN, THE EFFECTrIvE DEPOSITION 27 (2d ed.
1996) ("Depositions are the most powerful discovery device available to a litigator."); see
also Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Depositions are the
factual battleground where the vast majority of litigation actually takes place."); 7 JAMES
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portunity for counsel to speak directly with the opposing party before
trial. The deposition format allows the examining attorney to ask
questions without having those questions screened in advance by op-
posing counsel. Consequently, attorneys often obtain more informa-
tion, and more "honest" information, through deposition questions
than through other discovery devices. Depositions also allow the at-
torney to ask follow-up questions immediately, if the deponent an-
swers in an unexpected or incomplete manner. Further, the
questioning attorney can look the deponent in the eye and gauge the
deponent's testifying abilities and credibility1
6
Unfortunately, the effectiveness of depositions can be under-
mined through abusive antics.1 7 Because most depositions are not
court-supervised, some attorneys believe they can get away with hard-
ball tactics they would never try in open court.1" In addition, because
depositions involve face-to-face encounters between opposing sides,
WM. MOORE ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE § 30.02[2], at 30-15 (3d ed. 1997) ("The
importance of depositions to modem civil litigation was well (if perhaps cynically) cap-
tured by [the Hall] court.").
16. MALONE & HoFrMAN, supra note 15, at 27-31.
17. For example, in 1989, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
appointed a nine-member Seventh Circuit Committee on Civility, which was chaired by
Judge Marvin E. Aspen, a United States District Judge in the Northern District of Illinois.
Interim Report of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D.
371, 374-76 (1991). As part of its work, the Committee distributed a four-page civility ques-
tionnaire to jurists and more than 1500 members of the Seventh Circuit Bar Association.
Id. at 377. Of the practitioners responding to the survey, 94% indicated that a civility
problem existed among attorneys during discovery. Id. at 386. According to the report,
"Depositions, conducted by lawyers without direct judicial supervision, can be one of the
most uncivil phases of trial practice." Id. at 388.
In 1990, the Committee on Second Circuit Courts found, after questioning many prac-
titioners, that "the current method of taking and defending depositions is too often an
exercise in competitive obstructionism." Federal Bar Council, Committee on Second Cir-
cuit Courts, A Report on the Conduct of Depositions, 131 F.R.D. 613, 613 (1990). This
Committee called for more specific rules concerning deposition conduct, some of which
were incorporated into the 1993 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Id.
at 615-22; cf Robert D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Reforming the New Discovery Rules, 84
GEo. L.J. 61, 66-68 (1995) (summarizing several studies concerning attorneys' views about
the prevalence of deposition abuse); Susan Keilitz et al., Attorneys' Views of Civil Discovery,
JUDGES' J., Spring 1993, at 2, 4-6, 32-42 (surveying attorneys' views about discovery in five
state-court systems).
18. As one commentator observed, "No experience more clearly demonstrates the de-
cline of civility in the practice of law than viewing attorney conduct at a deposition. In this
ring, unfettered by a judicial referee, some lawyers conceive themselves gladiators free to
ignore such rules as there are and to bully witnesses and adversaries." Melvyn H. Bergstein,
Dirty Depositions: Soiling a Truth-Finding Process, N.J. L.J., Jan. 15, 1996, at 11, available in
LEXIS, Legnew Library, Njlawj File; accordJohnson, supra note 6, at 63 (categorizing law-
yers' confusion between rudeness and advocacy as one of the "[d]eadly [d]eposition
[sins").
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emotions run high. 9 An attorney trying to impede her opponent's
progress sometimes interjects countless objections, 20 or instructs the
witness not to answer questions propounded by the opposing coun-
sel.21 An attorney worried that her opponent is about to extract im-
portant or damaging information commonly calls recesses to confer
with the witness about how best to answer those touchy questions.
22
Attorneys trying to intimidate opposing witnesses sometimes ask inap-
propriate or baseless questions.23 Attorneys trying to impress their
own clients sometimes engage opposing counsel in shouting
matches.
2 4
Given the importance of depositions in civil litigation, and given
their susceptibility to abuse, it is no surprise that many different
sources contain rules that affect depositions. This Part will describe
rules that affect deposition conduct. Later, these rules will be applied
to depositions taken in the hypothetical case involving Ovar-X.
A. Court Rules and Case Law
1. Federal Courts.-
a. Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.-In 1993, Congress over-
hauled the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, including the rules con-
cerning depositions. 25 Rule 30, the rule governing deposition
conduct, was significantly altered. Before the 1993 amendments, Rule
30 was silent about how or what type of objections could be made,
when a defending attorney could instruct the witness not to answer,
and the consequences if one side delayed or impeded the examina-
19. Bergstein, supra note 18.
20. Id.
21. MALONE & Ho mAN, supra note 15, at 138.
22. See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (considering a
deposition dispute in which an attorney called inappropriate conferences and holding that
.a lawyer and client do not have an absolute right to confer during the course of the
client's deposition").
23. See Edward Bart Greene, The Folklore of Depositions, in THE LrTGATION MANUAL 211,
217 (John G. Koeltl ed., 2d ed. 1989) (describing a case that evidenced numerous "argu-
mentative and senseless" questions (internal quotation marks omitted)).
24. See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994) (addressing a situation in which an attorney engaged in abusive conduct while de-
fending his client in a deposition).
25. Seven Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concern depositions. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26
("General Provisions Governing Discovery; Duty of Disclosure"); FED. R_ Crv. P. 27 ("Depo-
sitions Before Action or Pending Appeal"); FED. R. Crv. P. 28 ("Persons Before Whom
Depositions May Be Taken"); FED. R. Crv. P. 30 ("Depositions upon Oral Examination");
FED. R. Crv. P. 31 ("Depositions upon Written Questions"); FED. R. Crv. P. 32 ("Use of
Depositions in Court Proceedings"); FED. R. Crv. P. 37 ("Failure to Make or Cooperate in
Discovery: Sanctions"). This Article will focus on oral depositions taken under Rule 30.
2791998]
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tion.26 Instead, the rule provided only that the court could terminate
or limit the deposition when a party or deponent showed that the
deposition was "being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or
party."
2 7
In 1993, the following language was added to Rule 30(d):
(1) Any objection to evidence during a deposition shall be
stated concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-sugges-
tive manner. A party may instruct a deponent not to answer
only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limi-
tation on evidence directed by the court, or to present a mo-
tion under paragraph (3).
(2) ... [T]he court... shall allow additional time... if the
deponent or another party impedes or delays the examina-
tion. If the court finds such an impediment, delay, or other
conduct that has frustrated the fair examination of the depo-
nent, it may impose upon the persons responsible an appro-
priate sanction, including the reasonable costs and attorney's
fees incurred by any parties as a result thereof.28
According to the advisory committee notes accompanying the
1993 amendments, paragraph 1 in Rule 30(d) was added because, in
the past, depositions frequently were prolonged and frustrated "by
lengthy objections and colloquy, often suggesting how the deponent
should respond."29 The language concerning instructions not to an-
swer was added because "[d] irections to a deponent not to answer a
question can be more disruptive than objections."3 ° Paragraph 2 was
added expressly to authorize courts "to impose the cost resulting from
obstructive tactics that unreasonably prolong a deposition on the per-
son engaged in such obstruction. '
Although not affected by the 1993 amendments, Rule 32(d)(3)
also impacts deposition conduct. This rule indicates what types of ob-
jections must and may be raised during a deposition. Under Rule
32(d) (3) (B), objections must be raised during the deposition, or
26. See FED. R Crv. P. 30(d) (1988).
27. Id. This language was retained in the 1993 revision. See FED. R. Clv. P. 30(d) (3)
(1993).
28. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d)(1)-(2) (1993).
29. FED. R Crv. P. 30(d) advisory committee notes on 1993 amendments.
30. Id.
31. Id.; accord Phillips v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 92 Civ. 8527 (KTD),
1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3748, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994) (considering sanctions under
amended Rule 30(d) for obstructionist tactics during a deposition, but denying such sanc-
tions, in part, because of the "newness of the amendment").
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otherwise be waived, if they concern errors or irregularities "in the
manner of taking the deposition," the form of the questions or an-
swers, "the oath or affirmation," or the parties' conduct.3 2 In addi-
tion, "errors of any kind which might be obviated, removed, or cured
if promptly presented, are waived unless seasonable objection thereto
is made at the taking of the deposition."3  As one commentator
observed:
The rule focuses on the necessity of making the objection at
a point in the proceedings at which it will be of some value in
curing the alleged error in the deposition. In addition, the
rule is intended to render technical objections based on er-
rors and irregularities in depositions unavailable at trial.3 4
In contrast, Rule 32(d) (3) (A) identifies objections that need not
be raised during the deposition.35 Specifically, objections to the com-
petency, relevancy, or materiality of testimony typically are not waived
if not raised during the deposition.3 6 When followed, this rule per-
mits depositions to be conducted in a more orderly fashion, with
fewer interruptions.3 7 This rule, however, does not prohibit attorneys
from raising these types of objections; it merely indicates that the ob-
jections are not waived if not raised during the deposition. Therefore,
some counsel will raise objections covered by Rule 32(d) (3) (A) either
32. FED. R. CIv. P. 32(d) (3) (B); accord 7 MooRE ET AL., supra note 15, § 32.45, at 32-59
to -60 (discussing when deposition objections should and must be raised).
33. FED. R. Clv. P. 32(d)(3)(B). For further discussion of objections during deposi-
tions, see infta Part IV.
34. 7 MooRE ET AL., supra note 15, § 32.45, at 32-60.
35. See FED. R. Cirv. P. 32(d) (3) (A); accord 7 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, § 32.45 at
32-61 & n.ll.
36. Rule 32(d) (3) (A) states:
Objections [relating] to the competency of a witness or to the competency, rele-
vancy, or materiality of testimony are not waived by failure to make them before
or during the taking of the deposition, unless the ground of the objection is one
which might have been obviated or removed if presented at that time.
FED. R_ Civ. P. 32(d) (3) (A); accord United States v. Irvin, 127 F.R.D. 169, 170 n.2 (C.D. Cal.
1989) (indicating that relevancy objections are preserved for trial and need not be raised
during the deposition).
37. See, e.g., Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (sug-
gesting that counsel should not repeatedly interrupt the deposition by raising objections
that are preserved for trial under Rule 32(d)(3) (A)); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fawcett
Publications, Inc., 4 F.RD. 237, 239-40 (S.D.N.Y. 1944) (chastising counsel for raising
nonwaivable errors and observing that "[t]he interruptions in the conduct of the examina-
tion were entirely unnecessary").
1998]
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out of fear of waiving them under the "might have been obviated"
clause3" or to disrupt the deposition.39
Even after the 1993 amendments, the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure still do not address the propriety of private conferences be-
tween a deponent and her attorney, and they have never addressed an
attorney's ethical obligations. Therefore, attorneys must search for
other rules and standards to fill these gaps.
b. Local Court Rules and Standing Orders.-To supple-
ment the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and to help curb unpro-
fessional and abusive conduct at depositions,4" the following
federal district courts adopted local rules to control deposition con-
duct: Middle District of Alabama,4" Southern District of Alabama,42
District of Alaska,4" District of Colorado,' Southern District of
38. See infra notes 407-409 and accompanying text; cf EDWARD J. IMWTNKELRIED & THE-
ODORE Y. BLUMOFF, PRETRIAL DiSCOVER- STRATEGY AND TACTICS § 6:21 (1996) (describing
situations in which the Rule 32(d) (3) (A) phrase "which might have been obviated or re-
moved if presented at that time" is confusing and ambiguous).
39. See discussion infta Part IV.D (proposing a rule that would prohibit objections
other than those that are waived for lack of timeliness).
40. See, e.g., S.D. FLA. L.R. 30.1 cmt. (stating that the purpose of its "Sanctions for
Abusive Deposition Conduct" is "to curb unprofessional conduct at depositions").
41. M.D. ALA. GUIDELINES CIv. DISCOvERY PRAc. guide. II(E)-(G). These guidelines
characterize an attorney's instruction to a witness not to answer as a "high-risk practice one
should use-if at all-only in extraordinary situations involving privilege, or temporarily in
situations in which Rule 30(d) suggests the propriety of a court order to protect from bad
faith examination or unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression of the
deponent or party." Id. guide. II(E). The guidelines also state that "[1]awyers should not
attempt to prompt answers by [using] suggestive objections," id. guide. II(F), and that
"[e] xcept during normal breaks and for purposes of determining the existence of privilege
or the like, normally at the request of the client, a deponent and his attorney should not
normally confer during a deposition," id. guide. II(G).
42. The Southern District of Alabama has the following pretrial procedure instructions
for the conduct of depositions:
Any objection made during a deposition must be stated concisely and in [a] non-
argumentative and non-suggestive manner. An instruction to a deponent not to
answer must not be made unless necessary to preserve a privilege, or enforce a
limitation directed by the court, or to present a motion under Fed. R. Civ. P.
30 (d) (3).
S.D. ALA. PRETRIAL PRO. INSTRUCTIONS, Conduct of Depositions.
43. In depositions taken pursuant to the authority of the District of Alaska,
"[e]xamination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed as permitted at the trial
under provisions of the Federal Rules of Evidence." D. ALASKA L.R. 30.1(c).
44. Colorado's rule prohibits the following five categories of abusive deposition
conduct:
1. Objections or statements which have the effect of coaching the witness, in-
structing the witness concerning the way in which he or she should frame a re-
sponse, or suggesting an answer to the witness.
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Florida,4 5 Southern District of Indiana,4 6 District of Maryland,4 7
2. Interrupting examination for an off-the-record conference between counsel
and the witness, except for the purpose of determining whether to assert a privi-
lege. Any off-the-record conference during a recess may be a subject for inquiry
by opposing counsel, to the extent it is not privileged.
3. Instructing a deponent not to answer a question except when necessary to
preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by the court, or
to present a motion under Rule 30(d) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
4. Filing a motion for protective order or to limit examination without a substan-
tial basis in law.
5. Questioning that unfairly embarrasses, humiliates, intimidates, or harasses the
deponent, or invades his or her privacy absent a clear statement on the record
explaining how the answers to such questions will constitute, or lead to, compe-
tent evidence admissible at trial.
D. CoLo. L.R. 30.1C.
45. The Southern District of Florida based its local rules on those promulgated by the
United States District Court for the District of Colorado. See S.D. FLA. L.R. 30.1 authority.
46. The rule in the Southern District of Indiana provides:
(a) An attorney who instructs a deponent... not to answer .. shall state, on
the record, the reasons and legal basis for the instruction ....
(b) If a claim of privilege has been asserted... the attorney seeking disclo-
sure shall have reasonable latitude ... to question the deponent to establish ...
the legal appropriateness of the assertion of the privilege ....
(c) An attorney for a deponent shall not initiate a private conference with
the deponent regarding a pending question except for the purpose of determin-
ing whether a claim of privilege should be asserted.
(d) An attorney shall not.., interpose objections ... which suggest answers
S.D. IND. L.R. 30.1.
47. In the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, the following con-
duct is presumptively improper:
" "[I]ntentionally ask[ing] a witness a question that misstates or mischaracter-
izes the witness' previous answer." D. MD. DIscovERY GUIDELINES guide. 5(a).
" Objecting or giving instructions that coach or suggest answers to the depo-
nent. Id. guide. 5(b).
* "[R]epeatedly ask[ing] the same or substantially identical question of a depo-
nent if the question already has been asked and fully and responsively an-
swered by the deponent." Id. guide. 5(c).
" "[I]nstruct[ing] a witness not to answer . . . unless under the circumstances
permitted by [FED. R. Crv. P.] 30(d)(1)." Id. guide. 5(d).
* Propounding questions "clearly beyond the scope" permitted by Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1), "particularly of a personal nature" and after an
objection that the deposition is being conducted in "bad faith" or in an unrea-
sonably annoying or harassing manner. Id.
* Refusing, if asked, to state the basis for an objection. Id. guide. 5(e).
• Conducting a private session with the deponent, except to determine whether
a privilege should be asserted. Id. guide. 5(f).
* Discussing, during breaks in the deposition, "the substance of the prior testi-
mony given by the deponent during the deposition." Id. guide. 5(g).
The Maryland guidelines also provide that when a privilege is asserted during a deposition,
the person asserting the privilege must first identify the nature of the privilege. Id. guide.
6(a)(i). Then, opposing counsel can ask questions designed to determine whether the
privilege was properly asserted. Id. guide. 6(a) (ii). In addition, the person recording the
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Northern District of Ohio, 48 District of South Carolina, 49 and District
of Wyoming."° In addition, a few courts have issued standing orders
or discovery guidelines concerning deposition conduct.5 '
In 1997, the Northern District of Illinois decided not to adopt
what would have been the most sweeping and comprehensive local
rules on deposition conduct.5 2 The proposed Illinois federal rules
would have applied to (1) attorneys taking or defending depositions
in the district,5" (2) attorneys representing a party during a deposition
in a case pending in the district, "irrespective of where the deposition
is taken,"5 4 and (3) attorneys taking or defending a deposition under
deposition must, at the request of an attorney or unrepresented deponent, describe in the
record any conduct that violates the guidelines or other applicable procedural rules. Id.
guide. 7.
48. The rule in the Northern District of Ohio provides that "[w]itnesses, parties, and
counsel shall conduct themselves at depositions in a temperate, dignified, and responsible
manner." N.D. OHIO L.R. 30.1(a).
49. The South Carolina local rules track the order issued in Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150
F.R.D. 525, 531 (E.D. Pa. 1993). See D.S.C. L.R. 30.04; see also infra Part I.A1l.c (discussing
Hall).
50. The Wyoming rule addresses several deposition abuses. First, with regard to in-
structions not to answer, the local rule states that "[r]epeated directions to a witness not to
answer questions calling for non-privileged answers are symptomatic that the deposition is
not proceeding as it should." D. Wyo. L.R. 30(c). It then directs that an instruction not to
answer should be "made only on the ground of privilege." Id. Next, the rule provides that
"[o]bjections in the presence of the witness which are used to suggest an answer to the
witness are presumptively improper." Id. 30(d). Objections should be concise, and objec-
tions based on privilege must be "stated and established." Id. The Wyoming rule also
prohibits private conferences between a non-party deponent and counsel "during the actual
taking of a deposition, except for the purpose of determining whether a privilege should
be asserted." Id. 30(e). Unlike other local rules, the Wyoming rule also addresses the
assertion of privilege or qualified immunity from discovery. Id. 30(f), (g). The rule states:
"Where a claim of privilege or qualified immunity from discovery is asserted during a depo-
sition, the attorney asserting the privilege or qualified immunity from discovery shall iden-
tify . .. the nature of the privilege or qualified immunity from discovery which is being
claimed." Id. 30(f). The questioning attorney then has "reasonable latitude ... to ques-
tion the witness ... concerning the assertion of the privilege or qualified immunity from
discovery .... ." Id. 30(g).
51. See, e.g., Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102
F.R.D. 339, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (ordering that "[a]n attorney for a deponent shall not
initiate a private conference with the deponent during the actual taking of a deposition,
except for the purpose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted" and prohib-
iting "[o]bjections in the presence of the witness which are used to suggest an answer" to
the question). The Manual for Complex Litigation also contains a proposed standing order
concerning deposition guidelines. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LmGATION (THIRD) § 41.38
(Matthew Bender 1997).
52. Telephone Interview with the Office of the Clerk, N.D. Ill. (Chicago office) (Dec.
29, 1997).
53. N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.21(A) (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on file
with author).
54. Id. 5.21(B).
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the court's subpoena power.55 The proposed rules repeatedly empha-
sized that attorneys must follow the restrictions on objections and in-
structions not to answer added by the 1993 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 6 They also indicated that judges
within the Northern District of Illinois expect attorneys at depositions
to treat witnesses and opposing counsel with the same courtesy and
respect they would show at trial,57 and to resolve disputes informally."
The proposed rules set time limits for seeking protective orders under
Rule 30(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure59 and imposed
strict limits on when the deponent's counsel can confer privately with
her client during a deposition.6" Although the Northern District of
Illinois did not adopt these extensive rules, the rules may provide a
guide for districts that seek to provide their practitioners with clear
directives about how depositions should be conducted. The proposed
rules would have undoubtedly changed the way depositions are con-
55. Id. 5.21(A).
56. See id. 5.22(A)-(C). The comment to the proposed rule included a recommenda-
tion from the Committee on Deposition Practice that the rules should contain language
"that reminds counsel of their obligation [s]" under Rule 30(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Id. 5.22 cmt.
57. Id. 5.21(C).
58. Id. 5.22(E) & cmt.
59. See id. 5.22(F) ("If a deposition is suspended because of an objecting counsel's
instruction not to answer and stated intention to proceed with a motion under [FED. R.
CIv. P.] 30(d)(3), objecting counsel must serve that motion within 10 days of the suspen-
sion of the deposition unless some longer or shorter time is agreed upon by the parties
60. Id. 5.23(B)-(D). The proposed rules sought to limit private communications dur-
ing depositions:
In order to prevent counsel for a deponent from improperly suggesting an-
swers or the content of testimony to a witness and to prevent disruption of the
deposition, during examination by any party or counsel other than the party of-
fering the deponent as a witness, no party or counsel, including the deponent's
counsel, shall communicate with the deponent (other than through on-the-rec-
ord interrogation) regarding the interrogation, the testimony or the facts of the
case. During interrogation by other counsel, counsel for the deponent may con-
fer with the deponent off-the-record only for the purpose of deciding whether to
assert a privilege .... This prohibition applies, without limitation, to all means of
communication and is applicable, without limitation, to all periods of examina-
tion of the witness by anyone other than counsel for the party offering the depo-
nent as witness. The prohibition, however, does not apply during ordinary and
necessary recesses taken during the deposition session, such as lunch breaks and
rest periods. Counsel for a deponent and the deponent shall not initiate breaks
or recesses for the purpose of engaging in communications to circumvent the
prohibitions of this Rule.
Id. 5.23(B). To determine whether the deponent or her counsel has violated section (B),
the examining attorney may ask the deponent with whom she has spoken. Id. 5.23(C).
After all other counsel have completed their examinations, the deponent and her counsel
may privately confer before the deponent's counsel examines the witness. Id. 5.23(D).
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ducted in the district, but for the better. In the future, hopefully Illi-
nois and other districts will reconsider these or similar conduct rules.
c. Scheduling Orders and Case Law.-In federal cases, all
phases of a civil deposition are subject to court control;61 the court
has discretion to issue orders designed to prevent abusive tactics dur-
ing depositions.6 2 Therefore, even when local rules do not address
deposition conduct, judges can control depositions through individ-
ual standing orders6" or rulings on discovery motions.64
One judge who has greatly impacted this area is Robert S. Gaw-
throp, III of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania. In a widely publicized opinion, Hall v. Clifton Precision,65
Judge Gawthrop gained the national spotlight by issuing strict guide-
lines for deposition conduct.6 6
During his client's deposition, plaintiff's counsel stated that, "at
any time if you want to stop and talk to me, all you have to do is
61. 8A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 211b, at 121
& n.ll (2d ed. 1994).
62. Id.; see also Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 527 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
63. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1995 WL
925664, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1995) (order stating, among other things, that (a) defend-
ing counsel may object to questions only "in a concise, non-suggestive, non-argumentative
manner"; (b) witnesses must answer questions unless their counsel can "in detail and with
sufficient clarity, state for the record the grounds under which the witness should not
answer as permitted by Rule 30(d)(1)"; and (c) witnesses and their counsel may not con-
duct private, off-the-record conferences during breaks or recesses, except to decide
whether to assert a privilege and only after the witness has specifically described the basis
for the consultation); In re All Pending & Future Liig. Before Hon. G. Ross Anderson, Jr.,
No. 6:93mc161 (D.S.C. Dec. 16, 1993), reprinted in S.C. Law., May-June 1994, at 42, 42-43
(order establishing deposition conduct guidelines for all cases pending in Judge Ander-
son's court); In re Braniff, Inc., Nos. 89-03325-BKC-6C1, 92-911, 1992 WL 261641, at *13-14
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 2, 1992) (order establishing deposition conduct rules for objections,
directions not to answer, private consultations between deponents and attorneys, and the
number of attorneys permitted to examine deponent); In re Domestic Air Transp. Antitrust
Litig., No. 1:90-CV-2485-MHS, MDL 861, 1990 WL 358009, at *8-9 (N.D. Ga. Dec. 21, 1990)
(order imposing restrictions on objections, instructions not to answer, and private confer-
ences); In re San Juan DuPont Plaza Hotel Fire Litig., No. MDL 721, 1989 WL 168401, at
*37-39 (D.P.R. Dec. 2, 1988) (order providing detailed rules concerning objections, direc-
tions not to answer, private consultations with deponents, and many other problems that
may arise during depositions).
64. See, e.g., Fashion Boutique of Short Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4544
(MGC), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4024, at *6-9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1994) (mem.) (order attach-
ing procedures and rules for conducting discovery in a case that involved discovery
disputes).
65. 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993).
66. Id. at 531-32; see also infra note 74 and accompanying text (listing cases in courts
around the country that have adopted Judge Gawthrop's very words); infra note 78
(describing a bench-bar conference that discussed implications of the ruling).
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indicate that to me. 67 Later, the deponent asked to confer with his
attorney about "the meaning of the word 'document."'68 The deposi-
tion was recessed, but when questioning resumed, the deponent asked
opposing counsel to define "document."69 Soon thereafter, defense
counsel showed the plaintiff-deponent a document and started to ask
questions about it.70 However, before defense counsel completed his
question, plaintiffs counsel interjected that "I've got to review it with
my client."7 1 Defense counsel objected to this tactic, and the attorneys
contacted the court, which ordered them to adjourn the deposition
and appear for a discovery conference.72
At the conference, plaintiffs counsel argued that an attorney has
a right to confer with his client at any time.71 Judge Gawthrop dis-
agreed. In a frequently quoted section of his opinion, Judge Gaw-
throp stated:
The underlying purpose of a deposition is to find out
what a witness saw, heard, or did-what the witness thinks. A
deposition is meant to be a question-and-answer conversa-
tion between the deposing lawyer and the witness. There is
no proper need for the witness's own lawyer to act as an in-
termediary, interpreting questions, deciding which questions
the witness should answer, and helping the witness to formu-
late answers. The witness comes to the deposition to testify,
not to indulge in a parody of Charlie McCarthy, with lawyers
coaching or bending the witness's words to mold a legally
convenient record. It is the witness-not the lawyer-who is
the witness.... Therefore, I hold that a lawyer and client do
not have an absolute right to confer during the course of the
client's deposition. 4
Judge Gawthrop also explained that although a lawyer has a right
to prepare a client for deposition, once the deposition begins, that
67. Hall 150 F.RD. at 526.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 528 (footnote omitted). The same or substantially similar language appears
in other cases. See Armstrong v. Hussmann Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299, 303 n.15 (E.D. Mo.
1995) (mem.); Frazier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 161 F.R.D. 309, 315 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (mem.); Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 2191, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995) (mem.); Van Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of
Science & Tech., 152 F.R.D. 179, 180 (S.D. Iowa 1993); Meehan v. Town Lyne House Res-
taurant, No. 925584C, 1994 WL 902907, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1994).
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right "is somewhat tempered by the underlying goal of our discovery
rules: getting to the truth. ''71 Judge Gawthrop recognized that pre-
trial depositions should be conducted like a trial: "During a civil trial,
a witness and his or her lawyer are not permitted to confer at their
pleasure during the witness's testimony. Once a witness has been pre-
pared and has taken the stand, that witness is on his or her own."76
Judge Gawthrop also held that this rule would hold true even if the
witness, not the attorney, initiated the conference.77 In addition,
Judge Gawthrop decided that these rules concerning private confer-
ences should apply during breaks agreed to by both counsel, such as
coffee breaks, lunch breaks, and evening recesses.7' He reasoned that
once the deposition begins, preparation ends.
79
Judge Gawthrop, however, did recognize one exception to the
no-conference rule. During a deposition, an attorney or witness may
request a private recess to discuss whether to assert a privilege. The
judge explained that a break to discuss a possible privilege is proper
because the attorney-client privilege is an important objection about
which a client is entitled to counsel. When a conference occurs for
the purpose of discussing privilege, the conferring attorney should
state for the record the fact that a conference occurred, the subject of
75. Hall 150 F.R.D. at 528.
76. Id. (footnote omitted). Judge Gawthrop continued:
The same is true at a deposition. The fact that there is no judge in the room
to prevent private conferences does not mean that such conferences should or
may occur. The underlying reason for preventing private conferences is still pres-
ent: they tend, at the very least, to give the appearance of obstructing the truth.
Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 529. At a bench-bar conference held in June 1994, Gawthrop clarified his
position on prohibiting conferences. When asked about talking to clients during a lengthy
hiatus in the deposition, Gawthrop acknowledged that, in Hall, he had not contemplated a
break stretching on for weeks or months. In that type of situation, Gawthrop responded
that "I'm not going to leave the hapless client floating around without a lawyer." Shannon
P. Duffy, Discovery Ruling Comes Under Fire: Merits of Gawthrop Opinion Debated by Bench-Bar
Panel LEGAL IN-rELUGENCER, June 28, 1994, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Lglint
File.
79. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 529. Otherwise, stated Judge Gawthrop, "[a] clever lawyer or
witness who finds that a deposition is going in an undesired or unanticipated direction
could simply insist on a short recess to discuss the unanticipated yet desired answers,
thereby circumventing the prohibition on private conferences." Id. The judge also noted
that to the extent improper conferences did occur during a deposition, the matters dis-
cussed between attorney and deponent would not be privileged. Id. at 529 n.7. Therefore,
opposing counsel could rightly inquire about what was discussed during the conference.
Id. Specifically, Judge Gawthrop stated: "Therefore, any such conferences are fair game
for inquiry by the deposing attorney to ascertain whether there has been any coaching and,
if so, what." Id.
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the conference, and the decision reached about whether to assert a
privilege. 0
Although it was not directly raised in the Hall plaintiffs deposi-
tion, the judge felt compelled to prohibit "on-the-record witness-
coaching through suggestive objections," because "the spirit of the
prohibition against private conferences could be flouted by a lawyer's
making of lengthy objections which contain information suggestive of
an answer to a pending question."8 ' Again comparing depositions to
trials, he noted that the Federal Rules of Evidence contain no rules
that permit a lawyer to make speaking objections during trial."'
Along with the opinion, Judge Gawthrop entered a nine-para-
graph order requiring the following:
* that the witness be instructed to ask deposing counsel,
not the witness's own counsel, for clarification and
explanations;
* that objections not be made during the deposition, unless
they are expressly permitted under Rule 32 (d) (3) (B) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are necessary to pre-
serve a privilege, or are interjected so counsel can seek a
protective order under Rule 30(d)(3);
* that counsel refrain from directing a witness not to an-
swer a question, unless counsel objects to the question on
grounds that the answer is privileged or that evidence on
that topic has been limited by the court;
• that counsel not make objections that might suggest an
answer to the deponent;
" that counsel and their witnesses not engage in private,
off-the-record conferences during depositions or breaks
in the deposition, except to decide whether to assert a
privilege; and
* that deposing counsel provide to the witness's counsel at
the deposition a copy of all documents shown to the
witness.83
Judge Gawthrop has expounded upon his Hall decision in two
other opinions. In Heller v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,84 he clarified that
the deponent's counsel need not remain "utterly mute.""5 Instead, he
explained that counsel has a duty "to interrupt to protect his client
80. Id. at 529-30.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 531-32.
84. Civil Action No. 95-3935, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11615 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 4, 1995).
85. Id. at *9 n.2.
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from overreaching and abuse by an opponent, provided it is done
within the rules." 6 In Langer v. Presbyterian Medical Center,8 7 Judge
Gawthrop sanctioned an attorney who improperly objected, in-
structed the witness not to answer on grounds other than privilege,"8
held several attorney-client conferences to discuss matters other than
whether to assert a privilege, 9 and made many unfounded privilege
objections.9 ° Even though the Langer deposition occurred before Hall
was decided,91 Judge Gawthrop believed that sanctions were appropri-
ate for the attorney's egregious deposition conduct.92 However, on
reconsideration, the judge vacated his order imposing sanctions in
Langer.3 Although he did not condone the deposition conduct, he
agreed with the offending law firm's position that the aggrieved party
waited too long to move for sanctions, thus procedurally barring the
sanctions motion.94
86. Id.
87. Civ. Action Nos. 87-4000, 91-1814, 88-1064, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2199 (E.D. Pa.
Feb. 17, 1995), vacated on reconsideration, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9448 (E.D. Pa. June 30,
1995).
88. Id. at *23. Judge Gawthrop noted that "[tihe deposition is peppered with objec-
tions on the basis of relevance and instructions that the witness refuse to answer on the
basis of relevance, form of the question, and 'asked and answered."' Id. Judge Gawthrop
reasoned that those objections were preserved for trial under Rule 32(d)(3) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and that counsel should not have raised the objection. If counsel
believed that the questions were harassing or oppressive, Gawthrop asserted, he should
have applied to the court for a protective order under Rule 30(d). Id. at *24.
89. Id. at *28-29. Judge Gawthrop believed that the attorney's "frequent conferences
with the witness, between question and answer, [led] to the inference, the appearance, of
tainted testimony, the parroted product of counsel's coachings, rather than the witness's
actual recollection." Id. at *29.
90. Id. at *30-31. The judge observed that the attorney's "improper invocation of the
privilege belies the assertion that he was merely preventing the disclosure of privileged
information, as opposed to obstructing discovery of damaging testimony." Id. at *30.
91. See id. at *29 n.4.
92. Id. at *37-39. Judge Gawthrop summarized the offending lawyer's conduct as
follows:
At a deposition, one may neither take the witness nor the law into one's own
hands. Here, counsel, figuratively or literally, did both. The deposition is a
"question-and-answer conversation between the deposing lawyer and the witness."
Hall 150 F.R.D. at 528. [The deponent's attorney] turned this concept on its
head, injecting himself as the dominant voice during the examination in order to
obstruct the discovery of damaging testimony, impermissibly roadblocking the
path to the truth.
Id. at *37.
93. Langer v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., Nos. 87-4000, 91-1814, 88-1064, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9448 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995).
94. Id. at *4-12. Judge Gawthrop applied a Third Circuit "supervisory rule," based on
Mary Ann Pensiero, Inc. v. Lingle, 847 F.2d 90, 99-100 (3d Cir. 1988), which held that mo-
tions for Rule 11 sanctions must be filed before the entry of a final judgment. See Langer,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9448, at *4 & n.2. Although the sanctions motion was not filed
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Other judges sitting in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania have
embraced the rules for deposition conduct Judge Gawthrop articu-
lated in Hall.95 In addition, the Hall holding has been adopted, at
least in part, by several other courts.96 Judge Gawthrop's opinion
under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Judge Gawthrop interpreted the
Lingle rule to extend to other types of sanctions motions as well. Id. at *5, 9. Because the
motion was filed after judgment was entered, the motion was procedurally barred. Id. at
*11-12.
95. See, e.g., O'Brien v. Amtrak, 163 F.R.D. 232, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.) (Joyner,J.)
(noting that the guidelines established in Hall are "intended to ensure that a witness's
words are placed on the record, not an attorney's"); Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint
Corp., No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2191, at *3-4 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995)
(mem.) (Naythons,J.) (declaring that "[t]his [c]ourt is bound by the decision in Hall" and
that this court "us[es] its holding not only as guidance, but as controlling directive"); Fra-
zier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 161 F.R.D. 309, 315 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.)
(Joyner, J.) (quoting Halts description of proper deposition procedure); Christy v. Penn-
sylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 160 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.) (Joyner, J.) (stating
that Hall "severely restricts the communications that can take place between witnesses and
their counsel during a deposition," but distinguishing the case at bar from Hall because
Hall "does not limit in any way communications between witnesses and counsel prior to
depositions");Johnson v. Wayne Manor Apts., 152 F.R.D. 56, 58-59 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (mem.)
(Joyner, J.) (relying on Halts guidelines in determining whether deposition conduct com-
plied with federal discovery rules).
96. See, e.g., In re Amezaga, 195 B.R. 221, 227-28 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1996) (noting that
"counsel may not instruct deponent not to answer questions posed by opposing counsel
except in particular situations"); Damaj v. Farmers Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 559, 561 (N.D.
Okla. 1995) (explaining that while the court would not implement "the full range of Hall
restrictions," it would "impose ... requirements for the conduct of further depositions");
Armstrong v. Hussmann Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299, 303 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (mem.) (citing with
favor Halts restrictions on counsel's conduct at depositions); Bucher v. Richardson Hosp.
Auth., 160 F.RD. 88, 94-95 (N.D. Tex. 1994) (mem.) ("It is improper for an intermediary
to interpret questions and help the witness formulate answers."); Chapsky v. Baxter V.
Mueller Div., Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 93 C 6524, 1994 WL 327348, at *1 (N.D. Ill.July
6, 1994) (mem.) (noting that "private conferences during a deposition between a depo-
nent and his or her attorney for any purpose other than to decide whether to assert a
privilege are not permitted"); Phillips v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 92 Civ.
8527 (KTD), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3748, at *12-13 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994) (quoting Hall
and explaining that the witness, not the witness's attorney, should "make the determina-
tion as to whether a question is clear and answer to the best of his or her ability"); Van
Pilsum v. Iowa State Univ. of Science & Tech., 152 F.R.D. 179, 180-81 (S.D. Iowa 1993)
(quoting Hall and sanctioning attorney for numerous "groundless" objections); cf Ethicon
Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 160 F.R.D. 98, 99 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (restrict-
ing deposition conduct in a manner similar to Hall without citing the case). Some state
courts have also embraced the Hall rationale. See, e.g., Paramount Communications, Inc. v.
QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 55-56 & nn.34, 36 & 37 (Del. 1994) (employing Halts
reasoning for prohibitions against attorneys' "coaching" deposition witnesses and making
superfluous objections); Operator Serv. Co. v. Croteau, No. CL961672AI, order at 2 (Fla.
Cir. Ct., 15thJud. Dist., Palm Beach County Aug. 5, 1996) (Order on Motions to Compel,
for Sanctions for Discovery Abuse, and to Appoint a Special Master to Supervise Deposition
Proceedings) (indicating that Halts reasoning was persuasive and ruling that holding "off-
record deposition conferences" while questions were pending was "improper") (on file
with author); Cholfin v. Gordon, Civ. Action No. CA943623, 1995 WL 809916, at *10
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grabbed the attention of judges and practitioners, and it refocused
attention on legal and ethical dilemmas that frequently arise during
depositions.9 7 In Hall, Judge Gawthrop made a significant contribu-
tion to the case law on deposition conduct. The opinion, however, is
controversial due to its strictness, and it is not followed in all
jurisdictions.98
2. State Courts.-
a. Court Rules.-Although this Article will focus primarily on
depositions taken in federal court, it is important not to ignore rules
(Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1995) (mem.) (quoting Halts aspiration that "[t]here is no
proper need for the witness's own lawyer to act as an intermediary" during depositions);
Meehan v. Town Lyne House Restaurant, No. 925584C, 1994 WL 902907, at *1 (Mass.
Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1994) (citing Hall to indicate that attorney "coaching" during deposi-
tions was "wholly inconsistent with the purpose of the discovery process and the obligations
imposed on attorneys while the process is going forward"); Corsini v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 630
N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (App. Div. 1995) ("A lawyer's duty to refrain from uncivil and abusive
behavior is not diminished because the site of the proceeding is a deposition room, or law
office, rather than a courtroom.").
97. See generally Duffy, supra note 78 (describing a bench-bar conference that discussed
implications of the ruling).
98. See Odone v. Croda Int'l P.L.C., 170 F.R.D. 66, 68 (D.D.C. 1997) (mem.) (maintain-
ing that this court is not "bound by the litany of deposition restrictions and prohibitions
[that Hall] outlines" and interpreting Halts holding as not placing "a blanket prohibition"
on attorney-client conferences).
In Acri v. Golden Triangle Management Acceptance Co., 142 Prr. LEGAL J. 225 (Pa. Ct.
C.P., Allegheny County 1994), the court chose not to follow the Hall guidelines for a
number of reasons:
(1) they prohibit counsel for a party being deposed from raising objections that
our discovery rules specifically allow; (2) they provide insufficient protection to
the deponent; (3) they can produce results that could not have been intended;'
(4) they fail to recognize the proper role of counsel; (5) they increase the burden
and expense of litigation; and (6) they are not necessary to curb the discovery
abuses which are described in the Hall v. Clifon Precision opinion.
Id. at 228. The court further expounded:
It is my experience that more often than not intervention by counsel for the de-
ponent shortens the deposition by requiring the deposing counsel to focus on
relevant matters and to allow the witness to fully respond in the witness's own
language. Depositions taken by certain attorneys would never end if other coun-
sel could not raise objections that the questions are repetitive or
argumentative....
We need not turn the lawyer for the deponent into a fly on the wall in order
to protect litigants' rights to obtain information from a witness in a witness's own
language through depositions by oral examination. If the misbehavior of the de-
ponent's counsel becomes a recurring and serious problem, counsel for the de-
posing party can discontinue the deposition and request judicial intervention. As
a discovery judge, I will review a transcript of the discontinued deposition and if I
agree with counsel for the deposing party that counsel for the deponent was at-
tempting to sabotage proper efforts to obtain discovery, I will tailor an order that
will protect the interests of the deposing party.
Id. at 230.
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that control state-court depositions. Some states have statutes that
track the current version of Rule 30 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure;9 9 however, most states still track the pre-1993 version of this
rule.10 0 A few states have deposition conduct rules that are less rigor-
ous than even the pre-1993 federal rules,1"1 while a few others have
exceeded the federal rules.10 2 As in federal court, some state courts
also have attempted to regulate deposition conduct through standing
orders. 103
At this point, New Jersey is the state with the most progressive
rules. New Jersey Superior, Tax and Surrogate's Courts Rule 4:14-3
limits the type of objections that can be raised to "those addressed to
the form of a question or to assert a privilege, a right to confidentiality
or a limitation pursuant to a previously entered court order."1 4 The
rule also directs that an objection concerning the form of the ques-
tion must include a statement about why the question is defective so
99. See, e.g., ARK. R. Crv. P. 30; COLO. R. Crv. P. 30; CONN. SUPER. CT. R. § 247; FLA. R_
Crv. P. 1.310; Ky. R. Civ. P. 30.03, 30.04; MINN. R. Civ. P. 30; R.I. SUPER. CT. R. Crv. P. 30;
VT. R. CIv. P. 30; Wyo. R. Civ. P. 30.
100. See, e.g., ALA. Sup. CT. R. 30; ALAsKA R. CIrv. P. 30; ARIz. R. CIrv. P. 30; D.C. SUPER.
CT. Civ. P. R. 30; GA. R. Civ. PRAc. 30; HAw. R. Civ. P. 30; IDAHo R. CIv. P. 30; IND. R. TRIAL
P. 30; IowA R. Civ. P. 148; KAN. R_ Civ. P. 60-230; LA. STAT. ANN. arts. 1443, 1444 (West
1984 & Supp. 1997); ME. K. Crv. P. 30; MAss. R. Civ. P. 30; Miss. R. Crv. P. 30; Mo. Sup. CT.
R. CIv. P. 57.03; MoNT. R. Civ. P. 30; NEV. CT. R. 30; N.M. DiST. CT. R. Civ. P. 1-030; N.Y.
C.P.L.R. 3113; N.C. R. Civ. P. 30; N.D. R. Crv. P. 30; OHIo R. Civ. P. 30; OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 12, § 3230 (West Supp. 1998); OR. R. Civ. P. 39; PA. R. Civ. P. 4011, 4016; S.C. R. Civ. P.
30; S.D. CT. R. 15-6-30(c); TENN. R. Civ. P. 30; UTAH R. Crv. P. 30; VA. Sup. CT. K. 4:5;
WASH. SUPER. CT. R. 30; W. VA. TRLAL CT. REC. R. Civ. P. 30; Wis. R. Civ. P. 804.05.
101. See, e.g., ILL. Sup. CT. R. 206 (omitting the references to instructions not to answer
and to non-suggestive objections); MICH. CT. R. Civ. P. 2.306 (addressing the assertion of
privilege, but omitting references to non-suggestive objections and to instructions not to
answer); NEB. R. Civ. P. 25-1242 (merely defining "deposition"); N.H. SUPER. CT. R. 37-44
(primarily discussing notice requirements); TEX. DisT. & CouNrY CTs. R. CIv. P. 204 (dis-
cussing the waiver and preservation of objections without indicating the nature of proper
objections).
102. For example, the Delaware rule provides:
From the commencement until the conclusion of a deposition, including any re-
cesses or continuances thereof of less than five calendar days, the attorney(s) for
the deponent shall not: (A) consult or confer with the deponent regarding the
substance of the testimony already given or anticipated to be given, except for the
purpose of conferring on whether to assert a privilege against testifying or on how
to comply with a court order, or (B) suggest to the deponent the manner in
which any questions should be answered.
DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 30(d).
103. See, e.g., Cascella v. GDV, Inc., Civ. Action No. 5899, 1981 Del. Ch. LEXIS 455 (Del.
Ch. Jan. 15, 1981) (confirming the court's earlier ruling that curtailed the scope of attor-
neys' instructions to deponents not to answer but allowing exceptions in circumstances
where the answer would disclose privileged information).
104. N.J. SUPER. T. & SUR. CTs. R. 4:14-3(c).
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the questioning attorney can amend the question. 0 5 However, "[n]o
objection shall be expressed in language that suggests an answer to
the deponent."10 6
The prohibition on instructions not to answer differs slightly
from the federal rule. The NewJersey rule states that an attorney may
instruct a client not to answer only if "the basis of the objection is
privilege, a right to confidentiality or a limitation pursuant to a previ-
ously entered court order.' 0 7 The New Jersey rule also differs from
the federal rule by addressing adjournments and private confer-
ences. 108 With regard to adjournments, the rule provides that, except
in limited circumstances, a deposition must be taken continuously
and without adjournment unless the court orders otherwise or the
parties and deponent stipulate.'0 9 Further, once the deponent has
been sworn, the defending attorney cannot communicate with the de-
ponent "during the course of the deposition while testimony is being
taken except with regard to the assertion of a claim of privilege, a
right to confidentiality or a limitation pursuant to a previously entered
court order."110
Like the federal rules, state-court rules are not exhaustive. They
do not address all serious abuses and do not deal with important ethi-
cal concerns. Moreover, among states that have traditionally pat-
terned their rules of civil procedure after the federal rules, some have
lagged in adopting revisions that track the 1993 amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' This lag has added to the confu-
sion about what constitutes proper deposition conduct. For example,
while instructions not to answer have been severely limited in federal
court, many state courts have not imposed those same restrictions.-" .
Because the 1993 version of the federal rules contains more specific
guidance about proper deposition conduct,1"' state legislatures
should consider amending their rules either to track or exceed the
federal rules as soon as is practicable.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. Contra FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) (1) ("A party may instruct a deponent not to answer
only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by
the court, or to present a motion under [FED. R. Clv. P. 30(d)(3)].").
108. See N.J. SUPER. T. & SUR. CTs. R. 4:14-3(d), (f).
109. Id. 4:14-3(d).
110. Id. 4:14-3(f).
111. See supra notes 100-101 and accompanying text.
112. See supra note 101.
113. See supra notes 25-31 and accompanying text.
[VOL. 57:273
1998] Tm LAw AND ETHics OF CMIL DEPOSITIONS
b. Case Law. -- State courts have also faced their fair share of
cases concerning deposition misconduct. The most extensively publi-
cized case concerning state-court deposition misconduct is Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc.,14 in which a Delaware supe-
rior court raised, sua sponte, the issue of appropriate deposition
behavior.1
1 5
According to the Paramount Communications court, "[] ne particu-
lar instance of misconduct during a deposition in this case demon-
strates such an astonishing lack of professionalism and civility that it is
worthy of special note here as a lesson for the future-a lesson of
conduct not to be tolerated or repeated."1 6 During the deposition of
a corporate representative, Texas attorney Joseph D. Jamail117 repre-
sented the deponent, a director of Paramount Communications.
1 8
The court concluded thatJamail's deposition conduct was abusive be-
cause he "improperly directed the witness not to answer certain ques-
tions,"11 raised many improper objections that suggested answers to
the deponent, 120 engaged in lengthy colloquies, 21 was "extraordina-
rily rude, uncivil, and vulgar,"122 and "obstructed the ability of the
questioner to elicit testimony to assist the Court in this matter." 1 2
114. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). The deposition was recounted widely in the legal and
nonlegal media. See, e.g., William A. Brewer III &John W. Bickel, Etiquette of the Advocate?,
TEX. LAW., Mar. 21, 1994, at 20, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Txlawr File; Debra
Cassens Moss & Stephanie B. Goldberg, No Ordinary Joe, AB.A J., May 1994, at 44; John Ira
Pe, Jamail Not Going to Delaware, Hous. Posr, Feb. 8, 1994, at C4, available in LEXIS, Tex
Library, Txnews File; Brenda Sapino, Jamail Unfazed by Delaware Court's Blast, TEX. LAW.,
Feb. 14, 1994, at 11, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Txlawr File; Jerry Urban, State Bar
to Review Lawyer Rebuked by Delaware Court, Hous. CHRON., Feb. 15, 1994, at A15, available in
LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File; Benjamin Weiser, Are Too! Am Not! Are Too! Am Not!
Judges Try to Impose a Civil Tone as Depositions Get Increasingly Down and Dirty, WASH. POST,
Mar. 10, 1994, at B10, available in 1994 WL 2275495.
115. Paramount Communications, 637 A.2d at 52 & n.23. No party or attorney complained
to the court about the deposition addressed in the opinion. Instead, the deposition tran-
script was submitted to the court as part of the record on appeal. Id. at 52. The court
raised the matter "as part of [its] exclusive supervisory responsibility to regulate and en-
force appropriate conduct of lawyers appearing in Delaware proceedings." Id. at 52 n.23.
116. Id. at 52.
117. Joseph D. Jamail is a litigator in Houston, Texas, who won national recognition for
his now-famous $10.53 billion verdict when he represented Pennzoil in its suit against Tex-
aco. Miriam Rozen, JoeJamail's Life in Litigator Heaven, AM. LAw., Oct. 1988, at 40, available
in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Amlawr File. This was notJamail's only brush with deposition
incivility. See infra note 484 (describing the Fat Boy/Mr. Hairpiece incident).
118. Paramount Communications, 637 A.2d at 52. The court noted that Mr. Jamail did not
appear in the Delaware proceeding and was not admitted to practice pro hac vice. Id.
119. Id. at 53.
120. Id. at 56.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 53.
123. Id. The following excerpt illustrates Jamail's deposition demeanor:
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Although the court recognized that an attorney has a duty to ad-
vocate staunchly for his client, the court also emphasized that "it is a
mark of professionalism, not weakness, for a lawyer zealously and
firmly to protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests by a profes-
sional, courteous, and civil attitude toward all persons involved in the
litigation process." 124 The court indicated that had Jamail been ad-
mitted to practice in Delaware, it would have at least censured him
and imposed heavy sanctions. 125
Paramount Communications has provided Delaware attorneys with
guidelines about how to act during depositions. However, in many
states, most discovery disputes never advance to the appellate level,
and most state courts do not publish their trial courts' decisions. 126
Consequently, less guidance exists about proper deposition con-
duct.127 This lack of published case law should serve as yet another
impetus for state legislatures to consider quickly more comprehensive
civil procedure rules concerning deposition conduct.
Q. (By Mr. Johnston [Delaware counsel for QVC]) Okay. Do you have any
idea why Mr. Oresman was calling that material to your attention?
MR JAMAIL: Don't answer that.
How would he know what was going on in Mr. Oresman's mind?
Don't answer it.
Go on to your next question.
MR JOHNSTON: No, Joe -
MR. JAMAIL: He's not going to answer that. Certify it. I'm going to shut it
down if you don't go to your next question.
MR. JOHNSTON: No. Joe, Joe -
MR. JAMAIL: Don't "Joe" me, asshole. You can ask some questions, but get
off of that. I'm tired of you. You could gag a maggot off a meat wagon. Now,
we've helped you every way we can.
Id. at 53-54 (alteration in original).
124. Id. at 54.
125. Id. at 55. The court also warned Delaware counsel to be careful about sponsoring
out-of-state lawyers' pro hac vice motions and cautioned that Delaware attorneys should
not passively allow deposition abuse to occur. Id. at 55-56.
126. See RobertJ. Martineau, Restrictions on Publication and Citation ofJudicial Opinions: A
Reassessment, 28 U. MicH. J.L. REFORM 119, 130 (1994).
127. See Mark A. Cohen, Courts Cracking Down on Discovery Abuse by Attorneys: "Irritated"
Judges Imposing More Sanctions, MAss. L. WKLY., Sept. 2, 1996, at 1, available in LEXIS,
Legnew Library, Malawr File ("Because appellate courts rarely pass on discovery matters,
Massachusetts has little precedential authority to guide the discovery conduct of lawyers.");
cf Bergstein, supra note 18 (describing a "litany" of "dirty" deposition tactics and the
problems associated with remedying them).
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B. Ethical Codes
As one commentator noted, "discovery abuse is a function of pro-
fessional ethics."12 8 Ironically, neither the Model Code of Professional Re-
sponsibility nor the Model Rules of Professional Conduct specifically
mentions depositions.' 2 9 This does not mean, however, that these
sources do not contain rules that affect deposition conduct. 30
The American Bar Association adopted the Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility in 1969. "1 The Model Code is divided into three
sections: Canons, Ethical Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules.13 2
Ethical Considerations (ECs) are "aspirational in character and repre-
sent the objectives toward which every member of the profession
should strive,""3' while Disciplinary Rules (DRs) are mandatory and
state the outer limits of acceptable behavior.' 34 Both the Ethical Con-
siderations and the Disciplinary Rules derive from the Canons, which
are "statements of axiomatic norms.'13 5
Even though the Model Code does not expressly mention discov-
ery or depositions, its Ethical Considerations and Disciplinary Rules
apply when an attorney prepares a witness to give deposition testi-
128. Robert E. Sarazen, Note, An Ethical Approach to Discovery Abuse, 4 GEo. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 459, 470 (1990).
129. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982); MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (1994).
130. See, e.g., MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4 (describing a lawyer's
obligation of fairness to the opposing party and counsel, including not assisting a witness
to testify falsely); id. Rule 4.4 (explaining that respecting the right of third persons in-
cludes not using means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or
burden).
131. STEPHEN GiLERS & Roy D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF LAWYERS: STATUTES AND
STANDARDS 421 (1997). By 1980, almost every state had adopted a code of professional
responsibility based on the Model Code. Id. Today, however, only a small minority of
states still base their professionalism rules on the Model Code. These states include the
following: Alaska, Georgia, Massachusetts, Nebraska, NewYork, Ohio, Oregon, Tennessee,
Vermont, and Virginia. See 2 GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & W. WILLIAM HONEs, THE LAw OF
LAWYERING: A HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT § AP4:107, at
1269-70 (2d ed. 1994 & Supp. 1997) (listing the states that have adopted the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct). Additionally, in California, "the rules of discipline follow the format
of neither the Code nor the Model Rules, but borrow considerable substance from each."
Id. § AP4:101, at 1255 n.1. Moreover, North Carolina, Michigan, and Illinois are counted
as having adopted the Model Rules, yet these states still retain some of the language of the
Model Code. Id. § AP4:101, at 1255-56 n.1.
132. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY preliminary statement 1.
133. Id. preliminary statement 4.
134. See id. preliminary statement 5 ("The Disciplinary Rules [DR], unlike the Ethical
Considerations [EC], are mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the mini-
mum level of conduct below which no lawyer can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action.").
135. Id. preliminary statement 3.
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mony, defends a witness during a deposition, and questions a witness
during the deposition. Specifically, the Model Code provides that an
attorney may not prepare or counsel his witness to present false testi-
mony or evidence or to suppress evidence that he or his client has a
legal obligation to produce.13 6 It also provides that an attorney must
protect his client's confidences.13 7 Further, the Model Code prohibits
an attorney from asking questions or engaging in conduct merely to
harass or embarrass.1 3 8 The Model Code also instructs lawyers that
they should treat each other, and the tribunal, with courtesy and re-
spect.1 3 9 Most importantly, the Model Code clearly indicates that
136. For example, one Ethical Consideration states:
Fraudulent, deceptive, or otherwise illegal conduct by a participant in a proceed-
ing before a tribunal .. . is inconsistent with fair administration ofjustice, and it
should never be participated in or condoned by lawyers. Unless constrained by
his obligation to preserve the confidences and secrets of his client, a lawyer
should reveal to appropriate authorities any knowledge he may have of such im-
proper conduct.
Id. EC 8-5; accord id. DR 1-102 (A) (4) (prohibiting a lawyer from "[e]ngag[ing] in conduct
involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation"); id. DR 7-102(A) (3) (prohibit-
ing a lawyer from "conceal [ing] or knowingly fail [ing] to disclose that which he is required
by law to reveal"); id. DR 7-102(A)(7) (prohibiting a lawyer from "[c]ounsel[ing or as-
sist[ing] his client in conduct that the lawyer knows to be illegal or fraudulent"); id. EC
7-26 ("The law and Disciplinary Rules prohibit the use of fraudulent, false, or perjured
testimony or evidence. A lawyer who knowingly participates in introduction of such testi-
mony or evidence is subject to discipline." (footnote omitted)); id. EC 7-27 ("Because it
interferes with the proper administration ofjustice, a lawyer should not suppress evidence
that he or his client has a legal obligation to reveal or produce.").
137. See id. EC 4-1 ("Both the fiduciary relationship existing between lawyer and client
and the proper functioning of the legal system require the preservation by the lawyer of
confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ him.").
138. One Disciplinary Rule is particularly telling:
In appearing in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not:
(1) State or allude to any matter that he has no reasonable basis to believe is
relevant to the case or that will not be supported by admissible evidence.
(2) Ask any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is relevant to
the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other person ....
(6) Engage in undignified or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a
tribunal.
(7) Intentionally or habitually violate any established rule of procedure or of
evidence.
Id. DR 7-106(C) (footnotes omitted); see also id. DR 7-102(A) (1) ("In his representation of
a client, a lawyer shall not ... [f]ile a suit, assert a position, conduct a defense, delay a trial,
or take other action on behalf of his client when he knows or when it is obvious that such
action would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another."); id. EC 7-25 (directing
that "a lawyer should not ask a witness a question solely for the purpose of harassing or
embarrassing him").
139. Ethical Consideration 7-37 provides:
In adversary proceedings, clients are litigants and though ill feeling may exist
between clients, such ill feeling should not influence a lawyer in his conduct,
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while attorneys have a duty to represent each client with zeal, 4 ' this
duty is not violated by complying with procedural rules or by treating
adversaries with civility."' Indeed, the Model Code provides that vio-
lating procedural rules may also constitute an ethical violation.
14 2
In 1983, the ABA replaced its Model Code with the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct.'4 3 Like the Model Code, the Model Rules direct
attorneys to "zealously assert[ ] the client's position under the rules of
the adversary system." '1 44 The Model Rules declare that a lawyer "shall
act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a cli-
ent" '4 5 and "shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation con-
sistent with the interests of the client."' 1
46
attitude, and demeanor towards opposing lawyers. A lawyer should not make un-
fair or derogatory personal reference to opposing counsel. Haranguing and of-
fensive tactics by lawyers interfere with the orderly administration of justice and
have no proper place in our legal system.
Id. EC 7-37 (footnote omitted).
140. See id. DR 7-101 (A) (1) ("A lawyer shall not intentionally... [flail to seek the lawful
objectives of his client through reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disci-
plinary Rules .... A lawyer does not violate this Disciplinary Rule ... by .. .avoiding
offensive tactics, or by treating [others] with courtesy and consideration." (footnotes omit-
ted)); id. EC 7-1 ("The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to
represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law, which includes Disciplinary
Rules and enforceable professional regulations." (footnotes omitted)).
141. See id. EC 7-19 ("The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to the legal system
are the same: to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law."); id. EC 7-20
("Not only must there be competent, adverse presentation of evidence and issues, but a
tribunal must be aided by rules appropriate to an effective and dignified process."); id. EC
7-25 ("[W] hile a lawyer may take steps in good faith and within the framework of the law to
test the validity of rules, he is not justified in consciously violating such rules and he should
be diligent in his efforts to guard against his unintentional violation of them."); id. EC 7-36
("Although a lawyer has the duty to represent his client zealously, he should not engage in
any conduct that offends the dignity and decorum of [judicial] proceedings."); id. EC 7-38
("A lawyer should be courteous to opposing counsel and should accede to reasonable re-
quests regarding court proceedings, settings, continuances, waiver of procedural formali-
ties, and similar matters which do not prejudice the rights of his client."); id. EC 7-39
("[P]roper functioning of the adversary system depends upon cooperation between law-
yers and tribunals in utilizing procedures which will preserve the impartiality of the tribu-
nal .. .without impinging upon the obligation of the lawyer to represent his client
zealously within the framework of the law.").
142. See supra notes 140-141 and accompanying text (citing parts of the Model Code
which address the ethical obligations involving procedural rules).
143. 2 HAzARD & HODES, supra note 131, § AP4:101, at 1255. Today, at least 38 states
and the District of Columbia have adopted all or significant portions of the Model Rules.
See id. § AP4:107, at 1269-70 (listing states that have adopted the Model Rules); see also
supra note 131 (explaining that some states have adopted the Model Rules while retaining
some language from the Model Code).
144. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. 2 (1994).
145. Id. Rule 1.3.
146. Id. Rule 3.2.
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However, the Model Rules also require an attorney representing
a client to "demonstrate respect for the legal system and for those who
serve it, including judges, other lawyers and public officials., 14 7 Also,
as under the Model Code, an attorney may not knowingly offer or
assist her client to offer false evidence. 148
Unlike the Model Code, the Model Rules actually mention pre-
trial discovery. Model Rule 3.4(d) provides that "[a] lawyer shall not
... in pretrial procedure, make a frivolous discovery request or fail to
make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper discov-
ery request by an opposing party."149 As the comments to this rule
explain, "Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by
prohibitions against. .. obstructive tactics in discovery procedure."' 50
In addition, the Model Rules forbid attorneys to use discovery meth-
ods "that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay,
or burden a third person."'' Finally, an attorney who violates any
other ethics rule automatically violates Rule 8.4, which proscribes con-
duct that violates or attempts to violate the rules of professional con-
duct, conduct that involves dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or
misrepresentation, and conduct prejudicial to the administration of
justice. 15 2
As noted above, both the Model Rules and Model Code impose
conflicting duties on attorneys.' 51 Moreover, attorneys conducting or
defending depositions cannot fulfill their ethical responsibilities with-
out reference and adherence to court rules and controlling case
147. Id. pmbl. 4; see also id. Rule 8.4(d) ("It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to
... engage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration of justice.").
148. Rule 3.4 provides:
A lawyer shall not:
(a) unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to do any such act;
(b) . . . counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely... ;
(c) knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation exists ....
Id. Rule 3.4; accord id. Rule 3.3(a) (4) ("A lawyer shall not knowingly... offer evidence that
the lawyer knows to be false.").
149. Id. Rule 3.4(d).
150. Id. Rule 3.4 cmt.
151. Id. Rule 4.4; see also id. cmt. (indicating that an attorney's responsibility to a client
"does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons").
152. Id. Rule 8.4(a), (c), (d); see also Robertson's Case, 626 A.2d 397, 400 (N.H. 1993)
(declaring that "[t]he violation of Rule 4.4 automatically violates Rule 8.4(a)").
153. See, e.g., supra note 1 and accompanying text (explaining the various responsibilities
and allegiances of attorneys).
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law.154 In addition, because the mandatory ethical rules are very
broad155 and do not contain specific guidance regarding deposition
conduct or other discovery procedures,156 some bar associations have
attempted to provide that guidance in the form of aspirational civility
or conduct codes.
157
154. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT pmbl. 13 ("The Rules presuppose a
larger legal context shaping the lawyer's role. That context includes court rules'and stat-
utes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of lawyers and sub-
stantive and procedural law in general.").
155. See id. ("The Rules simply provide a framework for the ethical practice of law.").
156. See supra notes 129-142 and accompanying text (providing examples of Ethical Con-
siderations in the Model Code that can be applied to deposition conduct or other discov-
ery procedures but that do not contain specific guidance regarding the same); cf supra
notes 149-151 and accompanying text (providing examples of the broad scope of the
Model Rules applying to discovery).
157. Several jurisdictions have adopted some type of aspirational conduct code. See ALA-
RAMA STATE BAR, A LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1991); MOBILE BAR ASs'N, A LAW-
YER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM (Ala. 1986); STATE BAR OF ARIZONA, A LAWYER'S CODE OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1989); PULASKI COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY
(Ark. 1986); BEVERLY HILLS BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Cal.
1989); CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Cal.
1993); Los ANGELES CourYrv BAR Ass'N, LITIGATION GUIDELINES (Cal. 1989); ORANGE
COUNTY BAR ASS'N, GOALS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Cal. 1990); SACRAMENTO COUNTY
BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Cal. 1994); SAN DIEGO COUNTY BAR
ASS'N, CIVIL LITIGATION CODE OF CONDUCT (Cal. 1990); SANTA CLARA COUNTY BAR ASS'N,
CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM (Cal. 1992); COLORADO BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S PRINCIPLES OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1990); BOULDER COUNTY BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COUR-
TESY (Colo. 1990); DENVER BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM (Colo. 1992); EL
PASO COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Colo. 1989); CONNCTictrr BAR
Ass'N, LAWYERS' PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONALISM (1994); DELAWARE STATE BAR ASS'N, STATE-
MENT OF PRINCIPLES OF LAWYER CONDUCT (1991); DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR, STANDARDS
FOR CVLITY IN PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1997); FLORIDA BAR ASS'N, IDEAS AND GOALS OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1990); THE FLORIDA BAR TRIAL LAWYERS SECTION, GUIDELINES FOR PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995); HILLSBOROUGH COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFES-
SIONAL COURTESY (Fla. 1987); ORANGE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL
COURTESY (Fla. 1990); PALM BEACH COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL COUR-
TESY (Fla. 1990); ST. PETERSBURG BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Fla.
1992); TALLAHASSEE BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Fla. 1990); HAWAII STATE
BAR FAMILY LAW SECTION, GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY AND CILITY (1995); Ev-
ANSVILLE BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Ind. 1990); INDIANAPOLIS BAR ASS'N,
TENETS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Ind. 1989); IOWA STATE BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONALISM (1991); KANSAS BAR ASS'N, HALLMARKS OF THE PROFESSIONAL (1988); JOHNSON
COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CREED OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Kan. 1989); WICHITA BAR ASS'N,
TENETS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Kan. 1993); KENTUCKY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL COURTESY (1993); LOUISVILLE BAR ASS'N, CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Ky. 1989);
LOUISIANA STATE BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM (1991); LOUISIANA TRIAL LAWYERS
ASS'N, LAWYER'S CREED (n.d.); BATON ROUGE BAR ASS'N, ATTORNEY'S CREED OF PROFESSION-
ALISM (La. 1990); SHREVEPORT BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (La.
1988); MARYLAND STATE BAR ASS'N, CODE OF CIVLITY (1997); BAR ASS'N OF MONTGOMERY
COUNTY, LAWYERS' CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Md. 1992); PRINCE GEORGE'S COUNTY BAR
ASS'N, LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Md. 1989); MASSACHUSETTS BAR ASS'N, STATE-
MENT ON LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM (1989); BOSTON BAR ASS'N, CIVILITY STANDARDS FOR
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C. Civility and Courtesy Codes
Many civility or conduct codes were formulated in the 1980s
and 1990s,158 during the era of the "Rambo litigator.'"159 Because
CIVIL LITIGATION (Mass. 1994); GENESEE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS FOR PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT WITHIN MICHIGAN'S SEVENTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (Mich. 1994); GRAND RAPIDS BAR
ASS'N, MISSION STATEMENT (Mich. 1989); UNITED STATES DisTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN
DISTRICr OF MICHIGAN, CIVLTY PRINCIPLES (1996); MISSISSIPPI STATE BAR, MISSISSIPPI CODE
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1990); HINDS COUNTY BAR ASS'N, PLEDGE OF PROFESSIONALISM
(Miss. 1988); LAFAYETrE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Miss. n.d.);
THE MISSOURI BAR, TENETS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1987); THE BAR ASS'N OF METRO-
POLITAN ST. Louis, TENETS OF PROFESSIONALISM (Mo. 1990); STATE BAR OF MONTANA,
GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BETWEEN LAWYERS AND CLIENTS, GUIDELINES FOR RELATIONS BE-
TWEEN AND AMONG LAWYERS (1986); STATE OF NEBRASKA, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM
(1994); CAMDEN COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONALISM (N.J. 1991); STATE BAR OF
NEW MEXICO, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1989); NEW YORK STATE BAR ASS'N,
GUIDELINES ON CIVILITY IN LITIGATION (1995); BROOKLYN BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL-
ISM (N.Y. 1989); MONROE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (N.Y.
1994); NORTH CAROLINA BAR ASS'N, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1989); NORTH
CAROLINA WAKE COUNTY/TENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT BAR, CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1977);
AKRON BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Ohio 1988); CLEVELAND BAR
ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Ohio 1988); OKLAHOMA COUNTY BAR ASS'N,
GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Okla. 1996); MULTNOMAH COUNTY BAR ASS'N, PRO-
POSED STATEMENT ON PROFESSIONALISM IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW (Or. 1988); BUCKS COUNTY
BAR ASS'N, RULES OF PROFESSIONALISM (Pa. 1992); THE NORTHAMPTON COUNTY BAR ASS'N,
GUIDE TO CONDUCT AND ETIQUETTE AT THE BAR (Pa. 1994); PHILADELPHIA BAR ASS'N, WORK-
ING RULES OF PROFESSIONALISM (Pa. 1990); RHODE ISLAND BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF
PROFESSIONALISM (1989); SOUTH CAROLINA BAR, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM (1993);
TENNESSEE BAR ASS'N, A LAWYER'S CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (1991); MEMPHIS BAR ASS'N,
GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL COURTESY AND CONDUCT (Tenn. 1989); NASHVILLE BAR
ASS'N, STANDARDS OF INTRA-PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Tenn. 1987); THE SUPREME COURT OF
TEXAS & THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALs, THE TEXAS LAWYER'S CREED: A MANDATE FOR
PROFESSIONALISM (1989); THE TEXAS TRIAL LAWYERS ASS'N & TEXAS ASS'N OF DEFENSE COUN-
SEL, GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1989); DALLAS BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL COURTESY (Tex. 1987); SAN ANTONIO BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES FOR PROFESSIONAL
COURTESY (Tex. 1989); TRAVIS COUNTY BAR AS'N, TRAVIS COUNTY CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES
FOR LAWYERS (Tex. n.d.); VERMONT BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY
(1989); VIRGINIA BAR, PRINCIPLES OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1988); FAIRFAX COUNTY BAR
ASS'N, CREED OF PROFESSIONALISM (Va. 1991); NoRFOLK & PORTSMOUTH BAR AS'N, CODE OF
PROFESSIONALISM (Va. 1991); THE BAR ASS'N OF THE Crrv OF RICHMOND, PRINCIPLES OF PRO-
FESSIONALISM (Va. 1990); WASHINGTON STATE BAR, COURTROOM DECORUM AND PRACTICE
GUIDELINES (1994); SEATrLE-KING COUNTY BAR ASS'N, GUIDELINES OF PROFESSIONAL COUR-
TESY (Wash. 1989); SPOKANE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Wash.
1989); TACOMA-PIERCE COUNTY BAR ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (Wash. 1989);
WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY (1990) (copies of each code
are on file with the author). The author thanks Debi Taylor, Project Coordinator of the
ABA Center for Professionalism, for supplying these codes.
158. These codes started to appear about the time jurisdictions began to replace the
Model Code with the Model Rules. See 2 HAZARD & HODES, supra note 131, § AP4:107, at
1269-70 (listing when the Model Rules of Professional Conduct were adopted by various states).
Because the Model Rules eliminated the aspirational goals articulated in the Model Code,
civility codes may have been enacted to fill the void once filled by the Model Code's ethical
considerations.
THE LAW AND ETHics OF CIVIL DEPOSITIONS
" [d]iscovery is the theater of incivility," 6 ' most codes contain detailed
aspirational rules concerning deposition conduct.
For example, under the Texas Lawyer's Creed, 6' lawyers pledge to
"not make objections nor give instructions to a witness for the purpose
of delaying or obstructing the discovery process," to "encourage wit-
nesses to respond to all deposition questions which are reasonably un-
derstandable," and to "neither encourage nor permit [their]
witness [es] to quibble about words where their meaning is reasonably
clear."' 6 2 As another example, the Boston Bar Association's Civility
Standards for Civil Litigation6 ' provide several aspirational rules for
deposition conduct with which Boston attorneys should comply.
These include the following:
* "A lawyer should not inquire into a deponent's personal
affairs or question a deponent's integrity where such in-
quiry is irrelevant to the subject matter of the
deposition";164
* "A lawyer should not harass a deponent and should re-
frain from repetitive or argumentative questions";165
* "A lawyer.., should limit objections to those that are well
founded and necessary for the protection of a client's
interest";' 66
159. Judge Thomas M. Reavley explained: "Rambo is the last name of a fictional United
States Green Beret veteran characterized in a novel byJohn Morrell and later portrayed by
Sylvester Stallone in several recent films. The character is the ultimate military warrior,
always willing and able to fight to the death." Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Pitting
Aggressive Tactics Against Legal Ethics, 17 PEPP. L. REv. 637, 637 n.4 (1990) (citing FIRST
BLOOD (Orion 1982); RAMBO: FIRST BLOOD PART II (Orion 1985); RAMBO III (Tristar
1988)). In the legal profession, a "Rambo litigator" is one who engages in "sharp and
nasty" practices. Thomas M. Reavley, Rambo Litigators: Aggressive Tactics Versus Legal Ethics,
TRIAL, May 1991, at 63, 63. One author, in half-jest, indicated that a Rambo litigator "[h]as
a tendency to foam at the mouth during depositions," "[p]roudly displays tattoos featuring
his favorite objections," and "look[s] for the office building with the scorched earth in
front." John G. Browning, Top 10 Ways to Spot a Rambo Litigator, 53 TEX. B.J. 1094, 1094
(1990); accord Jean M. Cary, Rambo Depositions: Controlling an Ethical Cancer in Civil Litiga-
tion, 25 HorSTRA L. REv. 561 (1996).
160. Cornelia Wallis Honchar, 'Rambo' Litigators Can Be Disarmed with Sanctions, CHI.
DAILY L. BULL., Nov. 4, 1994, at 5, available in LEXIS, Regnws Library, Ilnws File.
161. THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS & THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS, THE TEXAS LAW-
YER'S CREED: A MANDATE FOR PROFESSIONALISM (1989), reprinted in W.D. TEX. L.R app. M
(1997).
162. Id. pt. 111(17).
163. BOSTON BAR ASS'N, CvIuTY STANDARDS FOR CIVIL LITIGATION (Mass. 1994), reprinted
in BOSTON B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 11.
164. Id. stand. B(5)(e).
165. Id. stand. B(5)(f).
166. Id. stand. B(5)(g).
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* "[A] lawyer should not, through objections or otherwise,
coach the deponent or suggest answers"; 1
6 7
* "A lawyer should not direct a deponent to refuse to an-
swer questions unless he or she has a good faith basis for
claiming privilege or for seeking a protective order";"
" "A lawyer should refrain from self-serving speeches"; 169
and
* "A lawyer should not engage in any conduct during a
deposition that would not be allowed or would be inap-
propriate in the presence of a judicial officer or a
jury. "170
Other codes contain comparable directions and prohibitions for attor-
neys taking and defending depositions.1 71
For three primary reasons, civility codes can cause confusion
among the judiciary and the practicing bar. First, in certain situa-
tions, it may be unclear whether courts should apply the civility codes
or other standards of conduct, such as the Model Code of Professional
Responsibility or the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.1 72 Second, most
civility codes are merely aspirational and have no formal enforcement
mechanism. 173 For this reason, some believe they have no real impact
167. Id. stand. B(5)(h).
168. Id. stand. B(5)(i).
169. Id. stand. B(5)(j).
170. Id. stand. B(5)(k).
171. See, e.g., CONTRA COSTA COUNTY BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY
stand. II(D) (Cal. 1993) ("Attorneys should bear in mind that depositions are to be taken
as if the testimony was being given in court...."); Los ANGELES COUNTY BAR Ass'N, LITIGA-
TION GUIDELINES guide. 5 (Cal. 1989) (prohibiting counsel from, among other things, de-
laying a deposition for dilatory purposes, inquiring into a deponent's personal affairs,
making unfounded objections, coaching the deponent, and making self-serving speeches);
DENVER BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS OF PROFESSIONALISM stand. C (Colo. 1992) (advising attor-
neys to minimize argument, to refrain from instructing witnesses through speaking objec-
tions, and to refrain from smoking); ST. PETERSBURG BAR Ass'N, STANDARDS OF
PROFESSIONAL COURTESY stand. E (Fla. 1992) (cautioning attorneys to avoid inquiring into
a deponent's personal affairs, to refrain from repetitive questioning, and to limit objec-
tions); WASHINGTON STATE BAR, COURTROOM DECORUM AND PRACTICE GUIDELINES decorum
guide. VIII(C) (Wash. 1994) (instructing attorneys to "[m]ake only good faith objections
to discovery").
172. See Kathleen P. Browe, Comment, A Critique of the Civility Movement: Why Rambo Will
Not Go Away, 77 MARQ. L. REv. 751, 780 (1994) ("Overall ... codes of conduct do not add
much to the already existing standards of attorney conduct and, where the new codes do
differ from already existing rules, there is a potential for confusion and satellite litigation
as attorneys argue over which rules should apply."); id. at 779 ("[W]here a code has a
slightly different standard than the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, it could result in
a great deal of satellite litigation to determine which standard applies.").
173. One reason civility codes are aspirational only is to avoid satellite litigation, like
that generated by the 1983 version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. See Final Report
of the Committee on Civility of the Seventh Federal Judicial Circuit, 143 F.R.D. 441, 448
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on attorney behavior.174 A few courts, however, have announced a
willingness to sanction attorneys who violate the local civility code. 175
Thus, some confusion exists about whether and when courts will en-
force codes, which, by their express terms, are aspirational. Third,
some civility codes may actually set a lower threshold of acceptable
conduct than mandatory ethical rules, 176 while others contain goals
that conflict with mandatory ethical rules.1 77 Therefore, while civility
codes add welcome, specific admonitions about deposition conduct
and help to set the parameters for acceptable conduct, they can also
add to the confusion and tensions experienced by attorneys who must
take and defend depositions on a regular basis.
D. Interaction and Tension
Now that sources concerning deposition conduct have been iden-
tified, 171 the next step is to determine how attorneys should apply the
(1992) (stating in its preamble to the proposed standards for professional conduct that
"[v]oluntary adherence is expected" and that the standards "shall not be used as a basis for
litigation or for sanctions or penalties"); Browe, supra note 172, at 763 ("The purpose in
making these [civility] standards nonsanctionable is to avoid satellite litigation and to avoid
turning them into another weapon attorneys could use against each other in litigation
proceedings."); cf Daniel E. Lazaroff, Foreword, The Third Annual Fritz B. Burns Lecture on
Rule 11 Reform: Progress or Retreat on Attorney Sanctions?, 28 Loy. L.A L. REV. 1, 1-2 (1994)
(noting that one of the most frequent complaints about the 1983 version of Rule 11 was
that it "spawned time-consuming satellite litigation"); Howard A. Cutler, Comment, A Prac-
titioner's Guide to the 1993 Amendment to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, 67 TEMP. L. REv.
265, 273-74 (1994) ("Commentators have asserted that Rule 11 has.., created an abun-
dance of satellite litigation unconnected to the substance of a legal dispute." (footnote
omitted)).
174. One commentator asserted:
The problem with codes of civility.., is not their intention; there is no doubt that
professionalism in the bar is sorely in need of repair. The problem is the appro-
priateness of means. If the present mandatory rules of professional discipline are
not being observed, a new pledge of allegiance is unlikely to improve the level of
observance.
Geoffrey C. Hazard,Jr., Civility Code May Lead to Less Civility, NAT'L L.J., Feb. 26, 1990, at 13,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Nlawj File.
175. See supra note 12 (noting that some courts have decided to enforce local civility
codes by sanction).
176. See, e.g., Hazard, supra note 174 (asserting that as compared to the Model Code and
the Model Rules, the Texas Lawyer's Creed may lower the standard of conduct in some areas,
especially harassment).
177. See, e.g., Attack onRambo: Bar Courtesy Codes Spread, B. LEADER, Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 11,
29 (quoting one bar chair who criticized an aspirational code proposed by the ABA Tort
and Insurance Practice Section because "[i]t mixed mandatory rules and those that are
aspirational").
178. One other source that might affect deposition conduct includes advisory opinions
of ethics committees. The ABA and many state and local bar associations have ethics com-
mittees that consider and write opinions concerning legal ethics. Some committees pub-
lish their opinions, which can provide guidance to attorneys. Although they are not
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rules-and how conflicts among the rules should be resolved-so that
attorneys do not breach any legal or ethical duties. In the context of
depositions taken in the hypothetical below, this Article will analyze
the tensions caused by the interplay of the varied rules affecting depo-
sition conduct-federal and state rules, federal and state case law,
mandatory ethical rules, and aspirational civility codes.
II. THE HYPOTHETICAL
In February 1993, PharTech, Inc., a large pharmaceutical manu-
facturing company, received approval from the Federal Drug Adminis-
tration to manufacture and commercially market a long-term
contraceptive known as Ovar-X.1 79 Ovar-X must be administered by a
licensed physician because the contraceptive, which is encased in a
silicone capsule about the size of a watch battery, must be surgically
inserted and removed. When inserted, Ovar-X releases a synthetic
hormone to prevent pregnancy; the device is designed to work for
approximately three years.
In June 1994, Erin Sawyer, a thirty-two-year-old female who lives
in Cincinnati, Ohio, visited Dr. Harriet Foster, an OB/GYN, to discuss
birth control options. Ms. Sawyer had been married for two years and
previously had been taking birth control pills. At this point in their
binding, ethics opinions are often cited as persuasive authority. MORTIMER D. SCHWARTZ ET
AL., PROBLEMS IN LEGAL ETHICS 41 (3d ed. 1992). In addition, some bar associations are
willing to provide quick ethics information by telephone. The attorneys staffing these hot-
lines typically cite callers to controlling authority but do not give advice. Id. at 41-42.
179. Ovar-X is loosely based on the Norplant contraceptive. See supra note 13. The hy-
pothetical presented here is based on actual cases. See In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods.
Liab. Litig., 955 F. Supp. 700 (E.D. Tex. 1997) (mem.); Tamulavage v. American Home
Prods. Corp., No. 96 C 7769, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19284 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1996) (mem.);
In re Norplant Contraceptive Prods. Lab. Litig., 915 F. Supp. 845 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (order);
Woods v. Wyeth Labs. Inc., No. 94-1493 (W.D. Pa. filed Sept. 1, 1994); Neideffer v. Wyeth-
Ayerst Labs., No. 49D109502-CT0247 (Ind. Super. Ct., Marion County filed Feb. 16, 1995);
Avondet v. Blankstein, Nos. 69934, 69935, 1997 WL 64048 (Ohio Ct. App. Feb. 13, 1997);
Burton v. Wyeth Labs., No. 910 (Pa. Ct. C.P., Phila. County filed July 25, 1995); see also
Complaint: Doctor Negligent for Removal; Wyeth Liable for Defects, MEALv's LITIG. REP. NOR-
PIANT, Nov. 17, 1994, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Allnws File; Duncan, supra note
13; Parties Debate Sufficiency of Fraud, Punitive Damage Claims, MALv'S LTIG. REP. NOR-
pLANT, Feb. 2, 1995, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Allnws File; AVSC International,
Are Norplant Implants the Right Method for Me? (last modified July 31, 1996) <http://
www.avsc.org/nor-text.html>; AVSC International, Norplant Implants: Answers to Your Ques-
tions (last modifiedJuly 31, 1996) <http://www.avsc.org/norplant.html#what>; Norplant Pa-
tient Instruction: Patient Information (visited Sept. 5, 1997) <http://lib-sh.lsumc. edu/
fammed/pted/norppost.html>; Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Norplant
(visited Sept. 5, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/ppfa/contraception/choices-norplant-
detail.html>; Planned Parenthood Federation of America, Inc., Planned Parenthood Fact
Sheet: Norplant Contraceptive Implant (visited Sept. 5, 1997) <http://www.igc.apc.org/ppfa/
norplant.html>.
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busy careers, Ms. Sawyer and her husband, Matt, did not want chil-
dren. Ms. Sawyer did not like taking birth control pills, because given
her hectic schedule, she occasionally forgot to take them. Therefore,
she was interested in Ovar-X, the long-term contraceptive that had
been receiving so much media attention.
After discussing the matter with Dr. Foster, who explained that
the possible side effects of Ovar-X included nausea, irregular men-
strual bleeding, migraine headaches, and weight gain, Ms. Sawyer
opted to have Ovar-X implanted. Before Ms. Sawyer left the office,
Dr. Foster gave her some literature produced by PharTech that also
explained these and other possible side effects.
A week later, Dr. Foster performed the surgical implant proce-
dure in her office, using a local anesthetic. The doctor made a small
incision on the inside of Ms. Sawyer's left upper arm and inserted the
Ovar-X implant. Although Ms. Sawyer's arm was swollen for a few days
after the procedure, she did not experience any complications from
the surgical procedure.
During the first year, Ms. Sawyer suffered a few mild side effects,
including spotting between menstrual periods and slight weight gain.
After about six months, these symptoms disappeared. However, in
September 1995, Ms. Sawyer began to experience irregular menstrual
bleeding, stomach pain, mild dizziness, and additional weight gain; in
addition, Dr. Foster discovered an ovarian cyst. Due to these side ef-
fects and the fact that she and her husband decided they would like to
start a family, Ms. Sawyer decided to stop using Ovar-X. A few weeks
later, Dr. Foster removed the Ovar-X device during an in-office surgi-
cal procedure. Unfortunately, Dr. Foster had difficulty locating the
implant; this complicated the removal process and left Ms. Sawyer
with a three-inch scar on her left arm and some nerve damage in the
upper-arm area.
After several months of unsuccessfully trying to conceive, Ms.
Sawyer visited Dr. Victoria Hernandez, a fertility specialist. After run-
ning tests and examining Ms. Sawyer, Dr. Hernandez discovered that
Ms. Sawyer suffered from endometriosis, a condition that would se-
verely limit her ability to become pregnant.1 80 Distraught over the
diagnosis, Ms. Sawyer asked how she had developed the condition.
180. Endometriosis is "an abnormal condition in which menstrual tissue, instead of es-
caping from the uterus through the vagina, goes up the fallopian tubes and accumulates in
the pelvic cavity." 10 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 340 (int'l ed. 1996). Women with
endometriosis frequently are unable to conceive. Id.; see also Endometriosis: This "Career
Woman's Disease" Is a Major Cause of Infertility, MAYO CLINIC HEALTH LETTER, Mar. 1987, at 3,
3.
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Dr. Hernandez replied that the endometriosis could have been linked
to the Ovar-X implant.
After reading several newspaper accounts about other women
who had suffered similar effects from using Ovar-X, and who had sued
to recover for their injuries, Ms. Sawyer and her husband contacted
attorney Scott Palmer for advice. Mr. Palmer reviewed Ms. Sawyer's
medical history, interviewed the Sawyers, and conducted some prelim-
inary legal research. He then recommended that the Sawyers sue
PharTech and Dr. Foster; the Sawyers retained Palmer to initiate the
suit.
On June 3, 1996, Palmer filed suit for the Sawyers against Dr.
Foster and PharTech in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of Ohio. The counts directed at Dr. Foster alleged medi-
cal malpractice based on her failure to provide complete cautionary
instructions for Ovar-X use, negligence in removing the implant, and
loss of consortium. The complaint also contained causes of action
against PharTech for strict products liability, negligence, breach of ex-
press warranty of merchantability, failure to warn, consumer fraud,
misrepresentation, and loss of consortium. In addition to seeking
compensatory damages for items including medical expenses, lost
wages, and pain and suffering, the Sawyers also sought punitive dam-
ages against both defendants.
Although they filed separate answers, each defendant denied lia-
bility to the Sawyers. In addition, PharTech raised the following af-
firmative defenses: assumption of the risk, learned intermediary
doctrine, failure to mitigate damages, and contributory negligence.
Along with her answer, Dr. Foster cross-claimed against PharTech, al-
leging that the manufacturer failed to warn her about all possible risks
associated with Ovar-X and failed to train her properly on how to re-
move Ovar-X implants.
Two weeks after the answers were filed, Palmer noticed the depo-
sition of Randall Lee, PharTech's national product manager for Ovar-
X, to occur on August 12, 1996.181 Corrine Davis, lead counsel for
PharTech, responded by noticing Ms. Sawyer's deposition for August
7, 1996. Counsel for all parties then met and jointly agreed that Dr.
Foster and Mr. Sawyer would be deposed in mid-September.
181. Cf S.D. OHIO L.R. 26.5 ("Unless otherwise ordered or agreed by the parties, discov-
ery may begin at any time notwithstanding Rule 26(d), FRCP.").
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III. PRIVATE CONFERENCES WITH THE DEPONENT
A serious controversy exists regarding the propriety of a lawyer
conferring privately with his witness during a deposition, especially
when a question is pending. Some believe that a witness should have
complete, unbridled access to counsel during the deposition, 8 2 while
others believe that deposition testimony should be treated exactly like
cross-examination at trial, where the deponent cannot confer with her
attorney before her testimony is completed. 8 3 Still others seek a mid-
dle ground that would allow the deponent to confer with her attorney,
but only under limited circumstances. 84 Although courts typically
agree that a lawyer may confer with his client to determine whether to
assert a privilege, 85 confusion exists regarding other situations in
which a private conference might be proper.'86 Indeed, most jurisdic-
tions do not have rules concerning private conferences. 18 7 In addi-
tion, very few published cases address the propriety of private
conferences in the deposition setting.18 8 Therefore, attorneys in most
jurisdictions have little guidance about when private conferences
182. See, e.g., 7 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, § 30.43[6], at 30-71 ("As recently as the mid-
1980s, many lawyers counseled clients that they had an absolute right to confer at any time
during the deposition.").
183. See, e.g., Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R1D. 525, 528 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("During a
civil trial, a witness and his or her lawyer are not permitted to confer at their pleasure
during the witness's testimony. Once a witness has been prepared and has taken the stand,
that witness is on his or her own. The same is true at a deposition." (footnote omitted)).
184. See, e.g., M.D. ALA. GUIDELINES Crv. DiscovERY PRac. guide. II(G) (for language, see
supra note 41); D. CoLo. L.R 30.1C(A) (2) (for language, see supra note 44); S.D. FLA. L.R.
30.1 (tracking the Colorado local rule); S.D. IND. L.1 30.1 (for language, see supra note
46); D. MD. DISCOvERY GUIDELINES guide. 5(c) (for language, see supra note 47); D.S.C.
L.R. 30.04(E) (for additional information, see supra note 49); D. Wvo. L.R. 30(e) (for
language, see supra note 50); DEL. SUPER. CT. Crv. R. 30(c) (for language, see supra note
102); N.J. SUPER. T. & SUR. CTS. R. 4:14-3 (for language, see supra text accompanying notes
104-110); see also Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102
F.R.D. 339, 351 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("An attorney for a deponent shall not initiate a private
conference with the deponent during the actual taking of a deposition, except for the
purpose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted."); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION (THIRD), supra note 51, § 41.38, at 518 ("Private conferences between depo-
nents and their attorneys in the course of interrogation are improper except for the pur-
pose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted.").
185. See infra text accompanying notes 228-239.
186. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 6:27, at 55 ("The law governing the
propriety of private conferences between the deponent and the attorney representing the
deponent is unsettled.").
187. For example, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not address private confer-
ences. SeeFED. R. Crv. P. 30. For the federal jurisdictions that do have a private conference
rule, see supra notes 41, 44-47, and 49-51.
188. See supra Parts I.A.1.c and I.A.2.b.
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should be allowed or how to react when defending counsel confers
with the deponent during the deposition.
The legal and ethical issues concerning private conferences be-
tween the deponent and her attorney will be illustrated through ex-
cerpts from the August 7, 1996 deposition of Erin Sawyer, the plaintiff
in Sawyer v. PharTech, Inc. The plaintiff is being deposed by Corrine
Davis, counsel for PharTech. The deponent's attorney is Scott
Palmer. Counsel for Dr. Foster, Curtis Drizolli, is also present.
August 7, 1996. Time: 10:37 a.m. (the deposition com-
menced at 9:00 a.m.)
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, did you contact Dr. Foster as soon as
you began experiencing side effects you thought might be
associated with the Ovar-X implant?
MS. SAWYER: [Speaking tentatively] Well .... Um-I guess
MR. PALMER: Ms. Davis, I need to confer with my client
about this matter.
MS. DAVIS: Mr. Palmer, a question is pending. Your client
should answer the question. After she answers, I would be
more than amenable to a short recess.
MR. PALMER: No, we're taking a break now.
[Mr. Palmer leaves the room with his client, Ms. Sawyer.]
MS. DAVIS: Mr. Court Reporter, please note the time that
Mr. Palmer and his client left and the time they return. Also
note on the record my objection to this private conference.
[After about seven minutes, Mr. Palmer and Ms. Sawyer
return.]
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, please answer my question. Mr.
Court Reporter, would you please read back the question?
COURT REPORTER: [Reading back last question before
the break.] Ms. Sawyer, did you contact Dr. Foster as soon as
you began experiencing side effects you thought might be
associated with the Ovar-X implant?
MS. SAWYER: Yes. I tried to contact Dr. Foster's office sev-
eral times when I began experiencing the irregular periods,
but her line was always busy.
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, during the break, did you and Mr.
Palmer discuss your answer to the question you just
answered?
MR. PALMER: I object. What we discussed, if anything, is
subject to the attorney-client privilege. Move on, counsel.
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Time: 11:15 a.m.
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, I'm handing you what has been
marked as deposition exhibit 5. Please look at the docu-
ment. [The court reporter hands the document to Ms. Saw-
yer.] Ms. Sawyer, do you recognize this document?
MS. SAWYER: I need to speak with my attorney before I an-
swer that question.
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, I cannot see why you would need to
speak with your attorney. You've either seen the document
or you haven't. Answer the question.
MR. PALMER: Ms. Sawyer, let's step outside. [Ms. Sawyer
and Mr. Palmer leave the room; the pair returns about five
minutes later.]
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, have you ever seen deposition ex-
hibit 5? If so, please tell me what it is.
MS. SAWYER: I think I might have, but I'm not exactly sure
right now. It's published by PharTech and it describes some
possible effects of Ovar-X.
Time: 12:05 p.m.
MS. DAVIS: When did you first see Dr. Hernandez?
MS. SAWYER: I don't remember the exact date, but it was in
early March.
MS. DAVIS: March 1996?
MS. SAWYER: Yes.
MS. DAVIS: Do you have any way to determine the exact
date?
MS. SAWYER: Oh yes. I could look in my daytimer.
MS. DAVIS: Well, I see that it's after 12:00. Why don't we
break for lunch now? I'm just about ready to start a new
topic and I don't want to start it now. Is an hour and fifteen
minutes enough time?
MR. PALMER: That's fine. We'll be back here at 1:20.
[Participants take a lunch break. The deposition resumes at
1:25 p.m.]
MS. DAVIS: Did you have lunch with your attorney?
MR. PALMER: Objection, attorney-client privilege.
MS. DAVIS: Oh come on, Scott, I'm just asking whether you
ate together. There's nothing privileged about that. Are you
instructing her not to answer?
MR. PALMER: I guess not. Ms. Sawyer, you may answer that
question.
MS. SAWYER: Yes. In fact, Scott-uh-Mr. Palmer-took
me to a very nice Italian restaurant.
MS. DAVIS: Did you discuss any testimony from this
morning?
1998]
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MR. PALMER: I instruct the client not to answer. That ques-
tion definitely calls for privileged information.
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, are you going to follow your attor-
ney's advice and refuse to answer the question?
MS. SAWYER: I'm going to follow my attorney's advice.
MS. DAVIS: Well, I'll move on for now. But I'm going to
take this matter to the court in a motion to compel.
Time: 3:05 p.m.
MS. DAVIS: Ms. Sawyer, earlier we discussed your first visit to
Dr. Hernandez. At the end of that visit, what did Dr. Her-
nandez tell you, if anything, about the relationship between
Ovar-X and endometriosis?
MR. PALMER: Counsel, I need to briefly confer with my cli-
ent about whether we will raise the doctor-patient privilege.
May we go off the record for a few minutes?
MS. DAVIS: I would prefer that the witness answer the ques-
tion. I don't want you coaching the witness about how to
answer the question.
MR. PALMER: Counsel, as I said, I want to discuss whether
to assert a privilege. If you'll just give me a few minutes, Ms.
Sawyer may very well answer your question.
Time: 6:15 p.m.
MR. PALMER: Ms. Davis, it's getting late. My client has
been answering your questions since early this morning. Will
you please wrap it up?
MS. DAVIS: Well, I still have several important topics to
cover. I'm perfectly willing to adjourn for the evening, but
I'll need about three more hours to finish. Are you available
tomorrow?
MR. PALMER: No. My next available date is August 12, the
day I'm scheduled to depose Mr. Lee. As I previously told
you, I need more than a day for that depo, so I noticed it for
two days. But what if you finish Ms. Sawyer's deposition that
morning, and I'll start Mr. Lee's deposition after lunch? I'm
pretty sure I can finish in a day and a half.
MS. SAWYER: That's fine with me.
MS. DAVIS: Me too.
August 12, 1996. Time: 9:05 a.m.
MS. DAVIS: Good morning, Ms. Sawyer. This is the continu-
ation of your August 7 deposition. Do you realize that you're
still under oath?
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MS. SAWYER: Yes.
MS. DAVIS: Good. Please tell me whether you have met
with your attorney since August 7.
MR. PALMER: I object. You keep asking her about confer-
ences with me. That type of information is privileged. Don't
answer that.
In many private conference situations, the questioning attorney
must decide what steps are appropriate to combat what appears to be
witness coaching, as well as decide what relief, if any, to seek.1 89 The
deponent's lawyer, on the other hand, must grapple with the conflict
between protecting his witness and serving as an officer of the court in
the context of a proceeding meant to discover the truth.1 9 0
Here, five breaks occurred during the plaintiffs deposition. Two
breaks were initiated by the deponent's counsel, one by the deponent,
and two were taken by mutual agreement. How well did the respec-
tive counsel handle each break? Did the breaks comport with control-
ling court rules, ethical rules, and civility codes? Which counsel was
correct concerning whether the questioning attorney could inquire
about conversations conducted during the breaks?191 These questions
will be answered following a discussion of the applicable legal and eth-
ical rules.
A. Private Conferences During Pending Questions
Each attorney-initiated break in Ms. Sawyer's deposition was
called while a question was pending. The first break occurred during
the 10:37 a.m. session on August 7, when the deponent's attorney de-
manded a break immediately after PharTech's attorney posed a ques-
tion. Although PharTech's attorney indicated she would be willing to
break after the witness answered, Ms. Sawyer's counsel refused and
left with the deponent. The question asked did not call for the depo-
nent to reveal any privileged information. Instead, Mr. Palmer proba-
bly thought Ms. Sawyer's initial hesitation to a relatively easy-but
important-question indicated that she was in trouble. In all likeli-
189. See MaLoNE & HoFFmAN, supra note 15, at 135-37 (listing possible responses to the
.obstructionist" attorney who continues to interrupt the deposition to confer with his
witness).
190. See id. (discussing the purposes of conferring with a witness and how this right can
be abused).
191. Readers should note that the Southern District of Ohio does not have a local rule
concerning private conferences during depositions. See S.D. Ohio L.R.
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hood, therefore, he called the break to ensure that she answered
"correctly."
During the 3:05 p.m. session, the deponent's counsel requested a
conference when Ms. Davis, the examining attorney, asked about a
discussion between the deponent and her treating physician. Mr.
Palmer clearly indicated, on the record and before the conference,
that he needed to discuss whether to assert the doctor-patient privi-
lege with his client.
Typically, a lawyer has only four reasons to confer with a client
during a pending question: (1) to assist the client with the answer;1 9 2
(2) to calm the client;19 3 (3) to interrupt the flow of the opposing
counsel's examination;"' or (4) to discuss a possible privilege. 19 5
Under the first three circumstances, private conferences during a
pending question should be presumptively improper.
196
An attorney should not confer with a client during a pending
question if his purpose is to assist the client with the answer. Despite
192. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:39, at 81 (observing that some
attorneys use the private conference to assist the deponent with the answer).
193. SeeJ. Stratton Shartel, Abuses in Depositions: Litigators Describe Response Strategies, IN-
SIDE LITiG., July 1994, at 1, 12 (describing the phenomenon of the "paralyzed witness" and
advising that, in order to minimize damage, the defending attorney should immediately
take a break to talk with the nervous and confused deponent).
194. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:39, at 80-81 (describing how a de-
ponent's attorney can use private conferences to interfere with the opposing attorney's
questioning).
195. See MALONE & HOFFMAN, supra note 15, at 184 (referring to the use of conferences
to prevent disclosure of protected or privileged information). Some might suggest that
this list omits a situation in which "clever and unscrupulous examining counsel may at-
tempt to trap the witness into misleading statements that . . . can be used to hurt the
witness or parties at trial." 7 MOORE ET AL., supra note 15, § 30.43[6], at 30-72. Indeed,
one might argue that this list "overlooks [the fact] that witnesses can make honest mis-
takes, and [that] one of the functions of their counsel is to call those to their attention."
Id. However, a conference is not the way to remedy such abuses. Instead, deponent's
counsel should attempt to rehabilitate the deponent during cross-examination, object to
the inappropriate question or behavior, adjourn the deposition to seek a protective order,
or speak with the questioning attorney to work out the problem. Id.; see also FED. R. Crv. P.
30 (describing the proper procedure for the deponent's counsel to terminate or limit the
examination).
196. See Federal Bar Council, Committee on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the
Conduct of Depositions, 131 F.R.D. 613, 618 (1990) (declaring that a conference initiated
by an attorney for any purpose other than to determine whether a privilege should be
asserted is "presumptively improper"); Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery
in Civil Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339, 382 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (indicating that private conferences
during depositions, not including breaks, are presumptively improper); see also MANUAL
FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD), supra note 51, § 41.38, at 518 (suggesting that private
conferences are improper, except for the purpose of determining whether a privilege
exists).
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the practice of some attorneys, testifying is not a team sport."'
Although an attorney has a legal and ethical duty to prepare a client
before the deposition, t" s preparation, by definition, occurs before-
not during-the event.199 If the attorney did not adequately prepare
the client before the deposition, then the attorney and the client must
suffer the consequences.
In addition, using a conference to suggest an answer is analogous
to an attorney making speaking objections to coach the witness's re-
sponse.2 ° ° Since the 1993 amendments, suggestive objections have
been improper in federal court.2 1 Because the 1993 amendments to
Rule 30 were designed to limit the number of disruptions that occur
197. See Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d
890, 902 (7th Cir. 1981). This case involved a deponent's attorney who called 127 private
conferences, many of which occurred between the question and the answer. The court
emphasized, "It is too late once the ball has been snapped for the coach to send in a
different play." Id.
198. See, e.g., Christy v. Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 160 F.R.D. 51, 53 (E.D. Pa.
1995) (denying a protective order that would limit the otherwise proper preparation of a
witness for deposition); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528 & n.4 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
("A lawyer... has the right, if not the duty, to prepare a client for a deposition." (footnote
omitted)); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILy DR 6-101 (A) (2) (1982) ("A law-
yer shall not . . . [h]andle a legal matter without preparation adequate in the circum-
stances."); id. EC 7-19 (providing that an advocate should "zealous[ly] prepar[e]"); MODEL
RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.1 (1994) (requiring "thoroughness and prepara-
tion reasonably necessary for the representation"); see also ROBERTO ARON & JONATHAN L.
ROSNER, HOW TO PREPARE WrrNssEs FOR TRIAL 9 (1985) (commenting that "the very es-
sence of the advocate's ethical obligations to the client.. . is adequate preparation at each
stage of the process"); id. at 309-10 (indicating that 62% of lawyers surveyed believed wit-
ness preparation to be a duty).
199. See 12 THE OxFORD ENGLISH DIcnONARY 375 (2d ed. 1991) (defining "prepare" as
"[t]o put beforehand into a suitable condition for some action" (emphasis added)); see also
James W. McElhaney, The Pit Bull: Strategies to Keep Depositions on Track, A.B.A J., July 1989,
at 88, 89 ("Everyone knows that witnesses need to be prepared to testify, but that should be
done before the deposition."). However, in State v. McCormick, 259 S.E.2d 880 (N.C. 1979),
the North Carolina Supreme Court stated:
It is not improper for an attorney to prepare his witness for trial, to explain the
applicable law in any given situation and to go over before trial the attorney's
questions and the witness' answers so that the witness will be ready for his appear-
ance in court, will be more at ease because he knows what to expect, and will give
his testimony in the most effective manner that he can. Such preparation is the
mark of a good trial lawyer, and is to be commended because it promotes a more
efficient administration of justice and saves court time.
Id. at 882 (citation omitted).
200. See Standing Orders, 102 F.R.D. at 382 ("[S]uch conferences prima facie present the
appearance of the same evil as the suggestive objection in the presence of the witness but
in an even more insidious form since the examining attorney is not privy to the private
conference.").
201. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1) (directing that objections be made "concisely and in a
non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner"). For additional information on speaking
objections, see infra Part VA.
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during a deposition,2 °2 the spirit of the Federal Rules prohibits private
conferences during a pending question, except to discuss whether a
privilege should be asserted.2 °3
Further, if the attorney actually suggested that the witness should
answer untruthfully, then the attorney would also violate the ethical
duty of fairness to opposing counsel 2 4 and the duties to the client.
2 0 5
He would, moreover, abrogate his duties as a court officer by ob-
structing and delaying the judicial process.20 6 Even more seriously, he
might be disbarred 20 7 or subject to criminal prosecution for sub-
202. See FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d) advisory committee notes on 1993 amendments (acknowl-
edging that "[dlepositions frequently have been unduly prolonged .. .by lengthy objec-
tions and colloquy" and then explaining how the amendments hope to eradicate this).
203. Federal Rule 30(d) (1) indicates that objections should be non-suggestive and that
instructions not to answer are limited to only three circumstances. See supra text accompa-
nying note 28 (setting forth the text of Rule 30(d) (1)).
204. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(b) (1994) (stating that coun-
sel may not assist a witness to testify falsely); id. Rule 4.4 (prohibiting a lawyer from using
means "that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person").
205. See id. Rule 1.2 (declaring that a lawyer shall not assist a client in conduct he knows
to be fraudulent or criminal). Perjury is a criminal offense. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621
(1994) ("Whoever ... having taken an oath . . . that he will testify ... that any written
testimony, declaration, deposition, or certificate by him subscribed, is true, willfully and
contrary to such oath states or subscribes any material matter which he does not believe to
be true ... is guilty of perjury ....").
206. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102 (A) (5) (1982) ("A law-
yer shall not... [e]ngage in conduct that is prejudicial to the administration ofjustice.");
MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 ("A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts
to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."); id. Rule 3.2 cmt. ("Dila-
tory practices bring the administration of justice into disrepute. Delay should not be in-
dulged merely . . . for the purpose of frustrating an opposing party's attempt to obtain
rightful redress or repose."); see also United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457
(4th Cir. 1993) ("[L]awyers, who serve as officers of the court, have the first line task of
assuring the integrity of the process.").
Some courts have disbarred or suspended attorneys who advised clients to misstate
facts. For example, in Smith v. State, 523 S.W.2d 1, 5-6 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975, writ refd
n.r.e.), the court suspended for 32 months an attorney who advised a client to misstate
facts. Id. at 5-6. The Smith court held that the attorney's act constituted professional mis-
conduct "regardless of whether the act or acts in question constituted an offense under the
[state penal code]." Id. at 6.
207. See, e.g., In re McCarthy, 623 N.E.2d 473, 473 (Mass. 1993) (holding that an attorney
who elicits false testimony from a client should be suspended from practice); In re Kerr,
548 P.2d 297, 301-02 (Wash. 1976) (en banc) (finding that knowingly participating in sub-
ornation of perjury warrants disbarment).
316
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208 f jutice209orning perjury, 2° s obstruction of justice, or conspiracy to obstruct
justice. 21°
Interrupting the deposition to assist with an answer also violates
Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides
that "[e]xamination and cross-examination of witnesses may proceed
as permitted at the trial."2 1 1 No reported case has allowed an attorney
to confer privately with a witness while a question was pending at
trial. 12 Indeed, in Perry v. Leeke,213 the United States Supreme Court
stated:
[W] hen a defendant becomes a witness, he has no constitu-
tional right to consult with his lawyer while he is testifying.
He has an absolute right to such consultation before he be-
gins to testify, but neither he nor his lawyer has a right to
have the testimony interrupted in order to give him the ben-
efit of counsel's advice.2
14
208. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1622 ("Whoever procures another to commit any perjury is
guilty of subornation of perjury, and shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than five years, or both."); see also Shannon P. Duffy & Kelvyn Anderson, Client Told to Lie by
P.. Lawyer, LEGAL INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 9, 1992, at 1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library,
Lglint File (indicating that the district attorney was investigating another attorney, who
allegedly told his client to lie during a deposition, for suborning perjury); Dan Eggen,
Veteran Lawyer to Hand in License, DES MOiNEs REG., Oct. 17, 1996, at 3, available in 1996 WL
6259868 (describing a 38-year legal veteran who pleaded guilty to suborning perjury and
who surrendered his law license after forging a document and coercing a witness to lie
about the forgery).
209. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1512 (defining the criminality of knowingly persuading an-
other person to influence, delay, or prevent the testimony of that person in an official
proceeding).
210. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1511 (defining the criminality of obstructing state or local law
enforcement).
211. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(c); accord Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp.,
160 F.RD. 98, 99 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (warning that conduct not permissible in the court-
room is not permissible during a deposition).
212. See Sharon E. Grubin, Calling the Judge for a Ruling During a Deposition, or a View from
the Other End of the Line: The Ten Commandments, in TAKING AND DEFENDING DEPOSMONS IN
COMMERCIAL CASES 1994, at 155, 313-14 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook
Series No. 507, 1994) ("During a civil trial, a witness and his or her lawyer are not permit-
ted to confer at their pleasure during the witness's testimony. Once a witness has been
prepared and has taken the stand, that witness is on his or her own.").
213. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
214. Id. at 281. Perry was a criminal case whose holding was based on the Sixth Amend-
ment. See id. at 272-73. If a criminal defendant has no constitutional right to confer with
counsel while testifying, then a civil litigant will be hard-pressed to argue that he has a right
to confer with counsel during a pending question. See Aiello v. City of Wilmington, 623
F.2d 845, 858-59 (3d Cir. 1980) (concluding that the civil defendant had failed to demon-
strate reversible error that resulted from the district court's refusal to allow him to consult
with his attorney while on cross-examination).
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Under a fair reading of Federal Rule 30(c), the same holds true in the
deposition setting.
Similarly, a private conference simply to calm a witness's nerves
should be prohibited. Even if no improper coaching occurs, a witness
may give different testimony once she has had an opportunity to speak
with her attorney about the opposing counsel's question and to regain
her poise and composure. 215 Although a deposition can be a trau-
matic event, an attorney has a duty to prepare the client properly for
the psychological dimensions of a deposition. 216  This preparation
might include subjecting the client to a mock cross-examination or
explaining in detail strategies opposing counsel might employ during
the proceeding. 217 If the client appears to be nervous during the dep-
osition, the attorney could-if not done repeatedly or merely to har-
ass or delay-try to calm the witness down while on the record.21 8
This technique would avoid subjecting the deponent to suspicions
that she had been coached during a private conference.21 9
A private conference called merely to impede opposing counsel's
progress is also abusive and would violate both ethical and procedural
rules. 2 20 Rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states that the
federal rules should be construed "to secure the just, speedy, and in-
expensive determination of every action."2 21 Further, Rule 30(d) (2)
permits the court to sanction a deponent or counsel who impedes,
215. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 282 (noting the importance of uninfluenced testimony on
cross-examination as a measure of the accuracy and completeness of the story presented by
the witness on direct). But cf id. at 292 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (asserting that "a few
soothing words from counsel to the agitated or nervous defendant facing the awesome
power of the State might increase the likelihood that the defendant will state the truth on
cross-examination"); Thompson v. State, 507 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1987) (holding that
denying the defendant an opportunity to consult with counsel during a trial recess violated
the Sixth Amendment because the denial left the criminal defendant "nervous, confused,
and may have contributed to his performance on cross-examination").
216. Cf MALONE & HoI'MAN, supra note 15, at 155 ("No matter how well you prepare
the witness on the substance of his testimony, he will not present clear and persuasive
testimony unless he remains calm enough to understand the questions and to respond
appropriately and cautiously. .. ").
217. See generally id. ch. 13 (discussing effective methods to prepare a client to testify at a
deposition).
218. See id. at 183 (stating that the attorney and witness can confer quickly during the
deposition as many times as necessary, as long as this "right" is not abused).
219. See infra text accompanying note 255.
220. See MODEL CODE OF PROFEssIoNAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-38 (1982) ("A lawyer should
be courteous to opposing counsel ... ."); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.2 (1994) ("A lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with
the interests of the client."); id. Rule 3.4(a) (forbidding a lawyer from "unlawfully ob-
struct[ing] another party's access to evidence"); see also supra note 206 and accompanying
text.
221. FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
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delays, or otherwise frustrates the deposition.222 A conference of this
sort would also be sanctionable under Rule 30(d) (2).22 3
A conference called to interrupt the examination would also vio-
late the spirit of Federal Rule 30.224 The changes implemented in
1993-specifically, the limits set on objections and instructions not to
answer-were included to eliminate improper tactics used to prolong
or disrupt depositions. 225 Although private conferences were not ad-
dressed in the 1993 amendments, private conferences can be as, if not
more, disruptive than objections and instructions not to answer.226
Accordingly, they too should be prohibited when held for an im-
proper purpose.
Moreover, because this type of conference delays and hinders the
deposition, the attorney's conduct would violate Model Rules 3.2, 4.4,
and 8.4(d), or, in Model Code states, DRs 1-101 (A), 7-101 (A) (1), and
7-102 (A) (5).227
Courts allow one exception to the prohibition against private
conferences during pending deposition questions: when the defend-
ing attorney needs to discuss with the deponent the possible assertion
of a privilege. 228 As many courts have recognized, preserving the at-
torney-client privilege is crucial to the continued viability of the adver-
221sarial system. Moreover, an attorney must assist a client in
222. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (2).
223. See id.
224. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) advisory committee notes on 1993 amendments (discuss-
ing how depositions are naturally prolonged and frustrating, and explaining the intent
behind the 1993 amendments to help ameliorate these problems).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 29-31; infra Part IV.
226. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:39, at 81 (describing the proper
procedure for initiating a private conference and noting that conferences can become
lengthy or abused).
227. These are discussed in supra Part I.B.
228. A few courts have issued local rules or standing orders that expressly permit confer-
ences to discuss whether a privilege should be asserted to a pending question. See supra
notes 41, 44-47, 49, 50, 52; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD), supra note
51, § 41.38, at 518 ("Private conferences between deponents and their attorneys . .. are
improper except for the purpose of determining whether a privilege should be asserted.").
229. See United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 562 (1989) (noting the common law tradi-
tion of the attorney-client privilege); Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 389, 391
(1981) ("The attorney-client privilege is the oldest of the privileges for confidential com-
munications known to the common law .... 'The observance of the ethical obligation of a
lawyer to hold inviolate the confidences and secrets of his client ... facilitates the full
development of facts essential to proper representation of the client .... '" (citations omit-
ted) (quoting the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1)); United States v.
United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357, 358 (D. Mass. 1950) (explaining that the attor-
ney-client privilege is necessary "'in the interest and administration ofjustice'" (quoting
Hunt v. Blackburn, 128 U.S. 464, 470 (1888))); cf Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525,
529 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Since the assertion of a privilege is a proper, and very important,
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protecting privileged information. 23 1 In addition, Rule 30(d) (1) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits an attorney to instruct
his client not to answer a question "when necessary to preserve a privi-
lege. '23 1 Therefore, a corresponding rule concerning privilege in the
context of private conferences is appropriate.23 2
The following suggested procedure should be followed when a
question concerns privileged information. First, the defending attor-
ney should note on the record-before conferring with the depo-
nent-that a break is needed to discuss a possible privilege. 23 13
Second, upon returning from the conference, the defending attorney
should state for the record whether a privilege is being asserted.23 4 If
a privilege is asserted, the basis for the privilege should be clearly
stated.235 For example, if the question calls for information about a
communication between a doctor and a patient, the defending attor-
ney should indicate that the conference is to determine whether the
doctor-patient privilege should be asserted. If, after the conference,
objection during a deposition, it makes sense to allow the witness the opportunity to con-
sult with counsel about whether to assert a privilege.").
230. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILY DR 4-101 (1982) ("Preservation
of Confidences and Secrets of a Client"); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6 (1994) ("Confidentiality of Information").
231. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1).
232. Two commentators explained the appropriateness of such a rule as follows:
In fact, you cause no added interruption by this conference since the alternative
is for you to lodge an objection and direct the witness not to answer, in order to
protect her opportunity to find out if a privilege objection must be raised. After
that objection and direction, you and the witness would have exactly the same
conference.
MALONE & HoFFMAN, supra note 15, at 184-85.
233. See id. at 184 (discussing the appropriate procedure for requesting a break for the
attorney to confer with his witness).
234. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (5) (explaining that a party must state expressly whether
and what privilege is being asserted).
235. Rule 26(b) (5) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
When a party withholds information otherwise discoverable under these
rules by claiming that it is privileged or subject to protection as trial preparation
material, the party shall make the claim expressly and shall describe the nature of
the... communications ... not produced or disclosed in a matter that, without
revealing information itself privileged or protected, will enable other parties to
assess the applicability of the privilege or protection.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (5); accord D. MD. DIScOvERY GUIDELINES guide. 6(a) (i) (referring to
Rule 26(b) (5) as the proper procedure for asserting a privilege); Hall v. Clifton Precision,
150 F.R.D. 525, 529-30 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (explaining that, when objecting to confer with the
witness to determine whether to assert a privilege, the attorney should state on the record
the subject of the conference); Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil
Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339, 353-54 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (outlining the proper procedure for claim-
ing a privilege during a deposition and noting that "the attorney asserting the privilege
shall identify during the deposition the nature of the privilege . . .which is being
claimed").
320
1998] THE LAW AND ETHics OF CIVL DEPOSITIONS
the attorney and client decide not to assert a privilege, the deponent
should answer the pending question.236
Third, after the privilege has been asserted and explained, or af-
ter the question has been answered, the questioning attorney should
be allowed to inquire about discussions held during the private con-
ference."8 7 If a privilege is asserted, the questioning attorney should
be able to ask questions to test the basis for that privilege.2" 8 Proper
areas of inquiry should include the applicability of the asserted privi-
lege, possible exceptions to the privilege, possible waiver of the privi-
lege, and circumstances that might overcome a claim of privilege.239
The attorney should also ask if anything other than a privilege was
discussed.
If a privilege is not asserted after the conference, the questioning
attorney should be able to ask questions that will allow her to deter-
mine whether a possible privilege was actually discussed or whether
the claim of possible privilege was merely a smokescreen used to hide
236. In 1996, a Florida state court used a similar procedure:
Where any attorney defending a deposition in this matter wishes to confer with a
witness as to whether privileged matters may be revealed in response to a pending
question, that attorney shall specify on the record the reason for any desired con-
ference with the witness, including why privileged material may be revealed. On
the occurrence of same, the attorney propounding the question shall have the
following options:
1. Amending the pending question;
2. Moving to another line of inquiry with the option of raising the question
or line of questioning later; or
3. Allowing the witness to decide to take a break in the deposition proceed-
ings to confer with his or her attorney for the sole purpose of determin-
ing whether privileged material may be revealed in response to the
pending question.
Operator Serv. Co. v. Croteau, No. CL96-1672 Al (Fla. Cir. Ct., 15thJud. Dist., Palm Beach
County Aug. 5, 1996) (Order on Motions to Compel, for Sanctions for Discovery Abuse,
and to Appoint a Special Master to Supervise Deposition Proceedings) (on file with
author).
237. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b) (5) (explaining that, when a party withholds information
on the grounds that it is privileged, the other party shall be allowed enough information to
assess the applicability of the privilege); D. MD. DiscovERY GuIDEINES guide. 6(a) (ii) (not-
ing that the person seeking disclosure should have "reasonable latitude" to seek relevant
information concerning the assertion of a privilege).
238. See, e.g., S.D. INn. L.R. 30.1 (giving the questioning attorney, after a claim of privi-
lege is raised, "reasonable latitude... to question the deponent to establish relevant infor-
mation concerning the legal appropriateness of the assertion of the privilege"); D. MD.
DiscovERY GuIDEUNES guide. 6(a) (ii) (same).
239. D. Mo. DISCOVERY GUIDEtNES guide. 6(a) (ii); see also Fashion Boutique of Short
Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4544 (MGC), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4024, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1994) (mem.) ("If privilege is asserted, the person claiming privilege
must answer the predicate questions necessary to establish the applicability of the
privilege.").
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improper coaching. 4 ° If the deponent indicates that matters other
than whether to assert a privilege were discussed, or if the questioning
attorney can determine from the question and answer that a privilege
would not reasonably be at issue, then the deponent should-if
asked-be required to reveal the substance of discussions held during
the conference.24 1
Although this suggestion will disturb some attorneys, permitting
the examining attorney to learn the substance of conversations con-
ducted during an improper private conference is akin to-and maybe
even a logical extension of-the crime-fraud exception to the attor-
ney-client privilege. This exception acts to "assure that the 'seal of
secrecy' does not extend to communications 'made for the purpose of
getting advice for the commission of a fraud' or crime."242 The excep-
tion has been applied in circumstances when an attorney encourages
a client to give false testimony243 or otherwise to suppress the truth. 2 4 4
Some courts have indicated that other substantial abuses of the attor-
240. See, e.g., Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 532 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Any confer-
ences which occur ... are a proper subject for inquiry by deposing counsel to ascertain
whether there has been any witness-coaching and, if so, what.").
241. See id. at 529 n.7 (indicating that if prohibited conferences occur, the substance of
the conversation is not covered by the attorney-client privilege and that "any such confer-
ences are fair game for inquiry by the deposing attorney").
242. United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S. 554, 563 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting Clark
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) and O'Rourke v. Darbishire, [1920] App. Cas. 581,
604 (P.C. 1920)); accord Clark, 289 U.S. at 15 ("The privilege takes flight if the relation is
abused. A client who consults an attorney for advice that will serve him in the commission
of a fraud will have no help from the law. He must let the truth be told."); EDNA SELAN
EPSTEIN, THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND THE WORK-PRODUCr DOCrFINE 251 (3d ed.
1997) ("Society ... has no interest in facilitating the commission of contemplated but not
yet committed crimes, torts, or frauds. On the contrary, it has every interest in forestalling
prohibited conduct."); cf In re Grand Jury Matter No. 91-01386, 969 F.2d 995, 997 (11th
Cir. 1992) (instructing that the attorney-client privilege is not all-inclusive and is construed
narrowly as a matter of law in order not to exceed the means necessary to support the
policy it promotes).
243. See, e.g., White v. American Airlines, Inc., 915 F.2d 1414, 1424 (10th Cir. 1990)
(abrogating the attorney-client privilege when an attorney urged a client to commit per-
jury); United States v. Townsley, 843 F.2d 1070, 1086 (8th Cir.) (stating emphatically that
the attorney-client privilege did not apply to a conversation in which the attorney coached
witnesses to lie to the grand jury), modified on other grounds, 856 F.2d 1189 (8th Cir. 1988);
United States v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972, 975 (5th Cir. 1975) (holding that plans to
commit perjury are beyond the scope of the attorney-client privilege).
244. See, e.g., United States v. Laurins, 857 F.2d 529, 540 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding ob-
struction of justice to be a sufficiently serious offense to defeat the attorney-client privi-
lege); United States v. Sutton, 732 F.2d 1483, 1494 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that the
attorney-client privilege did not protect a client's statements to his attorney that he in-
tended to destroy records sought by the government); In reA.H. Robins Co., 107 F.R.D. 2,
14-15 (D. Kan. 1985) (applying the crime-fraud exception when the attorney and the client
allegedly attempted to manufacture false evidence).
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ney-client relationship may negate the privilege.245 Thus, extending
the rationale to improper deposition conferences is not a large leap
and would help to curb the abusive use of such conferences.
246
Presumptively prohibiting private conferences while a question is
pending makes sense. Many breaks during pending questions are
called for an improper motive-either to delay or interrupt the depo-
sition or improperly to coach the witness. 247 Not permitting the attor-
ney-client privilege to shield such improperly called conferences
would, in all probability, reduce their likelihood of occurring. 248 On
the other hand, the proposed rule still preserves true privileges. 249
245. IT&T Corp. v. United Tel. Co., 60 F.R.D. 177, 180 (M.D. Fla. 1973) ("The privilege
may be overcome, not only where fraud or crime is involved, but also where there are
other substantial abuses of the attorney-client relationship."); cf Central Constr. Co. v.
Home Indem. Co., 794 P.2d 595, 598 (Alaska 1990) ("'Acts constituting fraud are as broad
and as varied as the human mind can invent. Deception and deceit in any form universally
connote fraud. Public policy demands that the "fraud" exception to the attorney-client
privilege . . . be given the broadest interpretation.'" (ellipsis in original) (quoting In re
Callan, 300 A.2d 868, 877 (NJ. Super. Ct.), affd, 312 A.2d 881 (NJ. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1973), rev'd on other grounds, 331 A.2d 612 (N.J. 1975))).
246. Cf G. Michael Halfenger, Note, The Attorney Misconduct Exception to the Work Product
Doctrine, 58 U. CHI. L. REv. 1079, 1079 (1991) (arguing that the work product doctrine
should not be applied when the evidence sought is generated by attorney misconduct).
But cf John A. Rupp, Discovery 2000, FOR DEF., Sept. 1996, at 9, 9 (describing the Discovery
2000 Project of the Defense Research Institute and indicating that a Task Force has been
appointed to identify ways "to maintain and strengthen the attorney-client and work prod-
uct privileges" because "[t ] hese traditional privileges have been challenged by plaintiffs'
expanding attempts to redefine the crime-fraud exception").
247. See FRANcis H. HARE, JR. ET AL., FuLL DISCLOSURE: COMBATING STONEWALLING AND
OTHER DIsCOvERY ABUSES 105 (1995) (acknowledging that objections are used to deprive
examiners of discovery opportunities and that objections are employed to coach
witnesses).
248. Harnessing one evil sometimes generates another. One evil that might be gener-
ated by this rule if counsel misused it would be satellite litigation over what must be re-
vealed to the questioning attorney. Some have observed:
The crime-fraud exception to the attorney-client privilege is one of the most for-
midable weapons in the plaintiffs arsenal. As discovery batfles in major litigation
have escalated in scope and significance, the opportunity to breach the twin bas-
tions of the privilege and the work-product doctrine represents a potentially
profound tactical advantage. Moreover, the relatively minimal showing required
in some jurisdictions to invoke the exception makes it an irresistible target of
creative counsel.
Brian A. Foster et al., The Crime-Fraud Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, FOR DEF., Sept.
1996, at 27, 27.
249. If the deponent's attorney objects to this procedure, the parties might submit the
matter to the court. The court can hold an in camera review to determine if the private
conference concerned whether to assert a privilege. Cf United States v. Zolin, 491 U.S.
554, 565-73 (1989) (suggesting that an in camera review might be appropriate under some
circumstances); Foster et al., supra note 248, at 31 (indicating that most jurisdictions per-
mit some form of in camera review).
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In addition, prohibiting conferences during pending questions
might actually cause attorneys to prepare their clients better. Too
many lawyers spend only a few minutes truly preparing their witnesses
for depositions.2 5 And too often, these "preparation" sessions consist
of nothing more than providing the client with "tips" about how to
answer deposition questions-for example, "answer only the question
asked" and "don't speculate." 251 Because being deposed can be a
traumatic experience,252 clients deserve the best preparation an attor-
ney can give. Before the deposition, attorneys should spend time with
the client reviewing relevant documents, recounting the facts, and dis-
cussing deposition procedures.253 The deposition is not a place for a
client to hear this information for the first time.254
Moreover, private conferences merely call the deponent's credi-
bility into question. As one commentator noted, "Because witness
preparation is ordinarily conducted in private, it is difficult for the
lawyer and witness to avoid the appearance that they have invented a
convenient story for the jury.' ' 2 55 Thus, when "preparation" occurs
during the deposition, it merely casts doubt on the witness's veracity
and credibility. 256
250. See MALONE & HoFFMAN, supra note 15, at 155 ("Only [about] ... twenty percent of
attorneys realize that [commonly used preparation] approaches... [do not deal] with the
primary factor affecting the witness's performance at the deposition, which is his level of
confidence about his ability to perform in the deposition environment."); Briscoe R. Smith
& Edward D. Cavanagh, Preparing a Witness to Testify in a Commercial Case, LmGATION, Sum-
mer 1992, at 36, 36 ("Often a lawyer will rely on a quick meeting with a witness in the
adversary's waiting room before a deposition, expecting to control damage during the dep-
osition by a barrage of speaking objections, directions not to answer, off-the-record confer-
ences, and other diversions."); cf N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.21 cmt. (proposed May 24, 1995)
(rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on file with author) ("Serious problems arise when counsel tak-
ing or defending depositions are unprepared. The result is just the opposite of what the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are designed to accomplish.").
251. See, e.g., Shartel, supra note 193, at 12 ("'Too many lawyers believe that preparation
of a witness for a deposition consists of reading 20 rules on depositions .... It's not
enough to say "don't volunteer anything" and "listen to the questions."'").
252. See MALONE & HoFFMAN, supra note 15, at 156-58, 180 (describing the anxieties of
the deposed witness).
253. See id. ch. 13 ("Preparing the Witness to Be Deposed").
254. SeeJohnson, supra note 6, at 64 (explaining that letting a witness go in "cold and
blind" is a "deadly" deposition sin).
255. John S. Applegate, Witness Preparation, 68 TEX. L. REV. 277, 279 (1989); accord
Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102 F.RD. 339, 382
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) ("[T]here is a widespread belief at the bar that such conferences ... are
abused by some attorneys to suggest testimony to the witness.").
256. See Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d
890, 894 (7th Cir. 1981) (relating that defendants believed plaintiffs' counsel had coached
a witness during 127 private conferences); IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 6:27,
at 55 ("The more frequently you confer with the deponent, the stronger is the appearance
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Turning to the hypothetical, the first break in Ms. Sawyer's depo-
sition was improper because it was called to assist the client, not to
assert a privilege. In many jurisdictions, courts would conclude that
the deponent's attorney acted improperly.257 In some jurisdictions,
he would have violated specific rules prohibiting conferences during
pending questions.258 In other jurisdictions, depending on what oc-
curred during the conference, he might have violated ethical or crimi-
nal rules that prohibit witness coaching. 259  Of course, given the
dearth of authority on private conferences during depositions, courts
in some jurisdictions might conclude that he did not violate any rule
or obligation, or might simply warn him not to repeat his conduct in
future depositions.260
Apart from violating rules, Mr. Palmer may have lost his client's
confidence, if Ms. Sawyer perceived that she had not been adequately
prepared to testify.26 1 Further, under the rule proposed in this Arti-
cle, the questioning attorney would have been permitted to learn the
substance of communications that occurred during this conference,
thus further deteriorating the deponent's confidence in her attor-
ney's competence.262
The questioning attorney, Ms. Davis, had several options about
how to proceed after this first recess. After only one interruption,
running to court may not have been the best option.2 63 Ms. Davis did,
however, follow the rule advocated by most experts-object and build
a record of opposing counsel's conduct.26 She asked that the confer-
ence be postponed until the witness answered, and when the depo-
nent and her counsel left the room, she directed the court reporter to
note the conference on the record and to time the conference.265 If
she ever had to seek judicial assistance, the record of misconduct
would be clear.
of the evil that you are using the conferences as a pretext to coach the deponent about the
answers to the opposing attorney's questions.").
257. See supra notes 183-184.
258. See supra notes 183-184, 187 and accompanying text.
259. See supra notes 204-210, 227 and accompanying text.
260. See supra notes 101, 111-113 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 250-254 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 235-241 and accompanying text.
263. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:39, at 81 (noting that "it is a mis-
take to run to the law-and-motion judge for an order after the first private conference
between the deponent and the opposing attorney").
264. See, e.g., id. ("Your first response to the opposing attorney's conduct must be to
build a good record.").
265. Cf id. ("Time the conference; if it is lengthy, have the record reflect the duration
of the conference.").
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Another option would have been for Ms. Davis to let opposing
counsel know she disapproved of his tactics and signal the deponent
that something might be amiss. One commentator suggests the fol-
lowing when the deponent's counsel demands a recess while a ques-
tion is pending:
Offer[ I] the opposing counsel and his witness a five- or ten-
minute recess by saying, "If you haven't had a chance to brief
your witness in preparation for this deposition, why don't
you go outside and talk to him now so that you can come
back into the conference room and then we can proceed
with the deposition without interruption."266
Such a statement might embarrass the attorney enough to stop future
conferences.
In addition to building a record or chastising opposing counsel,
Ms. Davis had many other options available. For example, Ms. Davis
could have insisted that the parties stipulate to schedule breaks in ad-
vance and not to deviate from the schedule absent mutual agree-
ment.2 67 Or, when opposing counsel insisted on the conference, she
could have stopped the deposition and immediately called a judge or
magistrate to obtain a ruling prohibiting private conferences during
pending questions and requiring the deponent to disclose conversa-
tions held during improper conferences.268 Alternatively, at the con-
266. MARK A. DOMBROFF, DISCOVERY § 8.20, at 309 (1986).
267. SeeWILLIAM H. FORTUNE ET AL., MODERN .ITIGATION AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
riy HANDBOOK: THE Limrrs OF ZEALous ADvocAcY § 6.7.5, at 265 (1996) (suggesting that
scheduling breaks in advance will keep deponents' attorneys from derailing depositions).
268. The first rule before contacting ajudge or magistrate by phone is to know whether
she looks favorably on this type of dispute resolution. Compare Fashion Boutique of Short
Hills, Inc. v. Fendi USA, Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4544 (MGC), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4024, at *7-8
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 1994) (mem.) ("Disputes ... shall be brought to the attention of the
court in the first instance by telephone conference without adjourning the deposition.")
and Standing Orders of the Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339, 375
(E.D.N.Y. 1984) (declaring that when discovery disputes arise during a deposition, the at-
torneys or affected parties "shall notify the court by telephone and request a telephone
conference with the court to resolve such dispute") with Tenth AnnualJudicial Conference
of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 226 (Fed.
Cir. 1992) (Lamberth, J., panelist, commenting) ("I don't resolve [discovery disputes] by
telephone. I want to see the lawyers' eyeballs when I resolve it and about 70 percent of the
phone calls are resolved before the eyeballs get before me."). The United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Texas, in connection with its Civil Justice Expense and
Delay Reduction Plan, established a discovery hotline to provide instant rulings on deposi-
tion disputes. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas, Civil Justice
Expense and Delay Reduction Plan, art. 6, 1, reprinted in TEXAS RuLEs OF COURT: FEDERAL
386 (West 1997); see also Cary, supra note 159, at 593-94 (suggesting that other districts
implement similar hotlines). But see Deposition Practice in the Late '90s: 'Call Waiting'?, N.J.
LAw., June 10, 1996, at 6, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Allnws File (criticizing a
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clusion of the deposition, she could have filed a motion to compel,
asking that the deponent be required to divulge the substance of the
26private conversation. 69 Some courts would have permitted the ques-
tioning attorney to explore the substance of conversations held dur-
ing the conference.27 ° Other courts, on a motion by the questioning
attorney, might have sanctioned the deponent's counsel for delaying
or impeding the deposition, especially if the conduct were repeated
during the deposition.27
To protect her client from similar misconduct in the future,
PharTech's counsel might consider videotaping the deposition. 272 It
proposed rule that would have permitted attorneys to seek telephone resolution of dis-
putes that arise during depositions).
269. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) (2) (B) (authorizing the discovering party to move for an
order compelling an answer).
270. See, e.g., Langer v. Presbyterian Med. Ctr., Civil Action Nos. 874000, 91-1814,
88-1064, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2199, at *35 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 1995) ("It is well-established
that the 'structural framework,' or 'external trappings' of the attorney-client relationship,
as opposed to the substantive communications made during the relationship, are not privi-
leged."), vacated on reconsideration, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9448 (E.D. Pa. June 30, 1995); In
re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II, 848 F. Supp. 527, 567 (D. Del. 1994) (permitting the ques-
tioning attorney to inquire into the topic areas of private conferences); supra note 184
(identifying local rules covering private conferences). At a minimum, counsel is entitled to
know whether a conference occurred; that fact is not privileged. See IMW1NKELRIED &
BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:39, at 82.
271. Depending on the circumstances, sanctions in federal court might be available. See
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (1994) (providing sanctions for unreasonably or vexatiously multiplying
the proceedings); FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) (providing sanctions for impeding or delaying dep-
osition examination); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (providing sanctions for failure to obey discovery
orders). In addition, courts have an inherent power to sanction abusive litigation prac-
tices. See, e.g., Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 42-44 (1991) (upholding a district
court's exercise of its inherent judicial power to sanction improper conduct); Phillips v.
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 92 Civ. 8527 (KTD), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3748, at
*5-6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994) (discussing the parameters of the court's inherent power to
sanction misconduct). Sanctions for deposition conduct are not available under Federal
Rule 26(g). See Dobkin v.Johns Hopkins Univ., No. HAR 93-2228, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
4458, at *5-6 (D. Md. Mar. 24, 1995) ("Rule 26(g) does not authorize sanctions for in-
structing a deponent not to answer questions at a deposition. Sanctions are available
under this rule only where an attorney signs a discovery request, response, or objection in
violation of the standards set forth in the rule."); GREGORY P. JOSEPH, SANCTIONS: THE
FEDERAL LAw OF LITIGATION ABUSE 518 (2d ed. 1994) (noting that the scope of Rule 26(g)
includes "all discovery requests, responses or objections served or filed in federal district
court and to Rule 26(a) (1) and (3) disclosures"); cf Cary, supra note 159, at 588-93 (dis-
cussing sanctions available for attorney misconduct during depositions, including Rule 30,
Rule 37, 28 U.S.C. § 1927, and the court's inherent judicial power to regulate conduct, but
excluding, by implication, Rule 26(g)).
272. See, e.g., Milwaukee Concrete Studios, Ltd. v. Greeley Ornamental Concrete Prods.,
Inc., 140 F.RD. 373, 379-80 (E.D. Wis. 1991) (authorizing the use of videotape in an oral
deposition when confrontation and controversy between counsel were obstacles to efficient
discovery); David M. Balabanian, Medium v. Tedium: Video Depositions Come of Age, in THE
LITIGATION MANUAL, supra note 23, at 232. See generally Hugh B. Lewis, Survey, The Video
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is amazing how a camera can sometimes change behavior for the bet-
ter. 273  She might also consider requesting a discovery conference
with the presiding judge or assigned magistrate judge,274 for such a
conference might curtail an opponent's unprofessional behavior
merely by bringing it to the judge's attention. Alternatively, she might
request a protective order 275 or standing order 276 that addresses depo-
sition conduct and specifically prohibits conferences during pending
questions.277 Further, she might request that a special master or mag-
istrate be appointed either to attend future depositions or to be avail-
able to handle disputes as they arise during the deposition. 278 As an
Deposition as a Civil Litigation Tool 13 CAMPBELL L. REV. 375 (1991) (reporting the findings
of a research project on the video deposition's place in litigation).
273. See, e.g., Milwaukee Concrete, 140 F.R.D. at 379-80 (noting that "[i]mplicit in [the
defendant's] motion is a belief that the attorneys will behave themselves if they are aware
that any misbehavior is being recorded on videotape"); Balabanian, supra note 272, at 232
(observing that video depositions can suppress attorney misbehavior); Lewis, supra note
272, at 376 (commenting that using video depositions "affects the demeanor of the
attorneys").
274. See FED. R. CIv. P. 16 (indicating that discovery is an appropriate topic for a pretrial
conference); Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657 F.2d
890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981) (suggesting that the parties seek a discovery conference to iron
out discovery disputes); Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205, 226 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Lamberth, J., panel-
ist, commenting) (recommending that lawyers request Rule 16 conferences to resolve dis-
covery disputes).
275. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
276. See MANUAL ON COMPLEX LrrIGATION (THIRD), supra note 51, § 41.38(5) (b), at 518
(suggesting a standing order for effective discovery that deals with, among other things,
handling objections and directions not to answer).
277. See id. § 41.38 (5) (c), at 518 ("Private conferences between deponents and their
attorneys in the course of interrogation are improper except for the purpose of determin-
ing whether a privilege should be asserted.").
278. See, e.g., D. COLO. L.R. 30.1C(B) (indicating that a court may appoint a special
master, at the expense of the party or attorney engaging in abusive conduct, to attend
future depositions and report to the court); Mercer v. Gerry Baby Prods. Co., 160 F.R.D.
576, 577, 579 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (appointing a special master to manage discovery, to pro-
vide opportunities for alternative dispute resolution, and to foster settlement discussions);
Carlucci v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 102 F.R.D. 472, 476 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (mem.) (appointing a
special master to oversee all discovery proceedings when the personal animosity between
lawyers disrupted the discovery process); Palm Beach County Sch. Bd. v. Morrison, 621 So.
2d 464, 468 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (appointing a special master to preside over the
continuation of a deposition marked by many objections and instructions not to answer);
Acri v. Golden Triangle Mgmt. Acceptance Co., 142 Pi-r. LEGALJ. 225, 230 (Pa. Ct. C.P.
Allegheny County 1994) (asserting that it is appropriate to appoint a discovery master to
supervise a deposition in an extreme case); cf Miles W. Lord, Discovery Abuse: Appointing
Special Masters, 9 HAMLINE L. REV. 63, 66 (1986) (discussing the use of special masters to
help prevent discovery abuse in massive document productions).
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extreme measure, she might request that future depositions be taken
at the courthouse.2 79
Unlike the first conference, the conference called during the
3:05 p.m. session appears to be appropriate, because it was held to
discuss a possible privilege covering the pending question. Although
the excerpt does not show what happened after the conference, depo-
nent's counsel acted properly before the conference. He stated on
the record that he wished to discuss raising the doctor-patient privi-
lege with his client. Therefore, questioning counsel knew what was
going to be discussed during the private conference.
When Ms. Sawyer and Mr. Palmer returned to the room, Mr.
Palmer should have indicated whether a privilege was being asserted.
If it were, counsel should have again stated the basis for the privi-
lege.28° Although questioning counsel could not have asked about
privileged information,28' she could have probed about whether the
privilege was properly raised.2 8 2 She also could have asked whether
any other matters were discussed.283 If they were, she could have then
explored those matters-because, under the rule proposed in this Ar-
ticle, 84 discussions about other matters would have been improper
and thus would have lost the protection of the attorney-client
privilege.
B. Witness-Initiated Conferences and Conferences to Discuss Documents
During the 11:15 a.m. session, questioning counsel showed the
deponent a document and asked whether she had ever seen the docu-
ment. Before answering, the witness asked to confer with her attor-
ney. Should witness-initiated conferences be treated differently than
279. See, e.g., D. COLO. L.R_ 30.1C(B) (describing the court's ability to require that depo-
sitions be taken at the courthouse or in the master's office so that disputes can be decided
immediately); Goldman v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, 99 F.R.D. 554, 555 (S.D.N.Y.
1983) (ordering a deposition to be completed at a courthouse so that a judge could be
"available for an immediate ruling as to any problem that might arise"). But see Eggteston,
657 F.2d at 902-03 ("Depositions cannot be taken in the judge's reception room so that the
judge always will be readily available to either counsel.").
280. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
281. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 4.4 (1994); see also Valassis v.
Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 124-25 (E.D. Mich. 1992) ("[Model Rule 4.4] has been inter-
preted as preventing an attorney from inquiring about privileged matters." (citing ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991); 2 HAzARD &
HODES, supra note 131, § 4.2:107, at 738)).
282. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
283. See supra note 241 and accompanying text.
284. See supra notes 235-241 and accompanying text.
1998]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
attorney-initiated conferences? Should witnesses be allowed to confer
with counsel before answering questions about a document?
The answer to both questions is no. Courts have not been partic-
ularly concerned with who initiates the conference. In Hall, the court
explained:
To allow private conferences initiated by the witness would
be to allow the witness to listen to the question, ask his or her
lawyer for the answer, and then parrot the lawyer's response.
Again, this is not what depositions are all about-or, at least,
it is not what they are supposed to be all about. If the witness
does not understand the question, or needs some language
further defined or some documents further explained, the
witness can ask the deposing lawyer to clarify or further ex-
plain the question. After all, the lawyer who asked the ques-
tion is in a better position to explain the question than is the
witness's own lawyer. There is simply no qualitative distinc-
tion between private conferences initiated by a lawyer and
those initiated by a witness. Neither should occur.285
The rule articulated in Hall makes sense. Again referencing the
trial context, the witness is not allowed to break and speak with coun-
sel while she is testifying.2 6 This type of restriction does not violate
the witness's constitutional rights. 287 Therefore, to allow a witness to
call a break during a pending question would invoke most of the same
ethical and legal concerns as an attorney-initiated conference. In ad-
dition, as the Hall court noted, if attorney-initiated conferences were
prohibited but witness-initiated conferences were permitted, smart
counsel would simply encourage or signal the witness when to
break. 2 8 Thus, allowing witness-initiated conferences would, to some
attorneys, become a very tempting loophole.
Courts also have not distinguished between conferences to dis-
cuss documents and conferences to discuss any other type of ques-
285. Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 528-29 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (footnote omit-
ted); accord N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.23(A) (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on
file with author) ("At any time during a deposition, examining counsel may instruct the
deponent to ask examining counsel, rather than the deponent's own counsel, for clarifica-
tion, definitions of any words, questions, or documents presented during the course of the
deposition.").
286. See supra text accompanying note 214.
287. See infra notes 313-315 and accompanying text. But cf Standing Orders of the
Court on Effective Discovery in Civil Cases, 102 F.R.D. 339, 382-83 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (sug-
gesting that only attorney-initiated conferences are prohibited because "ordinarily witness-
initiated private conferences are for bona fide purposes").
288. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 528-29.
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tion.28 9 In other words, if a question is pending, a conference should
not be called, except to assert a privilege. As the Hall court indicated,
the questioning attorney "is entitled to have the witness, and the wit-
ness alone, answer questions about the document .... There is no
valid reason why the [witness's] lawyer and the witness should have to
confer about the document before the witness answers questions
about it."290
A similar ruling was issued in In re Amezaga,29 1 in which an attor-
ney instructed his client not to answer deposition questions concern-
ing exhibits that were not produced before the deposition began.292
Following Halts lead, the court determined that "[w]hile the depos-
ing attorney should furnish counsel with a copy of the document,
there is no requirement that the witness and his lawyer discuss the
document prior to the witness being questioned." 2 3 The court ex-
plained that the attorney did not present any valid reason-such as
needing to discuss whether a privilege should be asserted-for confer-
ring with the deponent, and the court therefore imposed monetary
sanctions on the deponent's attorney for this and other similar
conduct.2
9 4
Applying these principles to the Sawyer deposition, the witness-
initiated break to discuss a document was improper for the same rea-
sons the first break was improper. 29 5 It delayed the deposition and
presented an opportunity for the attorney to coach his witness and
possibly alter the truth. In addition, because the break was not called
to discuss a possible privilege covering the pending question,
289. See, e.g., id. at 529 ("The same reasoning [that prohibits lawyers and witnesses from
holding conferences during depositions and recesses] applies to conferences about docu-
ments shown to the witness during the deposition.").
290. Id.; accord Damaj v. Farmers Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 559, 560-61 (N.D. Okla. 1995)
(ruling that the deponent and the deponent's counsel are prohibited from discussing
"documents presented to the [deponent] during the deposition prior to the [deponent]
answering questions concerning the documents"). But cf In re Orthopedic Bone Screw
Prods. Liab. Litig., MDL No. 1014, 1995 WL 925664, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 1993) (Pretrial
Order No. 153) ("Deposing counsel shall, ten days prior to the deposition, furnish depo-
nent's counsel with all of the documents he or she expects to question the deponent about
during the deposition.").
291. 195 B.R. 221 (Bankr. D.P.R. 1996).
292. Id. at 227. Opposing counsel represented that the documents used at the deposi-
tion were previously produced by the deponent. Id.
293. Id.
294. Id. at 228-29. The deponent's counsel "engaged in extensive and unnecessary col-
loquy, asserted groundless objections, improperly objected and took every opportunity to
interrupt and argue with opposing counsel." Id. at 228.
295. See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text.
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PharTech's counsel should have the right to inquire what was dis-
cussed during the conference. 296
C. Private Conferences During Long Breaks
The last break in the Sawyer deposition occurred late on the first
day, when the attorneys decided to continue the deposition on an-
other day. The deposition resumed about one week later. At the con-
tinuation, PharTech's attorney asked whether the deponent had
conferred with her attorney during the long hiatus. The deponent's
attorney objected and claimed that any communications that might
have occurred during the recess were protected by the attorney-client
privilege.
The propriety of private conferences during regularly scheduled
breaks poses a more difficult question than conferences held while a
question is pending. A conference during a scheduled break does not
interrupt or delay the deposition.29 7 Thus, it would not violate the
spirit of the federal procedural rules that condemn delaying tactics.298
Moreover, a conference during a normal break would not affect the
answer to a pending question.29 9 On the other hand, such a confer-
ence might permit an attorney to suggest changes to prior answers or
coach the witness about questions that the attorney could now antici-
pate based on earlier questions. 00 Consequently, the potential exists
that the conference might be used to violate ethical or legal rules
against witness coaching.01 Conversely, prohibiting a client from
296. See supra notes 233-239 and accompanying text.
297. See supra note 184.
298. Such conferences might, however, violate the letter of the law in some jurisdictions.
See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Private conferences are
barred during the deposition, and the fortuitous occurrence of a coffee break, lunch
break, or evening recess is no reason to change the rules."); supra note 184 (detailing the
limited circumstances in which a witness may confer with counsel during a deposition, as
discussed in various local rules).
299. Cf Federal Bar Council, Committee on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the
Conduct of Depositions, 131 F.R.D. 613, 627 (1990) (arguing that a rule declaring attor-
ney-client conferences during depositions presumptively improper "would impose harsh,
rigid limitations on attorney/client interchange that are neither needed [nor] fair"). But
see Hall 150 F.R.D. at 529 (indicating that clever lawyers could use normal breaks during
depositions to discuss strategies for responding to pending questions).
300. See Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 529 ("A clever lawyer or witness who finds that a deposition is
going in an undesired or unanticipated direction could simply insist on a short recess to
discuss the unanticipated yet desired answers.").
301. See id. at 528 (noting that "a lawyer must accept the facts as they develop" and
holding that a lawyer and a client do not have an absolute right to confer during a deposi-
tion on the ground that "[t] here is no proper need for the witness's own lawyer to act as an
intermediary ... and help[ ] the witness to formulate answers"); cf Geders v. United Stites,
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talking to her attorney during a long break might penalize the client
unnecessarily.
31 2
In the criminal trial context, most courts have held that a testify-
ing witness may confer with her attorney, if the break lasts overnight
or longer.30 3 In Geders v. United States, °4 for example, the judge pre-
siding over a criminal trial instructed the defendant's attorney not to
speak with his client, who was in the process of being cross-examined,
"about anything" during the evening recess. 30 5 Although the attorney
objected to this instruction, the trial judge reasoned that the attorney
would not have been permitted to confer with his client had the recess
not been called.30 6
425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3 (1976) ("An attorney must respect the important ethical distinction
between discussing testimony and seeking improperly to influence it.").
302. See Potashnick v. Port City Constr. Co., 609 F.2d 1101, 1119 (5th Cir. 1980) (hold-
ing that an order prohibiting a civil defendant from conferring with counsel for seven days,
including overnight recesses, violated the party's due process right to retain counsel).
303. See infra text accompanying notes 304-311 (discussing Geders v. United States, 425
U.S. 80, 91 (1976)); see also Mudd v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1510 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
("[A]n order that denies a criminal defendant the right to consult with counsel during a
substantial trial recess, even though limited to a discussion of testimony, is inconsistent
with the [S]ixth [A]mendment of the Constitution."); United States v. Romano, 736 F.2d
1432, 1435-39 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the trial court violated the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to counsel by barring him from discussing his testimony with his attor-
ney during a five-day recess), vacated, 755 F.2d 1401 (lth Cir. 1985); United States v.
Venuto, 182 F.2d 519, 522 (3d Cir. 1950) (overruling the trial court's order that a defend-
ant could not communicate with counsel over an 18-hour overnight recess from the de-
fendant's cross-examination); Ashurst v. State, 424 So. 2d 691, 691-93 (Ala. Crim. App.
1982) (striking down an order barring a defendant from conferring with counsel during
any recess); Bova v. State, 410 So. 2d 1343, 1345 (Fla. 1982) (finding that no matter how
brief the recess, a defendant in a criminal proceeding must have access to his attorney);
People v. Hagen, 446 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91 (App. Div. 1982) (mem.) (finding that the trial court
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel by barring the defendant from
discussing his ongoing testimony with his attorney during an overnight recess); cf. Bailey v.
Redman, 657 F.2d 21, 22-25 (3d Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (holding that the trial court's
order prohibiting the defendant from discussing ongoing testimony with his attorney dur-
ing an overnight recess did not violate the Sixth Amendment because counsel did not
object to the order and did not present evidence that the defendant would have conferred
with counsel but for the order).
304. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
305. Id. at 82. The recess lasted about 17 hours. Id. at 88.
306. Id. at 83 n.1. The following exchange occurred between the judge, the defendant's
attorney (Mr. Rinehart), and the prosecutor (Mr. Blasingame):
MR. BLASINGAME: Has this witness been instructed now that he is not to talk to
anyone whatsoever, including his attorneys . . .?
MR. RINEHART: If he were instructed not to talk to his attorney, I feel that it
would be improper. I think I always have the right to talk to my client.
THE COURT: . .. [L]et's make this clear-you always have the right to talk to
your client-but except for the accident-and "accident" means something over
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The Supreme Court ruled that, in this-case, the order preventing
the criminal defendant from consulting with his attorney "about any-
thing" during a seventeen-hour overnight recess violated his right to
the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment.3°7
The Court reasoned that during overnight recesses, attorney and cli-
ent frequently discuss tactical decisions and review information made
relevant by the client's testimony that day. The Court also realized
that "the role of counsel is important precisely because ordinarily a
defendant is ill-equipped to understand and deal with the trial process
without a lawyer's guidance. '0 8
However, the Court was sensitive that an attorney might attempt
to coach a witness during the break. To address this concern, the
Court noted that the prosecutor had ways to cope with potential
"coaching" situations.30 9 The prosecutor could, for example, cross-ex-
amine the witness about the extent of any coaching that might have
occurred during the long recess.3 10 Further, if the trial court deter-
mined that the risk of coaching was high, it could arrange the se-
quence of testimony so that a long recess might be avoided or limit
communications for a shorter period of time than presented by these
facts.3 11
which you have no control-the cross-examination would have been right now
and you would not have had an opportunity to talk to him.
THE COURT: My question is: While a witness is subject to cross-examination,
even though he is a defendant, does his attorney have the right to confer with
him before he is cross-examined?
MR. RINEHART: I feel that I do have the right to confer with him but not to
coach him as to what he may say on cross-examination or how to answer
questions.
THE COURT: Then what else would you need to talk to him about?
MR. RINEHART: I don't know. Such as whom should I call as the next witness.
THE COURT: ... I think [your client] would understand it if I told him just not
to talk to you; and I just think it is better that he not talk to you about anything.
Id. at 83-85 n.1 (internal quotation marks omitted).
307. Id. at 91.
308. Id. at 88.
309. Id. at 89.
310. Specifically, the Court stated:
Skillful cross-examination could develop a record which the prosecutor in closing
argument might well exploit by raising questions as to the defendant's credibility,
if it developed that defense counsel had in fact coached the witness as to how to
respond on the remaining direct examination and on cross-examination.
Id. at 89-90.
311. Id. at 90.
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Although the Geders decision was expressly limited to the facts
presented, 312 and although it involved a criminal case, courts have fol-
lowed a similar rationale in civil cases. In Potashnick v. Port City Con-
struction Co.,3 13 for example, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit held that an order prohibiting a civil defendant from
conferring with counsel about any matter for a period of seven days,
including overnight recesses, violated the party's right to due process
under the Fifth Amendment.3 14 The court reasoned that, even in a
civil case, the trial judge's "denial of any attorney-client communica-
tion for such an extended period of time resulted in a significant dep-
rivation of the effective assistance of counsel and thus impinged
[upon the defendant's] constitutional right to retain counsel."315
Other courts have used similar reasoning.3 16 In addition, at least
one legislature has enacted a rule declaring that counsel may confer
with a deponent if the recess exceeds five days.317 Even Judge Gaw-
throp, author of Hall v. Clifton Precision,318 recognized a party's right
to consult with counsel during lengthy breaks.31 9
A variation of the Geders/Potashnick rule should be applied to long
breaks in civil depositions. Attorneys should be allowed to communi-
cate with their testifying client during breaks; however, these commu-
nications should not concern the substance of the client's prior or
future testimony. It is certainly true that attorneys and clients need to
speak regularly about the status of their cases and that prohibiting all
communications for a day or more might adversely affect the client,
especially if deadlines must be met. However, in the civil discovery
context, during which substantial time lapses are common between
significant events, few (if any) legitimate reasons exist why an attorney
or client would need to discuss the client's actual testimony.320 Thus,
to permit attorney and client to discuss the substance of the client's
312. Id. at 91. The Court declared that "[w]e need not reach, and we do not deal with,
limitations imposed in other circumstances." Id.
313. 609 F.2d 1101 (5th Cir. 1980).
314. Id. at 1119.
315. Id.
316. See supra note 303 for representative cases.
317. DEL. SUPER. CT. Civ. R. 30(d) (for language, see supra note 102); accord North Am.
Philips Corp. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., No. 88C-JA-155, 1995 WL 628447, at *6 (Del. Super.
Ct. Apr. 22, 1995) (mem.) ("[A] ttorney/witness consultations during an interim of five
days or more [are] presumptively proper and will not cause prejudice to the opposition.").
318. 150 F.R.D. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993). For a detailed description of Hall see supra Part
I.A.1.c.
319. See supra note 78.
320. For additional reasons why this approach is logical, see infra notes 347-358 and
accompanying text.
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testimony during long breaks would only increase the odds that im-
proper coaching would occur.3 21 Because truth is the ultimate goal of
discovery, 22 courts should adopt policies that promote that goal.
This proposed approach furthers that ultimate goal without unduly
impinging on the attorney-client relationship. 23
D. Private Conferences During Short Breaks
On the first day of the Sawyer deposition, the parties agreed to an
hour and fifteen-minute lunch recess. When the parties returned, Ms.
Davis asked the deponent whether she had spoken to her attorney
during the break and then proceeded to probe the substance of the
attorney-client conversation.
In the criminal trial context, the United States Supreme Court
has articulated different rules for attorney-client consultation during
long and short breaks.3 24 In Perry v. Leeke,125 the Supreme Court ad-
dressed whether a trial court could prohibit a testifying defendant
from speaking with his attorney during a fifteen-minute recess called
at the end of the defendant's direct examination.326 The state trial
court ordered that the defendant "not be allowed to talk to anyone,
including his lawyer, during the break. '3 27 After the recess, defense
counsel moved for a mistrial; the judge denied a mistrial, stating that
the defendant "'was not entitled to be cured or assisted or helped
approaching his cross examination.' 3 28 The Supreme Court ruled
that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to confer with
321. See Hal4 150 F.R.D. at 529 ("Private conferences are barred during the deposition,
and the fortuitous occurrence of a coffee break, lunch break, or evening recess is no rea-
son to change the rules. Otherwise .... [a] clever lawyer... could simply insist on a short
recess to discuss the unanticipated yet desired answers.").
322. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) (observing that civil discovery pro-
vides "[m ] utual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties... essential to
proper litigation"); cf United States v. Shaffer Equip. Co., 11 F.3d 450, 457-58 (4th Cir.
1993) (commenting that truth is the object of the adversarial system's process).
323. As in the private conference situation, this proposed rule could be enforced by
permitting the questioning attorney to ask whether the substance of the testimony was
discussed during the break. Improper discussions would not be protected by the attorney-
client privilege and would thus be subject to disclosure. See supra notes 235-254 and infra
note 356 (discussing potential enforcement problems).
324. Compare Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 91 (1976) (holding that a testifying
witness may confer with counsel if the break lasts overnight or longer) with Perry v. Leeke,
488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989) (concluding that a testifying defendant does not have a right to
advice from counsel during a short recess).
325. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
326. Id. at 274.
327. Id.
328. Id. (quoting Appellant's Brief at 4-5).
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counsel while he is actually testifying or during short breaks in the
testimony.3 29
Although the Court indicated that a trial court could permit such
consultation, 331 it ruled that a trial court could also prohibit a defend-
ant from speaking with his attorney during a short break in the de-
fendant's testimony, because "cross-examination of a witness who is
uncounseled between direct examination and cross-examination is
more likely to lead to the discovery of truth than is cross-examination
of a witness who is given time to pause and consult with his attor-
ney."33 1 It also posited that during "a short recess.., it is appropriate
to presume that nothing but the testimony will be discussed."33 2
In the civil deposition context, at least one court developed a ra-
tionale similar to that in Perry and has prohibited conferences during
short breaks in the deposition. In Hall v. Clifton Precision,33 the court
stated:
Private conferences are barred during the deposition, and
the fortuitous occurrence of a coffee break, lunch break, or
evening recess is no reason to change the rules. Otherwise,
329. Id. at 281-82. The Court distinguished this situation from that in Geders, see supra
Part III.C, by explaining that discussions between attorney and client during overnight
recesses typically encompass matters beyond the defendant's own testimony--"matters that
the defendant does have a constitutional right to discuss with his lawyer, such as the availa-
bility of other witnesses, trial tactics, or even the possibility of negotiating a plea bargain."
Perry, 488 U.S. at 284. The Court continued:
It is the defendant's right to unrestricted access to his lawyer for advice on a
variety of trial-related matters that is controlling in the context of a long recess.
The fact that such discussions will inevitably include some consideration of the
defendant's ongoing testimony does not compromise that basic right. But in a
short recess in which it is appropriate to presume that nothing but the testimony
will be discussed, the testifying defendant does not have a constitutional right to
advice.
Our conclusion does not mean that trial judges must forbid consultation be-
tween a defendant and his counsel during such brief recesses. As a matter of
discretion in individual cases .... it may well be appropriate to permit such con-
sultation. We merely hold that the Federal Constitution does not compel every
triai judge to allow the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his testimony is
in progress if the judge decides that there is a good reason to interrupt the trial
for a few minutes.
Id. at 284-85 (citation and footnote omitted).
330. See supra note 329.
331. Perry, 488 U.S. at 282. The Court explained that "the truth-seeking function of the
trial can be impeded in ways other than unethical 'coaching' [of the witness]." Id. For
example, allowing a witness to confer with counsel might permit the witness to regain her
composure or better understand the opponent's strategy, thus allowing her to give a better
answer. Id.
332. Id. at 284.
333. 150 F.RD. 525 (E.D. Pa. 1993). The Hall case is described in greater detail in supra
Part I.A.l.c.
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... [a] clever lawyer or witness who finds that a deposition is
going in an undesired or unanticipated direction could sim-
ply insist on a short recess to discuss the unanticipated yet
desired answers, thereby circumventing the prohibition on
private conferences. 34
Again, the court's primary concern must be witness coaching, because
conferences during scheduled breaks would not unduly prolong the
deposition.
On the other hand, some jurisdictions do not automatically pro-
hibit private conferences during normal breaks in the deposition.38 5
In New Jersey, for example, a new civil procedure rule provides that
"[o]nce the deponent has been sworn, there shall be no communica-
tion between the deponent and counsel during the course of the dep-
osition while testimony is being taken except with regard to the
assertion of a claim of privilege."336 New Jersey Superior Court Judge
Sylvia Pressler, in her comments to the new rule, stated that the rule
"clearly does not address consultation during overnight, lunch, and
other breaks."337
In addition, the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia recently refused to sanction an attorney who conferred with
his client during a five-minute recess, before which opposing counsel
had completed his examination, to discuss matters that might be cov-
ered in direct examination to rehabilitate the client.33' The court in-
terpreted Hall to state only that "'a lawyer and client do not have an
334. Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 529.
335. Even the trial court in Geders permitted the testifying defendant to confer with
counsel during a lunch break, after cross-examination had been completed. See Geders v.
United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89 (1976). In addition, many courts that have addressed the
"short break" issue in criminal trials have held that denying a defendant counsel during
any break violates the Sixth Amendment. See, e.g., Sanders v. Lane, 861 F.2d 1033, 1034
(7th Cir. 1988); Bova v. Dugger, 858 F.2d 1539, 1540 (11th Cir. 1988) (per curiam); Mudd
v. United States, 798 F.2d 1509, 1512 (D.C. Cir. 1986); Stubbs v. Bordenkircher, 689 F.2d
1205, 1206 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. DiLapi, 651 F.2d 140, 148 (2d Cir. 1981); State
v. Mebane, 529 A.2d 680, 685 (Conn. 1987); McFadden v. State, 424 So. 2d 918, 919-20
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Wooten-Bey v. State, 547 A.2d 1086, 1089 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1988), affd, 568 A.2d 16 (Md. 1990); People v. Hagen, 446 N.Y.S.2d 91, 91 (App. Div.
1982) (mem.). Although the constitutional right at issue in criminal cases (the Sixth
Amendment) is different from that at issue in civil cases (the Fifth Amendment), given the
dearth of cases on this issue in the civil context, these criminal cases are instructive.
336. N.J. SUPER. T. & SUR. CTS. R. 4:14-3(f).
337. Gianfranco A. Pietrafesa, Rule Doesn't Bar Conferences, N.J. L.J., Dec. 9, 1996, at 23,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Njlawj File (quoting Judge Sylvia Pressler). But see
Peter Lynch, New Deposition Rules Turn Rambo into a Potted Plant, N.J. L.J., Oct. 28, 1996, at
35, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Njlawj File (interpreting the rule to prohibit con-
ferences during deposition recesses).
338. See Odone v. Croda Int'l P.L.C., 170 F.R.D. 66, 70 (D.D.C. 1997) (mem.).
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absolute right to confer during the course of the client's deposition,"'
but not to prohibit all private conferences.3 3 9 Because the deponent's
counsel did not call the break, because opposing counsel had com-
pleted his deposition, and because the conference was held to deter-
mine whether the client misunderstood the question and needed to
be rehabilitated on direct, the court felt sanctions were not war-
ranted.3 4 ° Although the court was not willing to impose sanctions, it
noted that, "in retrospect, it would have been preferable for the plain-
tiff's attorney to ascertain on the record whether his client misinter-
preted a document."3 4 ' The court also observed that opposing
counsel could have further examined the witness when he changed
his position because of supposedly misunderstanding the original
342question.
Given the paucity of cases on this "short break" issue in deposi-
tions and civil trials, and the conflict among the few authorities that
do exist, no clear rule currently exists in most jurisdictions. However,
except in limited circumstances,3 43 the most sensible approach would
be to prohibit the deponent and her attorney from discussing the sub-
stance of prior or future deposition testimony during short recesses
agreed to by all counsel. The deponent could, however, confer with
counsel about other matters during these breaks. After the break, the
questioning attorney could ask whether deposition testimony had
been discussed. 3 " If the deponent indicates that testimony had been
discussed, then the substance of the conversation concerning prior or
339. Id. at 68 (quoting Hal4 150 F.R.D. at 528).
340. The court stated: "The Court... cannot penalize an attorney for utilizing a five-
minute recess that he did not request to learn whether his client misunderstood or misin-
terpreted the questions and then for attempting to rehabilitate his client on the record."
Id. at 69. The court also noted that the deponent was born in Italy and was not completely
proficient in the English language. See id. at 69 n.6.
341. Id. at 69.
342. Id.
343. The deponent and her counsel should be permitted to confer during a short break
when (1) they need to discuss whether to assert a privilege, see supra notes 228-232 and
accompanying text, or (2) all other counsel have completed their examinations and the
deponent's counsel is about to question his client, see N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.23 (proposed May
24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on file with author). The proposed Northern District
of Illinois local rules explained:
The reason for the second exception is to give a deponent the same right to
confer with counsel as a witness at trial. At trial an officer of a defendant might
be called as an adverse witness during plaintiffs case and called again during the
defendant's case. Between testimony sessions the officer could consult with
counsel.
Id. 5.23 cmt.
344. As noted earlier, the fact that a conversation occurred is not privileged. See supra
note 270.
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future testimony should be fair game for additional questions.345 If
the deponent indicates that testimony had not been discussed, then
the substance of the conference would be protected, assuming all
other requirements to preserve a privilege had been met.
3 46
This approach is consistent with the one adopted during some
trials.34 7 This proposed standard-which is less harsh than that articu--
lated by Judge Gawthrop in Hal 348-also represents a logical compro-
mise between competing interests. Primarily, this approach permits a
client to communicate with her attorney about matters other than her
deposition testimony. It therefore promotes the attorney-client rela-
tionship. In addition, it allows attorney and client to make efficient
use of their time together. In these busy times, many attorneys and
clients do not have the luxury of regularly communicating face-to-
face. Permitting attorney and client to use breaks to discuss other as-
pects of the litigation, such as upcoming motions, the whereabouts of
possible witnesses, and the schedule for future discovery, may actually
help advance smooth litigation.
Further, allowing an attorney and client to communicate about
matters other than the client's testimony does not outlaw all talk
about the deposition. Instead, some limited "wood-shedding" '49
about form could be allowed without stepping onto a slippery slope.
Indeed, little harm would be caused by allowing an attorney to remind
the witness to listen to the question, to give verbal answers instead of
head bobs, or to stop twisting in the chair.
On the other hand, courts should have the ability to control the
course of discovery and punish deposition abuses. 3 0 Because the
United States Supreme Court has ruled that a litigant's constitutional
rights are not violated if she is prohibited from consulting counsel
345. See supra notes 235-241 and accompanying text.
346. For example, if the "private conversation" were held in front of a third person, the
privilege would be waived. See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 113 F.3d 1457, 1464 (7th Cir.
1997) (holding that the attorney-client privilege was waived because the conversation was
held in front of a third party); In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated Nov. 16,
1974, 406 F. Supp. 381, 386 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (mem.) (same).
347. See, e.g., People v. Stroner, 432 N.E.2d 348, 351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (approving trial
court's instruction, given before a 30-minute recess, that permitted the testifying defendant
to consult with his attorney about matters other than his testimony), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 449 N.E.2d 1326 (Ill. 1983).
348. See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.RD. 525, 529 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (prohibiting virtu-
ally all attorney-deponent communications during short recesses).
349. The term "wood-shedding" or "horse-shedding" refers to preparing the witness to
testify. Douglas E. Acklin, Witness Preparation: Beyond the Woodshed, 27 A.F. L. REv. 21, 21
(1987); James W. McElhaney, The Horse Shed, LITIGATION, Summer 1981, at 43, 43.
350. See Hal4 150 F.R.D. at 527 (noting that the court has broad authority and discretion
to control discovery).
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during short breaks,35" ' courts do have some ability to restrict private
conferences, even during recesses.2. Thus, when a party or attorney
demonstrates a propensity for using conferences for improper pur-
poses,35 3 the court should not hesitate to sanction the offending party
or attorney, or to prohibit prospectively conferences during short
breaks.35 4
This proposed standard also sends a strong signal that witness
coaching and other obstructionist tactics will not be tolerated. If testi-
mony is discussed during the break, then the consequences can be
high, because the offending communications will be subject to scru-
tiny by opposing counsel, the court, and if admitted at trial, the
jury. 5  In addition, the witness's credibility may be irreparably tar-
nished by the perception-if not the reality-that testimony has been
changed to gain a tactical advantage. 56
Another attractive feature of the proposed standard is that it
demonstrates confidence in attorneys' honesty and in the continua-
tion of a self-regulating discovery system. The only other realistic solu-
tion would be to be prohibit all communications between attorney
and deponent during the pendency of the deposition. But that alter-
native assumes the worst: It would send a loud message that attorneys
cannot be trusted.
Finally, this standard is consistent with that proposed for long re-
cesses: The witness can speak with his attorney during breaks, but the
conversation may not concern the witness's prior or future deposition
testimony.357 As one professor wrote in his critique of Peny, having
different standards for long and short breaks makes little sense:
351. SeePerryv. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 277 (1988); see also supra notes 213-215 and accom-
panying text.
352. See Hall, 150 F.R.D. at 529 (indicating that rules restricting attorney-client confer-
ences during depositions also apply during recesses).
353. For what constitutes an "improper purpose," see supra notes 195-196 and accompa-
nying text.
354. See, e.g., In re ML-Lee Acquisition Fund II, 848 F. Supp. 527, 567 (D. Del. 1994)
("[I]n future depositions ... counsel are not to consult with their clients regarding the
subject of their testimony while questions are pending and while deponents remain under
oath.").
355. See supra notes 235-241 and accompanying text.
356. In any self-regulating system, enforcement may be a problem, because a client
would rarely admit to any improprieties that occurred during a break. Although, being
under oath, witnesses would hopefully tell the truth, questioning attorneys would bear
heavy burdens in designing cross-examinations that would uncover improper coaching.
The burdens would be equally heavy in either filing motions to compel or seeking sanc-
tions to prohibit and punish the improper conduct.
357. See supra text accompanying notes 313-319.
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The same matters that might be discussed during an over-
night break in defendant's testimony would be relevant dur-
ing a shorter recess as well. The fact that there is less time to
confer, or that the discussion of testimony may have a higher
priority, does not mean that these other matters could not or
would not be discussed. Indeed, an irony in the [Supreme
Court] majority's argument is that longer recesses permit an
unethical attorney to coach a client more effectively.358
The standard proposed in this Article avoids the problems created in
the criminal context by the apparent inconsistency between Geders
and Perry.
E. Summary Concerning the Propriety of Private Conferences
The propriety of private conferences during civil depositions is a
serious problem that has not yet been solved."' 9 Indeed, the lack of
cases on the topic is somewhat puzzling, given the disruptive impact
that private conferences can have on a deposition.36 ° However, as one
commentator postulated about witness preparation, "Practitioners
themselves are partially responsible for the lack of rules and guide-
lines. Faced with the considerable inconveniences of conducting
their own witness preparation in public, lawyers seem satisfied to leave
each other's preparation alone. Without litigation, there is little judi-
cial authority on the subject."36 1 The same probably holds true in the
analogous private conference area. Based on personal experience,
most attorneys talk to their clients at some point during a deposition.
358. Jay Sterling Silver, Equality of Arms and the Adversarial Process: A New Constitutional
Right, 1990 Wis. L. REV. 1007, 1020. Professor Silver's concerns echo those articulated by
Justice Thurgood Marshall in his Perry dissent:
Because this [long break-short break] distinction has no constitutional or logical
grounding, and rests on a recondite understanding of the role of counsel in our
adversary system, I dissent.
... In practical terms, the majority leaves the trial judge "to guess at whether
she has committed a constitutional violation" . . . . Is it appropriate to presume
that a 30-minute recess will involve a discussion of nontestimonial matters? How
about a lunch break? Does it matter that defense counsel has promised only to
discuss nontestimonial matters with his client? Does the majority's rationale en-
compass recesses during the defendant's direct or redirect testimony, or just
those after the direct examination has concluded? These are not abstract inquir-
ies, but the sort that have arisen, and will continue to arise, on a routine basis.
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 285, 296 (1989) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (quoting Sanders v.
Lane, 861 F.2d 1033, 1037 (7th Cir. 1988); other internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
359. See supra notes 324-342 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 192-196 and accompanying text.
361. Applegate, supra note 255, at 280 (footnote omitted).
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Because most attorneys use private conferences, no one wants to com-
plain too loudly.362 But this rationale does not justify such abuse.
Because private conferences are easily used for improper and un-
ethical purposes,"' and because they violate Rule 30(c) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state court rules,364 courts and
legislatures should consider adopting rules to limit private confer-
ences. The following rule would help prevent improper conferences
while preserving the client's right to protect privileged information
from disclosure:
PRoPosED RuLE CONCERNING PRIVATE CONFERENCES
DURING DEPOSMONS
(1) CoNFERENCEs DURING PENDING QUESTIONS. A private
conference held while a question about any matter is pend-
ing is presumptively improper, whether initiated by the de-
ponent or the deponent's counsel. However, a private
conference may be held while a question is pending if the
conference is called for the limited purpose of determining
whether a privilege should be asserted to the pending ques-
tion. Before the conference concerning the privilege is held,
the deponent's attorney should clearly state, on the record,
the contemplated privilege.
(2) COAERENCES DURING RECESSES. During any mutually
agreed-upon recess in the deposition, the deponent may
confer with his or her attorney. These communications may
not concern or address the substance of the deponent's
prior or anticipated future deposition testimony. However,
after all other counsel have completed their examination of
the deponent, the deponent and the deponent's counsel
may privately confer before the deponent's counsel begins
his or her examination. During this conference, the depo-
nent and the deponent's counsel may discuss the substance
362. In his article on witness preparation, Professor John S. Applegate noted:
One is tempted to postulate that there is a tacit understanding among civil
trial lawyers that they will not look too deeply into each other's witness prepara-
tion. The practical literature makes clear that preparation activities are ordinarily
left untouched by discovery....
My own experience in practice tends to confirm the suggestion that trial law-
yers have a tacit understanding that preparation activities are protected. Exper-
ienced litigators prepare witnesses with little apparent thought of waiver
problems. Instead, they simply instruct witnesses not to answer substantive ques-
tions about their preparation beyond the fact that it occurred.
Id. at 280-81 n.12 (citations omitted).
363. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (regarding what constitutes an "im-
proper purpose").
364. For the language of Federal Rule 30(c), see supra text accompanying note 211.
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of the deponent's testimony without waiving the attorney-cli-
ent privilege.
(3) CONIDENrIALITY OF A rTOJ vEY-CLINzT COMMUNICA TIONS
DURING PRIvATE CONFERENCES. After any private conference
or recess in the deposition, the questioning attorney may ask
the deponent whether he or she conferred with counsel.
(a) If the deponent indicates that a conference was
held, and the deponent or the deponent's counsel indicates
that the conference concerned only whether to assert a privi-
lege, then the questioning attorney may not inquire into the
substance of the attorney-client communication, but may ask
questions reasonably calculated to test the validity of the
privilege.
(b) If the conference occurred during a pending ques-
tion and the deponent indicates that matters other than
whether to assert a privilege were discussed, then the ques-
tioning attorney may ask about the substance of those other
conversations, and the deponent will be required to answer
those questions.
(c) Except as provided in subsection (2), if the confer-
ence occurred during a mutually scheduled recess, and the
deponent indicates that the deponent discussed the sub-
stance of his or her prior or anticipated future testimony
with his or her attorney, then the questioning attorney may
ask about the substance of those conversations, and the de-
ponent will be required to answer those questions.
This proposed rule will help enforce the provisions of Rule 30(c)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and similar state rules by mak-
ing deposition testimony more like trial testimony. 6 5 As most cases
are settled after some discovery has occurred, it is important that dep-
osition testimony be afforded the same truth-guarding procedures as
allowed at trial.36 6 Although this proposed rule may well be contro-
365. See Damaj v. Farmers Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 559, 560 (N.D. Okla. 1995) ("Since the
fact (truth) finding process in civil litigation is almost exclusively conducted in the discov-
ery phase of litigation, it follows logically that the efficacy of the discovery process ...
would be enhanced by employing, to the extent possible, the same rules of procedure
during discovery as employed at trial.").
366. See id. (criticizing an attorney for making unnecessary objections and showing the
court's "concern[ ] . . . because the vast majority of the civil cases in this country are de-
cided by way of settlements which are reached on the basis of 'facts' developed during
discovery, particularly oral depositions"); Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D. 525, 531
(E.D. Pa. 1993) ("Depositions are the factual battleground where the vast majority of litiga-
tion actually takes place."); cf. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., THE LAW AND ETHICS OF
LAWYERING 469 (2d ed. 1994) (citing studies showing that 90-95% of all civil and criminal
cases are settled rather than tried).
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versial, "there is an urgent need for a bright line rule governing attor-
ney-client communication during depositions . . . [that would]
prohibit any communication that would improperly interrupt the dep-
osition and jeopardize the truth-finding process." 367 The rule pro-
posed in this Article should promote truth over tactics, while
encouraging attorneys to act as true professionals. It would also pro-
vide some certainty in this important, but infrequently addressed,
area.
IV. OBJECTIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS NOT TO ANSWER
A common tactic in depositions is to impede the questioning law-
yer's progress with objections or instructions not to answer.3 6 Most
litigators have encountered an opposing counsel who, while objecting
to the question, includes narrative that suggests what the "correct" an-
swer should be." 9 As one committee appointed to study deposition
abuse concluded, "[f]requently, depositions degenerate into more
'testimony' from the attorney than from the witness."3 70
Although objections and instructions not to answer sometimes
may be used to hamper progress during a deposition, some are
proper.371 Indeed, sometimes a lawyer has an ethical duty to object or
instruct the witness not to answer.3 7 2 Other times, applicable court
rules might require the attorney to make the objection or waive it.3 7 3
In still other situations, an attorney may have a legitimate need to de-
tail the basis for the objection. 374 Although recent amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure have attempted to address what
types of objections are appropriate and when an attorney may
367. N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.23 cmt. (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on file
with author).
368. See Hall 150 F.R.D. at 531 (addressing improper "strategic interruptions, sugges-
tions, statements, and arguments of counsel"); see also Browning, supra note 159, at 1094
(describing characteristics and tactics of Rambo litigators).
369. See Federal Bar Council, Committee on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the
Conduct of Depositions, 131 F.R.D. 613, 617 (1990) (observing that "[v]irtually every active
litigator" has encountered witness coaching).
370. Id.
371. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
372. See supra note 137.
373. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
374. See, e.g., N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.22(B) (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997)
(on file with author).
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instruct a witness not to answer, 7 5 serious questions remain
unanswered.
37 6
Here, the defense lawyer, Ms. Davis, is defending the deposition
of Randall Lee, PharTech's national product manager for Ovar-X.
The plaintiffs attorney, Scott Palmer, is taking the deposition.
August 12, 1996. Time: 1:45 p.m.
MR. PALMER: Mr. Lee, what tests did your client run on
Ovar-X before applying to the FDA for approval?
MS. DAVIS: If you know.
MR. LEE: Well, I'm not quite sure. That's not really in my
area.
MR. PALMER: Whose area is it?
MS. DAVIS: Again, if you know.
MR. LEE: I'm not exactly certain. It would be the testing
and development department, but it's hard for me to say
right now who within that department.
MR. PALMER: Ms. Davis, please do not coach the witness. If
you have an objection, state it. Otherwise, please let the wit-
ness answer. Your statements are in clear violation of Fed-
eral Rule of Civil Procedure 30.
Time: 4:30 p.m.
MR. PALMER: What type of training does PharTech provide
for doctors who intend to surgically implant and remove
Ovar-X?
MS. DAVIS: I object. Mr. Palmer, you've already asked that
question four or five times. Mr. Lee has given you extensive
information about PharTech's medical team that runs three-
day seminars for doctors and then provides follow-up train-
ing when necessary. Please move on.
MR. PALMER: Mr. Lee, you may answer the question.
MS. DAVIS: No, Mr. Lee, do not answer the question. Mr.
Palmer is not entitled to ask you the same question over and
over and over again.
375. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1) (stating that objections should be concise, non-argu-
mentative, and non-suggestive, and that attorneys "may instruct a deponent not to answer
only when necessary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence directed by
the court, or to present a motion under [rules governing bad faith conduct]").
376. See Cary, supra note 159, at 580 ("[T]he problem is not the lack of rules or guide-
lines to control the behavior, but the perception in the practicing bar that the available
sanctions will not work, or are too expensive and cumbersome to utilize." (footnote
omitted)).
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Time: 5:00 p.m.
MR. PALMER: Mr. Lee, since I didn't get any background
information from you at the beginning of the deposition, let
me do that now before we leave. Please describe your work
history and educational background, starting with college.
MS. DAVIS: Object to the form of the question. Compound.
MR. PALMER: Okay, please describe your educational back-
ground, starting with college.
MR. LEE: I graduated from Cornell University in 1983 with
a degree in biochemistry. I then obtained an M.B.A. in 1985,
with an emphasis on marketing and product development,
from the University of Pennsylvania.
MR. PALMER: What about work? Have you always worked
for PharTech?
MS. DAVIS: Objection. Compound.
MR. PALMER- Please describe your work history.
MR. LEE: I started with PharTech right out of college and
have been with them ever since.
MR. PALMER: What were your duties?
MS. DAVIS: Object to the form of the question. Vague.
MR. PALMER: What was your first job at PharTech?
MR. LEE: I was a national sales trainee.
MR. PALMER: Why were you promoted?
MS. DAVIS: Objection. Calls for speculation.
MR. PALMER: Do you really have to object to every question
I ask? These are not hard questions.
During Mr. Lee's deposition, Ms. Davis interrupted in three dif-
ferent ways. During the 1:45 p.m. session, after Mr. Palmer asked a
question, Ms. Davis did not object, but instead coached Mr. Lee not to
answer unless he "knew" the answer. Next, she interrupted with a nar-
rative speaking objection and instructed Mr. Lee not to answer, be-
cause she believed Mr. Palmer's questions were repetitive. Finally, she
made many "proper" objections, which Mr. Palmer felt were interrupt-
ing the flow of the deposition. Were Ms. Davis's interruptions appro-
priate? Did Mr. Palmer react in the best possible manner?
A. Speaking Objections and Other Suggestions
Rule 30(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure now states
that "[a] ny objection to evidence during a deposition shall be stated
concisely and in a non-argumentative and non-suggestive manner."377
Some attorneys, like Ms. Davis, attempt to circumvent this rule by not
377. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1).
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"objecting." Instead, they interject with phrases such as "if you know"
or "if you understand the question. "37  They then rationalize their
behavior by contending that the interruptions are necessary to clear
up confusion, to protect the witness, or to protect the record. 79 The
better view, however, is that Rule 30(d) (1) prohibits this suggestive
behavior s.3 " The effect of Ms. Davis's remarks is reflected in Mr. Lee's
answers. After each remark by Ms. Davis during the 1:45 p.m. session,
he responded that he did not know the answer. He was coached by
Ms. Davis's suggestive statements. 381
During the 4:30 p.m. session, Ms. Davis's interruptions
mushroomed into an improper speaking objection, in which she elab-
orated on her reasons for objecting, rather than concisely stating her
objection. Ms. Davis objected to Mr. Palmer's question on grounds
378. See, e.g., Sinclair v. Kmart Corp., No. 95-1170-JTM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19661, at
*19-20 (D. Kan. Dec. 9, 1996) (describing an attorney's instruction to a deponent to an-
swer "if you recall" or "if you remember" or "if you know"); Bergstein, supra note 18 (com-
menting that instructions to a deponent to answer a question with the qualification "if you
remember" or "if you recall" characterize one form of the petty tactics used in abusive
depositions); Duffy, supra note 78 (noting that a lawyer's interjection of "if you know" is
"clearly improper"). A similar tactic is for the deponent's attorney to indicate that he, the
attorney, does not understand the question or to state that the question is unclear. Such
an objection is also improper. See Phillips v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., No. 92 Civ.
8527 (KTD), 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3748, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 1994) (quoting from a
deposition that included an attorney indicating she did not understand the question ad-
dressed to the deponent). As the Hall v. Clifton Precision court stated, "A lawyer's purported
lack of understanding is not a proper reason to interrupt a deposition." 150 F.R.D. 525,
530 n.10 (E.D. Pa. 1993); accord Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-CV-4603,
1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2191, at *6 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995) (mem.) ("[An] attorney may not
object to a question that the attorney does not understand .... Nor may the lawyer state
for the record what his understanding of the question is." (citations omitted)); How to Deal
with Improper Objections and Tactics During Depositions, FED. DiscovERY NEWS, June 1995, at 3,
available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Lrpfd File (summarizing remarks of Florida attorney
Lewis F. Collins, who stated that a lawyer's understanding is not relevant, so long as the
deponent is instructed at the start of the deposition that he is entitled to clarifications, if
necessary).
379. See, e.g., Sinclair, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19661, at *19-20 (describing counsel's base-
less contention that objections were justified because the deponent might not have under-
stood the question); O'Brien v. Amtrak, 163 F.R.D. 232, 236 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.)
(describing counsel's assertion that he was "simply doing his job by protecting the wit-
nesses from improper questions... and ensuring that the record was accurate"); cf Resolu-
tion Trust Corp. v. International Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 89-4020, 1993 WL 98677, at *2 (E.D.
La. Mar. 26, 1993) (minute entry) (commenting that an attorney who objects to the form
of a question need not offer an explanation, and in fact should not, if it will coach the
witness).
380. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1) (stating that objections should be, among other things,
"non-suggestive").
381. See, e.g., Sinclair, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19661, at *19 (observing that, after counsel's
"if you remember" and "if you recall" remarks, the witness tended to respond that he did
not remember or recall the answer).
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that it had been asked and answered; she then proceeded to "repeat"
the prior testimony. Although Ms. Davis might have believed that she
was simply protecting her client, her actions violated the clear lan-
guage of Rule 30(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: She sug-
382gested the answer.
Ms. Davis's conduct during the 1:45 p.m. and 4:30 p.m. sessions
also violated Rule 30(c), the rule indicating that deposition testimony
should proceed like trial testimony.383 To quote one federal court, "It
is no stretch to conclude that the objections interposed at the deposi-
tion would not have occurred had the testimony been taken before a
judge and jury at trial."3 8 4 It should be apparent to most readers that
Ms. Davis's remarks either changed Mr. Lee's responses or prevented
his response. Because the truth-finding process in civil litigation is
conducted primarily during discovery, such truth-altering conduct
should not be permitted.
Moreover, Ms. Davis's obstructionist conduct violated several
mandatory ethical rules. Most obviously, she violated Model Rules 3.2,
3.4, 4.4, and 8.4(d), because her conduct delayed and hindered the
litigation, obstructed the plaintiffs' access to evidence, and prejudiced
the administration ofjustice.3 s5 In Model Code jurisdictions, Ms. Da-
382. A "concise" objection should include the word "object" or "objection" and then
include only one additional phrase (e.g., "objection, compound" or "objection, leading").
See N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.22(B) (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on file with
author) ("Under [Federal Rule 30(d)(1)] counsel may interpose an objection by stating
'objection' and the legal grounds for the objection."). Controversy exists regarding how
much detail should or must be given. May an attorney state, "Objection, form," or must
she give the specific basis, such as "Objection, compound"? One treatise explains:
In some jurisdictions .... you need not specify the precise ground for the
objection. However, in otherjurisdictions, at least when the examiner asks you to
specify a ground for the objection, the failure to do so results in a waiver. More-
over, even in jurisdictions that do not demand a specification of the ground for
the objection, many attorneys favor briefly naming the ground.
IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 6:23, at 48 (footnotes omitted). Keeping in
mind that the objection should be concise and non-suggestive, the best approach is to state
the specific basis for the objection so that the examining attorney can more readily re-
phrase the question. At a minimum, attorneys should state the precise objection when the
questioning attorney requests specificity or clarification. But see infra note 389 (suggesting
that the deponent should leave the room if a lengthy explanation is to be given).
383. For the text of Rule 30(c), see supra text accompanying note 211.
384. Damaj v. Farmers Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 559, 560 (N.D. Okla. 1995); accord Armstrong
v. Hussmann Corp., 163 F.R.D. 299, 303 (E.D. Mo. 1995) (mem.) ("Because attorneys are
prohibited from making any comments, either on or off the record, in the presence of a
judicial officer, which might suggest or limit a witness's answer to an unobjectionable ques-
tion, such behavior is likewise prohibited at depositions.").
385. For the text of these rules, see supra notes 146-149, 151 and accompanying text.
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vis's behavior violated DRs 1-102(A)(5), 7-101(A)(1), 7-102(A)(1),
and 7-106(C) (6) for these same reasons.386
If Ms. Davis truly wanted to protect the record and her client
from unclear questions, she could have interposed concise, non-sug-
gestive objections.387 If she believed that Mr. Palmer's questions rose
to the level of bad faith, she should have sought relief from the court
under Rule 30(d)(3).388 If she felt that a lengthy objection was
needed to protect the record, then she could have asked her client to
leave while she stated the objection.389 That way, opposing counsel
would have the benefit of her thoughts, the record would be clear, but
the witness would not be improperly influenced.
B. Instructions Not to Answer Based on Repetitive Questioning
During the 4:30 p.m. session, Ms. Davis instructed the witness not
to answer because she believed Mr. Palmer's question had been previ-
ously asked and answered. Rule 30(d) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure prohibits instructions not to answer except "when neces-
sary to preserve a privilege, to enforce a limitation on evidence di-
rected by the court, or to present a motion under paragraph (3) [to
terminate a deposition on bad-faith grounds] ."390 Although some fed-
eral courts permitted instructions not to answer based on repetitive-
ness or relevancy before the 1993 amendments,391 such conduct is
now "highly improper," regardless of counsel's intentions. 392 Because
386. For the text of these rules, see supra notes 138, 140, 206 and accompanying text.
387. Cf FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d) (1) (requiring concise, non-suggestive objections).
388. See Applied Telematics, Inc. v. Sprint Corp., No. 94-CV-4603, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
2191, at *7 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 22, 1995) (mem.) (considering a situation in which the plaintiff
argued that his objections were proper because the questions had previously been asked
and answered, and ruling that "[i] f the questions asked by counsel for defendant [became]
unreasonable or harassing then plaintiffs counsel [could have objected] under Rule
30(d) (3)").
389. See Shartel, supra note 193, at 12 ("Another way of 'calling the defending attorney's
bluff' is to ask the opposing attorney if the witness may briefly be allowed to step outside
the room."); see also N.D. ILL. L.R. 5.22 cmt. (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24,
1997) (on file with author) ("Reasons for the objection, if stated at all, are to be stated
outside the presence of the deponent.").
390. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d)(1).
391. See, e.g., Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No. 130, 657
F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981). For a discussion of objections and instructions not to answer
based on relevancy, see infra Part V.
392. Dravo Corp. v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 70, 75 (D. Neb. 1995) (mem.)
(quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. McFarland, 550 F.2d 967, 973 (4th Cir. 1977)); accord Fra-
zier v. Southeastern Pa. Transp. Auth., 161 F.R.D. 309, 316 (E.D. Pa. 1995) (mem.);
Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 160 F.R.D. 98, 99 (S.D. Ohio 1995).
But see D. MD. DIscovERY GUIDELINES guide. 5(c) (prohibiting an attorney from repeatedly
asking the deponent "the same or substantially identical question").
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instructions not to answer also delay and hinder the litigation process,
this conduct violates the same ethical rules broken by suggesting an-
swers to the witness. 
93
The proper procedure when opposing counsel asks repetitious
questions is to enter a concise objection: "Objection, asked and an-
swered."3 94 The witness should then answer the question. 39 5 if the
answer confuses the record, the defending counsel can attempt to
clarify the confusion by examining the witness after her opponent fin-
ishes.3 96 If interrogating counsel persists in asking repetitious ques-
tions to the extent that it constitutes harassment, then the deponent's
counsel should protect her witness by applying to the court for a pro-
tective order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(d) (3). 7
The questioning attorney has a number of responses to Ms. Da-
vis's improper actions. At the beginning of the deposition, the exam-
ining attorney should inform the witness that he is free to ask for
clarification or to state when he does not know or recall an answer.3 98
This instruction might eliminate some meddling by the deponent's
attorney. When the defending attorney cues the witness or otherwise
improperly interrupts the deposition, the questioning attorney might
then warn the defending attorney-as Mr. Palmer did in this case-
that her conduct violates established deposition procedures.399
One well-known professor suggests driving a wedge between the
deponent and the deponent's counsel:
The usual objection just makes it clear that you are not get-
ting what you want-the witness's testimony. But the wedge
focuses on how your opponent is treating the witness.
Some appropriate responses are: "I object. You're not
being fair to the witness. You're cutting him off before he
393. See supra notes 385-386 and accompanying text.
394. See N.D. ILL. L.R_ 5.22(B) (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on file
with author) (providing examples of objections that comply with Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 30(d) (1) in that they are "stated 'concisely' and in a 'non-argumentative and
non-suggestive manner'").
395. See FED. R Crv. P. 30(c).
396. See Federal Bar Council, Committee on Second Circuit Courts, A Report on the
Conduct of Depositions, 131 F.R.D. 613, 617-18 (1990).
397. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery, 160 F.R.D. at 99.
398. See Sinclair v. Kmart Corp., No. 95-1170-JTM, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19661, at *20
(D. Kan. Dec. 9, 1996); see also supra note 285.
399. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:40, at 83-84 (suggesting that one
method of dealing with attorney misconduct during a deposition is to state to opposing
counsel, and for the record, why opposing counsel's conduct violates established rules); cf
Shartel, supra note 193, at 11 (indicating that a good approach to deal with improper
speaking objections is to warn the offending attorney that if the conduct continues, the
court's authority will be invoked).
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has a chance to finish." Or, "Objection. Give the witness a
chance to tell his story." Then say to the witness, "Have you
finished what you were going to say?" Or, "Is there some-
thing you would like to add?
40 0
If informal dispute resolution methods do not work, judicial interven-
tion is always an option.40 ' And, as in other disputes, an attorney
should make a record of the improper conduct.
40 2
C. Numerous "Proper" Objections
Most attorneys know that courts will discipline those who inter-
pose excessive "improper" objections and instructions not to an-
swer. 40 3 But can counsel be sanctioned for raising numerous "proper"
objections?
In federal court, objections to questioning, testimony, or conduct
that "might be obviated, [or] removed" if presented at the deposition
are waived if not raised during the deposition.40 4 On the other hand,
objections concerning the competency of the witness, relevancy, and
materiality are not waived if omitted during the deposition, unless the
ground for the objection might have been obviated if raised at that
time.40 5 However, in seeming contrast to these directives to make the
objection or lose it, the advisory committee notes for Rule 30(d) ex-
400. McElhaney, supra note 199, at 89; accord Kevin J. Dunne, Going Awry: How Can a
Deposition Go Wrong? Let Us Count Some Ways, L.A. DAiLYJ., Nov. 17, 1995, Verdicts & Settle-
ments supp. at 1 ("[C]ounsel's best defense is to zero in on the deponent and ask him or
her to explain what it is about the question that is confusing, or ask the deponent what the
deponent's understanding of the 'vague' word is, and go from there.").
401. For other alternatives, see supra notes 267-279 and accompanying text. For two
extremes, compare RE. Linder Steel Erection Co. v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co., 102 F.R.D. 39, 41
(D. Md. 1983) (mem.), which entered an order under which "[ffor each interruption,
counsel shall personally pay, as liquidated attorney's fees and expenses, to the interrogat-
ing counsel, the sum of $5.00," with Martin Berg, Attorney Fined $1 Million Marks Sixth Day in
Jail, L.A. DAILvJ.,June 16, 1993, at 1, which reported that ajudge in the Central District of
California imposed a $1 million fine on an attorney for deposition and discovery abuses
and then ordered him jailed for failing to pay an installment.
402. See supra note 264 and accompanying text.
403. See, e.g., Damaj v. Farmers Ins. Co., 164 F.R.D. 559, 561 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (granting
"Plaintiffs Motion for Order Directing Counsel to Cease Obstructionist Tactics During
Oral Depositions" after defense counsel made objections on 64 pages of a 102-page deposi-
tion); cf Amy Singer, Two Days, 1,144 Interruptions, Am. LAw., Apr. 1993, at 25, available in
LEXIS, Legnew Library, Amlawr File (discussing attorneys against whom opposing counsel
sought sanctions for making 1144 objections and interruptions during a deposition of
which the transcript was less than 600 pages).
404. FED. R. Crv. P. 32(d) (3) (B).
405. FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d) (3) (A).
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plain that "the making of an excessive number of unnecessary objec-
tions may itself constitute sanctionable conduct.
40 6
To compound the confusion, as a leading discovery expert ex-
plained, "The reach of the 'might have been obviated or removed'
clause in particular cases is unclear."4°7 It applies to objections to the
form of the question, but it may sometimes apply when the question
lacks foundation.4"' Given this uncertainty, careful counselors would
want to protect their clients' interests by objecting to all form-of-ques-
tion problems, foundation problems, and other areas in which they
believe a failure to object would result in waiver.40 9
The ethics rules further complicate the analysis. Both the Model
Rules and the Model Code clearly indicate that attorneys must protect
their clients within controlling procedural and court rules.410 Raising
any and all objections permitted by the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure would seem to be consistent with these ethical mandates. How-
ever, both the Model Rules and the Model Code prohibit attorneys
from engaging in conduct that has no substantial purpose other than
to delay or burden a third person.41 Therefore, if the court or griev-
ance committee perceives that legitimate objections are being used
for an improper purpose, it may opt to sanction or enjoin the
offender.4 12
What, then, is a diligent and ethical attorney to do? One alterna-
tive is to stipulate at the beginning of the deposition to reserve all
objections until trial. An omnibus stipulation will typically benefit the
examining attorney because it will permit him to proceed with rela-
406. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) (1) advisory committee notes on the 1993 amendments. Or, as
one group of authors noted, "'protection' can become a cover for obstruction." FORTUNE
ET AL., supra note 267, § 6.7.4, at 264.
407. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER ET AL., CIVIL DIscovERY AND MANDATORY DISCLOSURE: A
GUIDE TO EFFICIENT PRACrICE 3-45 (2d ed. 1994).
408. Id. at 3-46.
409. See FORTUNE ET AL., supra note 267, § 6.7.4, at 264 ("[T]here is no unanimity re-
garding which objections are 'obviable' or 'waivable'; therefore, many lawyers feel obli-
gated to interpose a great number of substantive objections to avoid waiver .. ").
410. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBiLrr DR 7-101 (A) (1) (1982) (stating
that lawyers must use only the "means permitted by law" in seeking the objectives of their
clients (footnote omitted)); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 & cmt.
(1994) (providing that measures taken to indicate a client's cause must be "lawful and
ethical").
411. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrIY DR 7-102(A) (1); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4.
412. See Leiching v. Consolidated Rail Corp., No. 92-CV-1170, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
20796, at *6 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 1996) (indicating a willingness to sanction an attorney for
"constant objections to the form of questions" because of the delay and disruption that
such objections can cause).
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tively few interruptions.41 3 It may also protect the defending attorney
from sanctions.414 This option, however, has serious drawbacks. If ob-
jections are reserved, the deponent's counsel may not be in a position
to object immediately to protect the record and the client.4 15 Instead
of shortening the deposition, it may actually facilitate the questioner's
taking more time, unrestrained by objections from the opposing
counsel. In addition, an ingenious questioner might succeed in docu-
menting something other than the truth if the deponent's counsel
were required to remain mute on the sidelines. Further, if the stipula-
tion is not properly crafted, important objections might be deemed
waived. 416
Under the current Federal Rules, probably the best alternative is
for the deponent's attorney to make all necessary objections. At trial,
most attorneys do not make every possible objection.41 7 Instead, they
raise objections only when reasonably certain that the answer will ma-
terially hurt their client's case and when the objection has a solid legal
basis.4"' Attorneys defending depositions should do the same. But,
when in doubt, attorneys should err in favor of protecting their cli-
ents, within the bounds of controlling rules.
Thus, in Randall Lee's deposition, Ms. Davis's objections to the
form of the question were permissible under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Had she not raised the objections, she would have waived
them.41 On the other hand, Mr. Palmer's questions, although not
artfully asked, were easily understandable and not relevant to the mer-
its. Therefore, some courts might have perceived that Ms. Davis was
merely attempting to delay or hinder the examination. To have
avoided such an appearance, she should have objected only when Mr.
Lee's answers would have damaged PharTech's case.
413. SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 407, at 3-46.
414. See FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d) (2) (providing for sanctions where a party impedes or de-
lays a deposition).
415. See MALONE & HOirmAN, supra note 15, at 179 (discussing the importance of objec-
tions in protecting the record and the client).
416. See SCHWARZER ET AL., supra note 407, at 3-46 ("Because the effect of an omnibus
stipulation is uncertain, it is preferable to spell out specifically which objections are saved
and which are not.").
417. Cf John C. Conti, Trial Objections, in THE LITIGATION MANUAL 663, 665 (John G.
Koeltl ed., 2d ed. 1989) ("The simplistic notion that an objection must be raised to every
technical violation of the rules of evidence should be discarded.").
418. See THoMAs A. MAUET, TRIAL TECHNIQUES 421-22 (4th ed. 1996) (suggesting when
to make objections at trial).
419. See FED. R. Crv. P. 32(d) (3) (B).
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D. Revising the Current Objection Rule
To bring more certainty to this area and to eliminate a tool of
obstructionists, Congress-or, on a local level, individual districts-
should consider revising Rule 32(d) (3). As it now reads, Rule
32(d) (3) (A) contains a category of permissible but unnecessary objec-
tions: Objections concerning competency, relevancy, and materiality
generally need not, but can, be raised.421 Thus, counsel who want to
obstruct a deposition can do so by continuously raising these types of
objections-because courts may be reluctant to sanction an attorney
for conduct not expressly prohibited by the Federal Rules. 421 One
solution is to rewrite Rule 32(d) (3) to eliminate permissible but un-
necessary objections. 4 22 The revised rule would identify categories of
objections that must be made or waived during the depositions and
categories of objections that are both forbidden and preserved for
trial. The revised rule also would increase the certainty that forbidden
objections would not be waived if not immediately raised.4 23 Using
these parameters, the revised rule would read:
PROPOSED REVISION TO FEDERAI. RuuI OF CIViL PROCEDURE
32(d)(3) AS TO TAKING DEPOSmONS
(A) Objections concerning privilege, the form of a
question or answer', the oath or affirmation, or the conduct
of parties and counsel, must be made promptly at the deposi-
tion or waived.
(B) No objection other than those listed in subsection
(A) may be raised during a deposition. All objections not
expressly permitted under subsection (A) are automatically
preserved for trial. This rule does not affect Rule 30(d)(1)
concerning instructions not to answer.
420. See FED. R. Civ. P. 32(d) (3) (A).
421. See, e.g., Chapsky v. Baxter V. Mueller Div., Baxter Healthcare Corp., No. 93 C 6524,
1994 WL 327348, at *2 (N.D. Ill. July 6, 1994) (mem.) (declining to impose sanctions on
an attorney who advised her client not to answer questions based on a relevancy objection,
but warning that sanctions would be imposed if the conduct continued).
422. At least one court has taken a similar step. See Hall v. Clifton Precision, 150 F.R.D.
525, 528 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 1993) (deeming it improper to make competency, relevancy, or
materiality objections during a deposition).
423. At least two authors have observed:
Perhaps because of their lack of confidence in their own knowledge of the rules
of evidence, or because they are unsure about what objections are waived and
what objections are preserved, attorneys at depositions object and battle over ob-
jections 517 percent more, by actual count, than is actually necessary to represent
their clients properly.
MALONE & HorVMAN, supra note 15, § 14.5, at 185.
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Examples of required objections would include the following:
leading the witness, vague or ambiguous question, compound ques-
tion, lack of foundation, argumentative, calls for a legal conclusion,
calls for an improper lay opinion, and nonresponsive answer.4 2 4 Con-
trarily, examples of forbidden objections would be as follows: compe-
tency of the witness, relevance, materiality, hearsay, cumulative, more
prejudicial than probative, and calls for speculation.425
Applying the proposed rule to the hypothetical, Ms. Davis would
not have been permitted to raise relevancy objections, and the rele-
vancy objections clearly would have been preserved for trial. Thus,
Ms. Davis's client would have been protected, and the deposition
would have proceeded with fewer interruptions.
V. LIMITS OF PROPER QUESTIONING
Deposition abuse can occur when one party attempts to use lib-
eral discovery rules to harass, intimidate, or attempt to extract a settle-
ment from the other side.4 26 Deposition abuse also can occur when
424. Cf id. § 14.5.1, at 188-91 (describing these objections as curable under current
Rule 32(d) (3), and therefore waived if not made at the deposition).
425. Cf id. § 14.5.3, at 193-94 (describing these objections as non-curable under current
Rule 32(d) (3), and therefore not waived if no objection is made).
426. Monroe Inker, Abusive Discovery Tactics in Depositions, 26 FAm. L.Q. 27, 27 (1992).
One class-action plaintiff encountered such an attorney:
The defense counsel . . . seemed determined to instill fear in the individuals be-
ing deposed .... His approach was to bait, belittle, ridicule (even to the extent of
mimicking the speech pattern and accent of one of the other plaintiffs) and
threaten ("If you lose, you may be faced with some huge legal fees incurred by the
defendant company").
In addition to the psychological terror he attempted to instill, a principal
tactic was to deliberately confuse. Much of his interrogation bore absolutely no
relevancy to the issues at hand... ; obviously he was only collaterally interested in
the truth. His objective, in the interest of winning, was to intimidate regardless of
the facts and/or methods employed.
M. Vanderveer, Face to Face with an Abusive Attorney, NAT'L L.J., May 14, 1984, at 13, available
in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Ntlawj File. One author has reported that in depositions con-
cerning the intrauterine contraceptive Dalkon Shield, the manufacturer's attorneys fre-
quently asked women very personal, embarrassing questions, such as in the following
situation:
[In] the Shield suit of an Iowa mother of two children who had suffered PID
[pelvic inflammatory disease] and the consequent loss of her ovaries and
womb[,] [A.H.] Robins's counsel took depositions from her and her husband,
each in the presence of the other. To her, the company attorney put queries
about her sexual relations before their marriage in 1963, ten years before she was
fitted with a Shield, and fifteen years before she was stricken with P1D.
During a deposition in Minnesota in May 1982, lawyers for a Boston woman
directed her not to answer questions by Robins counsel about which way she
wiped, and whether, and how often, she engaged in oral and anal intercourse and
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one attorney attempts to prevent the other from seeking permissible
information that happens to be sensitive or embarrassing. 427 In many
cases, however, it is difficult to distinguish when a line of questioning
is distasteful but relevant and when it is being pursued primarily for
harassment value. When does an examining attorney cross the line
between acceptable questions and harassment? How does the defend-
ing attorney protect his client without violating rules against ob-
structing the discovery process?
In this scenario, Curtis Drizolli, counsel for Dr. Foster, is ques-
tioning one plaintiff, Matt Sawyer, about his loss-of-consortium claim.
Mr. Sawyer is represented by Scott Palmer. Corinne Davis, counsel for
PharTech, and the other plaintiff, Erin Sawyer, are also present.
September 13, 1996. Time: 9:30 a.m.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Good morning, Mr. Sawyer. My name is
Curtis Drizolli, and I represent Dr. Foster in this action. Mr.
Sawyer, I'm most interested in the basis of your loss-of-con-
sortium claim.
MR. SAWYER: Okay.
MR. DRIZOLLI: I know that some of my questions might be
embarrassing, but I need to know the answers. First, before
your wife had the Ovar-X device implanted, how often did
you have-uh-relations?
MR. SAWYER: [To Mr. Palmer]: Do I really have to answer?
MR. PALMER: Yes.
MR. SAWYER: Well, we were newlyweds, so three or so times
a week, most times, I guess.
MR. DRIZOLLI: What about after she had the implant?
MR. SAWYER: Well, during the first six months or so, she
had problems occasionally, but I would guess still about the
same-with some breaks when she wasn't feeling well.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Okay, what about after the first six months?
used so-called marital aids. Five months later, however, ajudge compelled her to
return to the Twin Cities to answer the questions.
MORTON MINTz, AT ANY COST: CoRP'oRATE GREED, WOMEN, AND THE DALKON SHIELD 194-95
(1985). Similarly, when a female doctor sued a New York hospital after she contracted
AIDS by pricking her finger with a contaminated needle negligently left in a patient's
bedding, the defense attorney sought to discredit her by "examin[ing] her love life and
discuss[ing] her abortions." David Margolick, Defense Tactics in the AIDS Doctor's Suit, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 1990, at B1, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nyt File. The attorney argued
this information was relevant because the doctor might have contracted AIDS from a trans-
fusion or from sexual contact. Id.
427. Cf Inker, supra note 426, at 27 ("Domestic relations litigants may be particularly
vulnerable because a spouse or former spouse can reveal confidential information that will
embarrass or otherwise harm the other spouse." (emphasis added)).
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MR. SAWYER: She started feeling better. I guess she got
used to the Ovar-X and how it affected her system. We were
back to normal for awhile, but then she started feeling very
poorly.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Then what happened?
MR. SAWYER: Well, she wasn't feeling well, so-uh-we
dropped to just a couple a times a month-maybe less some
months.
MR. DRIZOLLI: What about after she had the Ovar-X
removed?
MR. SAWYER: Well, she had that scar on her arm, which was
painful, but I guess things started to pick up. We had de-
cided that we wanted children so we were-you know-
trying.
MR. DRIZOLLI: So what's the basis of your loss of consor-
tium claim?
MR. SAWYER: Well, ever since Erin was diagnosed with en-
dometriosis, she really doesn't want me near her. I think she
feels guilty about maybe not being able to have kids. She
knows I wanted to have children.
MR. DRIZOLLI: During your marriage, have you ever had
an affair with another woman?
MR. PALMER: I object. That's an outrageous question. It's
not relevant.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Sir, it is relevant to the consortium claim.
If you don't want me to ask these questions, drop that claim
and I'll be glad to move on.
MR. SAWYER: I'll answer-no. I've never cheated on my
wife.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Have you attended strip clubs or gentle-
men's clubs since you were married?
MR. PALMER: Now you're really off base! I object. You're
simply trying to embarrass the witness.
MR. SAWYER: I'd really rather not answer that question.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Okay. We'll mark that question and ask the
court whether you need to answer it.
MR. DRIZOLLI: How are your finances?
MR. PALMER: What are you doing? Why is that relevant?
You're just fishing.
MR. DRIZOLLI: It's relevant because I want to know if
something other than Ovar-X chilled his relationship with
his wife. My client has a right to know. Your client's trying
to get a lot of money from my client, and I need to be able to
defend her.
MR. PALMER: I'll let him answer the question if you will
agree that this information will be kept confidential by you
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and your client. I'll get you the paperwork for a confidential-
ity agreement tomorrow.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Okay, fair enough. Now, Mr. Sawyer,
please answer my question.
MR. SAWYER: We're fine. We both have good jobs. That's
not a problem.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Do you realize that if you lose this case, you
and your wife may be liable to reimburse both defendants for
their costs and attorneys' fees which, I might add, are
considerable?
MR. PALMER: Objection, argumentative and irrelevant.
Don't answer that.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Okay. I'll withdraw the question. Let me
change the subject again. Your wife gained some weight
while she was on Ovar-X, right?
MR. SAWYER: Yes.
MR. DRIZOLLI: How much?
MR. SAWYER: About twenty pounds.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Did you find your wife unattractive at that
point?
[Ms. Sawyer begins to cry.]
MR. SAWYER: You're upsetting my wife. I love my wife.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Answer the question.
MR. SAWYER: I did answer it.
MR. DRIZOLLI: We'll let the judge decide whether you did
or didn't. Earlier I asked whether you had seen any other
women during your marriage. I forgot to ask whether you've
had affairs with any men during that same period.
MR. PALMER: This deposition is over! You've really crossed
the line now. Get the hell out of my office!4 28
A. Were the Questions Proper?
To determine whether Mr. Drizolli's questions were proper, the
starting point should be Federal Rule 26(b) (1), which defines the
scope of permissible discovery and provides that "[p] arties may obtain
discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, which is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action. "429 The key "hurdle"
words in this rule are "privileged" and "relevant."4"'
428. Cf Golembiewski v. Hallberg Ins. Agency, 635 N.E.2d 452, 456 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994)
(quoting an attorney who told "the court reporter to leave and [told another] attorney to
get the hell out of [his] office'" (second alteration in original)).
429. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(1).
430. Inker, supra note 426, at 29.
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Privileged information is information protected by any statutory
or common law privilege and material protected by the work product
doctrine. 431 None of Mr. Drizolli's questions required the deponent
to divulge privileged information.432 Thus, he easily cleared this
hurdle.433
At trial, relevant information is that evidence "having any ten-
dency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it
would be without the evidence. '43 4 Relevance in the discovery con-
text, however, is very broad.435 Under the Federal Rules, "relevance"
does not mean that the information will be admissible at trial; instead,
the information need only appear "reasonably calculated to lead to
the discovery of admissible evidence."4 6 Further, "[b]y linking rele-
431. Id.
432. Even if a question had called for privileged information, neither the deponent nor
the deponent's counsel objected. Thus, any privilege would have been waived. See, e.g.,
Kyrnissis v. Rozzi, No. 93 Civ. 8609(JGK)RLE, 1997 WL 278055, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 23,
1997) ("If an attorney allows a deponent to testify concerning an area to which an alleged
privilege would normally apply, the client is bound by the resulting waiver."); Perrignon v.
Bergen Brunswig Corp., 77 F.R.D. 455, 459 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (mem.) (finding the privilege
to be waived when the deponent described allegedly privileged conversations without ob-
jection from counsel).
433. Had Mr. Drizolli asked questions designed to elicit privileged information, he also
would have run afoul of Rule 4.4 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. See Valassis v.
Samelson, 143 F.R.D. 118, 124-25 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (stating that Rule 4.4 "has been inter-
preted as preventing an attorney from inquiring about privileged matters" (citing ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 359 (1991) and 2 HAZARD &
HODES, supra note 131, § 4.2:107, at 738)).
434. FED. R. EID. 401. However, "Rule 401 is silent as to what factors the court must
consider in determining whether an item of evidence is relevant. Thus, the determination
of relevance is not automatic or mechanical." 2 WEINSTEIN'S FEDERAL EVIDENCE
§ 401.04[1], at 401-14 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed. 1997).
435. See, e.g., Liew v. Breen, 640 F.2d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1981) ("For discovery pur-
poses 'relevancy' is a broad term."); Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local
Union No. 130, 657 F.2d 890, 903 (7th Cir. 1981) ("Admissibility at trial is not the test.");
Liz Claiborne, Inc. v. Mademoiselle Knitwear, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 2064 (RWS), 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 1272, at *15 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 7, 1997) ("The standard for discoverability of infor-
mation under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is lower than the standard for admissi-
bility of evidence under Rule 401 [of the Federal Rules of Evidence]."); Schaap v.
Executive Indus., 130 F.R.D. 384, 386 (N.D. III. 1990) ("[R]elevancy 'is to be more loosely
construed at the discovery stage than at the trial.'"); Cox v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co.,
38 F.R.D. 396, 398 (D.S.C. 1965) ("Fortunately, in the search for the ultimate, TRUTH, the
Federal Courts, blessed with the rules of discovery, are not shackled with strict interpreta-
tions of relevancy."); see also 8A WRIGrr ET AL., supra note 61, § 2008 passim (discussing the
meaning of the word "relevant" as used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1)).
436. FED. R_ Crv. P. 26(b) (1); accord Chubb Integrated Sys. Ltd. v. National Bank, 103
F.R.D. 52, 59 (D.D.C. 1984) (mem.) ("Rule 26(b) makes a clear distinction between infor-
mation that is relevant to the subject matter for pretrial discovery and the ultimate admissi-
bility of that information at trial.").
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vance to the 'subject matter' of the case," the rule does not restrict
inquiry into the issues alleged in the pleadings.437 As one treatise ex-
plains, the breadth of discovery relevance is reflected by courts ruling
that discovery should be permitted on matters that ""'might conceiva-
bly have a bearing"' on the subject matter." '438 It is a flexible concept
that is usually addressed on a case-by-case basis.4"9 When in doubt,
courts typically rule in favor of discoverability. 44 The relevancy hur-
dle, therefore, is much lower than the privilege hurdle.'
Even if the questioning attorney clears the Rule 26(b) (1) hurdle,
the next hurdle is Rule 30(d) (3), which concerns depositions con-
ducted in bad faith or in a manner to annoy, embarrass, or oppress
the deponent:
At any time during a deposition, on motion of a party or
of the deponent and upon a showing that the examination is
being conducted in bad faith or in such manner as unreason-
ably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent or party,
the court in which the action is pending ... may order the
officer conducting the examination to cease forthwith from
taking the deposition, or may limit the scope and manner of
the taking of the deposition as provided in Rule 26(c). 4 2
437. HARE ET AL., supra note 247, at 7 (citing Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 397
F. Supp. 1146, 1187 (D.S.C. 1974); United States v. IBM Corp., 66 F.R.D. 180,182 (S.D.N.Y.
1974); La Chemise Lacoste v. Alligator Co., 60 F.R.D. 164, 170-71 (D. Del. 1973); Triangle
Mfg. v. Paramount Bag Mfg., 35 F.R.D. 540, 542 (E.D.N.Y. 1964)); see also supra text accom-
panying note 429. Relevant subject matter includes affirmative defenses as well as claims.
See HARE ET AL., supra note 247, at 7 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1)).
438. HARE ET AL., supra note 247, at 9 (quoting United Nuclear Corp. v. General Atomic
Co., 629 P.2d 231, 250 (N.M. 1980) (quoting Triangle, 35 F.R.D. at 542)); accord 8 WRiGr-r
ET AL., supra note 61, § 2008, at 108-09 ("[I]t is not too strong to say that a request for
discovery should be considered relevant if there is any possibility that the information
sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the action.").
439. 2 WErNsrEIN'S, supra note 434, § 401.07, at 401-43; see also id. § 401.04[3] [b], at 401-
32 (explaining that relevancy is determined not only by evidentiary rules, but also by con-
trolling substantive law); Eggleston, 657 F.2d at 903 (requiring "flexible treatment" of what
is considered relevant (internal quotation marks omitted)).
440. See, e.g., Rolscreen Co. v. Pella Prods., 145 F.R.D. 92, 97 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (ordering
deposition testimony although it "may prove to be duplicative"). But see 8 WPdGrr ET AL.,
supra note 61, § 2008, at 107-08 (indicating that, even under the liberal discovery rules,
relevancy does not include information "that has no conceivable bearing on the case").
441. See Eggleston, 657 F.2d at 903 ("Relevancy, although mentioned in the rule along
with privilege, does not necessarily deserve the same respect.").
442. FED. R. Civ. P. 30(d) (3). Rule 26(c) provides that "the court ... may make any
order which justice requires to protect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment,
oppression, or undue burden or expense," including that discovery not be had, that the
discovery be conducted only on specified terms, that the discovery be obtained by another
method, that certain matters not be inquired into, that the persons allowed to attend be
limited, or that trade secret information not be divulged. FED. R. Crv. P. 26(c); accord D.
COLO. L.R. 30.1C(A) (discussed at supra note 44).
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Even assuming that the questioning attorney's conduct comports
with controlling court rules or rules of civil procedure, his conduct
may still violate mandatory ethical rules. Under the Model Rules,
"[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third
person, or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal
rights of such a person.""44 The Model Code contains similar prohibi-
tions. Specifically, DR 7-106(C) (2) provides that a lawyer shall not
"[a]sk any question that he has no reasonable basis to believe is rele-
vant to the case and that is intended to degrade a witness or other
person."444 In addition, DR 7-102 (A) (1) forbids a lawyer from acting
"when he knows or when it is obvious that such action would serve
merely to harass or maliciously injure another."44 Thus, an attorney
may violate an ethical rule by asking a relevant question with an im-
proper motive.
Finally, a questioning attorney's conduct might run afoul of civil-
ity codes, some of which may be enforced by courts through threat of
sanction.446 For example, several codes proscribe attorneys from ask-
ing questions that "inquire into a deponent's personal affairs or ques-
tion a deponent's integrity where such inquiry is irrelevant to the
subject matter of the deposition" or that are harassing, repetitive, or
447argumentative.
Here, Mr. Drizolli did not ask any questions calling for privileged
information, so he cleared the first hurdle. Moreover, given the low
relevancy threshold, many of Mr. Drizolli's questions, although
pointed, would also survive the Rule 26(b) relevancy hurdle. Because
the Sawyers pleaded loss of consortium, they opened their private re-
lationship to scrutiny. Although many of the questions asked were
personal and embarrassing, and even caused the deponent's wife to
cry, they were relevant under the discovery definition of "relevant."
448
At a minimum, there was some possibility that most of the information
sought would lead to the discovery of evidence that would be admissi-
443. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 (1994).
444. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C) (2) (1982).
445. Id. DR 7-102(A) (1).
446. See supra Part I.C.
447. BOSTON BAR ASS'N, CMLITY STANDARDS FOR CML LITIGATION stand. B(5)(e)-(k)
(Mass. 1994), reprinted in BOSTON B.J., Sept.-Oct. 1994, at 11, 12; see also Los ANGELES
CouNry BAR ASS'N, LITIGATION GUIDELINES guide. 5 (Cal. 1989) (prohibiting, among other
things, inquiry into a deponent's personal affairs); ST. PETERSBURG BAR ASS'N, STANDARDS
OF PROFESSIONAL COURTESY stand. E (Fla. 1992) (cautioning attorneys to avoid inquiring
into a deponent's personal affairs).
448. See supra notes 435-441 and accompanying text (discussing the meaning of "rele-
vant" under Rule 26(b)).
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ble in connection with the Sawyers' loss-of-consortium claim." 9 In ad-
dition, Mr. Drizolli owed his client an ethical and legal duty to develop
the facts fully and to craft a defense to the Sawyers' allegations.450
Thus, he needed to ask some hard questions to satisfy that duty.
There was one question, however, that did not seek relevant in-
formation. At one point, Mr. Drizolli attempted to intimidate Mr.
Sawyer by indicating that the Sawyers might be liable for the defend-
ants' attorneys' fees if they lost. Whether Mr. Sawyer knew of this po-
tential-and highly unlikely-liability was in no way relevant to the
merits. Further, Mr. Drizolli did not need to know the information to
defend his clients in the lawsuit. Instead, the question was asked
merely to intimidate the Sawyers. Mr. Drizolli was trying to scare the
Sawyers into settling the case.
In addition, one other question-the one concerning a potential
same-sex affair-was probably designed merely to embarrass the wit-
ness. The witness had already indicated unequivocally that he had not
cheated on his wife, yet Mr. Drizolli still insisted on asking the same-
sex question. Because Rule 30(d),4 5 ' the mandatory ethical codes,4 52
449. During the deposition of a plaintiff in a case in which it was claimed the defendant
intentionally caused the plaintiff emotional distress by sexually harassing her, the defend-
ant's counsel asked the plaintiff questions concerning her sexual relationship with her
husband both before and after the events at issue. James v. Miller, No. 86 C 10081, 1988
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6793, at *2 (N.D. Ill. June 29, 1988) (mem.). "Specifically, the plaintiff
was asked to state the frequency that she and her husband had sexual intercourse, the
duration of their sexual intercourse, whether either party achieved climax, and, if so, how
often, and finally whether the parties were satisfied after they had intercourse." Id.
Although the plaintiff answered one of these questions, on advice of counsel, she refused
to answer others. Id. When the defendant moved to compel answers to these questions,
the plaintiffs attorney argued that the questions were not relevant because the plaintiff
had not sought damages for loss of consortium or any sexual dysfunction or trauma. Id.
The defendant argued that the information was relevant, or was at least calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence. Id. at *2-3. Although the court sympathized with
the plaintiffs sense of embarrassment, it granted the defendant's motion to compel be-
cause the plaintiff indicated that the defendant's actions had led to a decline in sexual
relations between her and her husband. Id. at *3 & n.2. The court indicated that plain-
tiffs counsel could object to the questions, but could not instruct the client not to answer;
it also indicated that the plaintiff could seek a limiting order under Rule 30(d). See id. at
*4 & n.2.
450. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1994) ("A lawyer
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition.., and may take whatever
lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client's cause or endeavor.").
451. See supra text accompanying note 27 (quoting the portion of Rule 30(d) that per-
mits a court to terminate or limit a deposition when it is being conducted in a manner as
unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the deponent).
452. See supra notes 138, 151 and accompanying text (discussing sections of the Model
Rules and Model Code that prohibit attorneys from asking questions or engaging in con-
duct merely to harass or embarrass deponents).
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and many civility codes453 prohibit questions designed to embarrass,
harass, and annoy, Mr. Drizolli stumbled when he approached these
hurdles.
B. Did the Defending Attorney Respond Properly?
Mr. Drizolli was not the only attorney at this deposition faced with
ethical and legal dilemmas. Mr. Palmer, the deponent's attorney, also
had to grapple with some difficult issues. Unfortunately, he too stum-
bled both legally and ethically.
When a witness is faced with sensitive and potentially embarrass-
ing questions, a defending lawyer's first inclination is to protect the
witness.4 5 4 For some attorneys, the protective mechanism might be to
object;45 5 others might ask the questioner to move to another line of
inquiry.45 6 Protecting the client, however, should begin with careful
preparation and disclosure.4 57 Even before an attorney files a claim
that might require a client to reveal personal or sensitive information,
the client should be informed about the pros and cons of pursuing
such a claim. Indeed, the attorney has an ethical obligation to "ex-
plain a matter to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client
to make informed decisions regarding the representation. 45 8 In a
loss-of-consortium case, therefore, the attorney should warn the client
about the types of questions he will face during discovery. If the client
elects to proceed with the claim, then the attorney should carefully
prepare the client so that the client will not be blindsided by very per-
sonal questions at the deposition.
If the questioning attorney oversteps the bounds of privilege, the
attorney may instruct the client not to answer the questions.459 Rele-
vancy, however, is more problematic.
453. See, e.g., supra notes 164-170 and accompanying text (quoting BOSTON BAR ASS'N,
CIVILrrY STANDARDS FOR CIVIL LITIGATION stand. B(5)(e)-(k) (Mass. 1994)).
454. See supra notes 426, 449 (providing examples of attorneys who instructed witnesses
not to answer detailed questions about their sexual relationships).
455. See John R. Woodard III, Discovery Abuse: "I Know It When I See It," BRIEF, Winter
1997, at 32, 38 (observing that an objection will often result in an opposing attorney aban-
doning a line of inquiry, thus sparing a deponent from examination "of an otherwise sensi-
tive area").
456. In line with this approach, attorneys will often instruct their witnesses not to answer
such a question. See supra note 426 (noting attorneys' instructions to their witness not to
answer questions about how often she engaged in oral and anal intercourse and how often
she used so-called marital aids).
457. See supra notes 198, 250-254 and accompanying text.
458. MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.4(b) (1994).
459. FED. R. CIV. P. 30(d)(1).
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Because of the broad definition of relevance during pretrial dis-
covery,460 a relevancy objection is difficult to sustain.4 6 1 Moreover, an
attorney cannot instruct a witness not to answer simply because the
attorney believes that the question calls for irrelevant information.4 6 2
In other words, a party cannot unilaterally restrict the scope of ques-
tioning on relevancy grounds.4 63 As the United States Supreme Court
indicated in Hickman v. Taylor, 4 64 "No longer can the time-honored
cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party from inquiring
into the facts underlying his opponent's case. "465
If an attorney in a federal court case instructs a witness not to
answer a deposition question based on relevancy, then that attorney
risks sanctions under Rule 30(d) (2) and Rule 37 for impeding the
examination.4 6 6 In addition, the attorney risks prosecution for violat-
ing ethical rules, because interposing improper objections in violation
of controlling court rules runs afoul of Model Rules 3.2, 3.4, and
8.4(d), and DRs 1-102(A) (5), 7-101 (A) (1), and 7-102(A) (1).467
What, then, should a lawyer do when a questioning attorney asks
the deponent embarrassing questions or clearly irrelevant questions,
and the attorney feels he must do more than simply object? In federal
460. See supra notes 435-441 and accompanying text (discussing the breadth of the term
"relevant" in the discovery context).
461. See Resolution Trust Corp. v. International Ins. Co., Civ. A. No. 89-4020, 1993 WL
98677, at *1-2 (E.D. La. Mar. 26, 1993) (minute entry) (chastising an attorney for in-
structing a witness not to answer on the grounds that the question lacked relevance); Rol-
screen Co. v. Pella Prods., 145 F.R-D. 92, 95 (S.D. Iowa 1992) (stating that a relevancy
objection "is a difficult objection upon which to prevail during the discovery phase of an
action" (internal quotation marks omitted)). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
relevancy objections may be reserved for trial. FED. R. Cirv. P. 32(d) (3) (A).
462. See Resolution Trust Co. v. Dabney, 73 F.3d 262, 266 (10th Cir. 1995) ("It is inap-
propriate to instruct a witness not to answer a question on the basis of relevance."); Stan-
dard Chlorine v. Sinibaldi, No. 91-188-SLR, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3388, at *15 (D. Del.
Mar. 21, 1994) (mem.) ("[C]ounsel's instruction not to answer a deposition question on
grounds of relevance is manifestly at odds with proper deposition procedure.").
463. See Baine v. General Motors Corp., 141 F.R.D. 328, 330 (M.D. Ala. 1991) (holding
that a party may not withhold information based on a unilateral determination of rele-
vancy); Smith v. Logansport Community Sch. Corp., 139 F.R.D. 637, 648 (N.D. Ind. 1991)
(mem.) (same).
464. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
465. Id. at 507. But see Eggleston v. Chicago Journeymen Plumbers' Local Union No.
130, 657 F.2d 890, 904 (7th Cir. 1981) (declaring, before the 1993 amendments, that "the
'fishing license' nevertheless need ordinarily be only a limited one with an early expiration
date").
466. See FED. R_ CIv. P. 30(d) (2) (allowing for imposition of sanctions upon persons
whose conduct "has frustrated the fair examination of the deponent"); FED. R. Clv. P. 37
(providing for sanctions when an attorney advises a deponent not to answer a question,
and providing for a motion to compel an answer to that question).
467. See supra notes 138, 140, 147-148, 206 (quoting the relevant portions of these
rules).
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court, Rule 30(d) may provide the needed relief. "At any time during
a deposition," a party or deponent may present a motion to the court
indicating that the deposition "is being conducted in bad faith or in
such manner as unreasonably to annoy, embarrass, or oppress the de-
ponent or party."468 In addition, Rule 30(d) (1) permits an attorney to
counsel his client not to answer a question on the grounds that the
question is designed to embarrass the deponent or is irrelevant, if the
attorney intends to present a motion under Rule 30(d)(3).469 The
attorney, however, may not merely instruct the witness not to answer
such a question without adjourning to present the Rule 30(d)(3)
470motion.
If the deponent's attorney believes that the questioning attorney
is entitled to the requested information, but also wants to restrict dis-
tribution of his client's sensitive information, he might ask the oppos-
ing counsel to sign a confidentiality agreement.471 If the opponent
will not entertain a confidentiality agreement, upon a showing of
good cause, the court may enter a protective order.472 After the depo-
sition, if the deponent's attorney believes that the information gained
during the deposition is prejudicial, he might consider filing a motion
in limine to prevent the opponent from introducing the sensitive evi-
dence at trial.47
468. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(3).
469. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(1).
470. Id.; accord Smith v. Logansport Community Sch. Corp., 139 F.R1D. 637, 643 (N.D.
Ind. 1991) (mem.) (calling an attorney's after-the-fact attempt to reconcile a unilateral
termination with the requirements of Rule 30(d) "disingenuous, at best"). In one case in
which Rule 30(d) was invoked, the court explained:
The problem presented in this case, is that although several aspects of the
instant deposition fall squarely within the Rule 30(d) requirement of unreasona-
bleness and oppression of the deponent[, defense counsel never made a Rule
30(d) motion to the Court to terminate the examination. In fact, defense coun-
sel went so far as to arrogate to himself the right to terminate the examination in
a unilateral fashion without consideration of the applicable legal authority. This
tactic contravenes the requirement that an application to terminate must be
made to the court.
Hearst/ABC-Viacom Entertainment Servs. v. Goodway Mktg., Inc., 145 F.R.D. 59, 62 (E.D.
Pa. 1992) (mem.) (citation omitted).
471. See Sharjah Inv. Co. (UK) v. P.C. Telemart, Inc., 107 F.R.D. 81, 82-83 (S.D.N.Y.
1985) (discussing deposition transcripts subject to a stipulated confidentiality agreement).
472. See FED. R. CIrv. P. 26(c) (providing for a court order sealing a deposition, which
may be opened only by order of the court).
473. See generally Edna Selan Epstein, Motions in Limine: A Primer, LITGATION, Spring
1982, at 34 (discussing the use of motions in limine to prevent the introduction of evi-
dence at trial); Stephen A. Saltzburg, Tactics of the Motion in Limine, LITIGATION, Summer
1983, at 17 (discussing the impact that a motion in limine can have on a trial).
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The first time Mr. Drizolli asked Mr. Sawyer a sensitive question,
Mr. Sawyer hesitated and asked his own attorney whether he had to
answer. Mr. Palmer correctly directed Mr. Sawyer to answer the ques-
tion, which sought relevant, nonprivileged information. Later, Mr.
Palmer objected to a question on grounds of relevance. But Mr.
Palmer did not instruct his client not to answer the question, and the
client quickly volunteered the answer. Mr. Palmer's conduct, how-
ever, soon deteriorated. Instead of stating objections, he started yell-
ing at Mr. Drizolli. Such conduct is inappropriate and would provide
a basis for sanctions under Rule 30(d) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure; it also violates the letter and spirit of several ethical
rules.4 74
Next, in response to a question concerning the plaintiffs' fi-
nances, Mr. Palmer suggested that he would not instruct the witness
not to answer if opposing counsel would sign a confidentiality agree-
ment. Although the attempt to stipulate concerning confidentiality
was appropriate,4 75 Mr. Palmer's threat to instruct the witness not to
answer was inappropriate. 476 The better step would have been to seek
protection under Rule 30 (d) (3).477 A few questions later, in response
to Mr. Drizolli's comment regarding attorneys' fees, Mr. Palmer ob-
jected and then instructed the witness not to answer. Again, in federal
court, such an instruction is prohibited under Rule 30(d) (1) absent a
motion under Rule 30(d) (3).478
Finally, when Mr. Drizolli asked Mr. Sawyer about a possible male
lover, Mr. Palmer exploded and ejected Mr. Drizolli from the office.
Although such behavior might be understandable, it is inappropriate.
In Golembiewski v. Hallberg Insurance Agency,4 79 a case on which this part
of the hypothetical is based, the trial court barred the deponent from
testifying at trial, prohibited the offending attorney from presenting a
defense, and ordered the attorney's firm to pay $900 to opposing
counsel for time spent at the deposition.48 Although the deponent
and his counsel appealed this ruling, the appellate court affirmed the
474. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(1) (1982)
(prohibiting action that serves to harass or injure others); MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCr Rule 3.4 (1994) (prohibiting the obstruction of access to evidence).
475. See N.D. Ill. L.R_ 5.22 cmt. (proposed May 24, 1995) (rejected Feb. 24, 1997) (on
file with author) (indicating that a Rule 30(d) motion should not be presented to the
court until the parties have made a good-faith effort to resolve the matter informally).
476. See supra note 470 and accompanying text.
477. See supra note 468 and accompanying text.
478. See FED. R_ CIv. P. 30(d)(1).
479. 635 N.E.2d 452 (Ill. App. CL 1994).
480. Id. at 456. In Golembiewski, the court characterized the sanctioned attorney's con-
duct as representing "discovery practice at its worst" and pointed out that the deposition
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ruling.481 Thus, although Mr. Drizolli prompted Mr. Palmer's con-
duct, Mr. Palmer probably would have ended up in as much, if not
more, trouble than Mr. Drizolli.
VI. INTERACTION WITH OPPOSING COUNSEL
The primary temptation for attorney misbehavior in depositions
arises from the absence of a judge.4" 2 In this scenario, the defense
lawyer adopts a "Rambo" strategy48 and the plaintiffs lawyer must de-
cide how to react to that strategy. Does she respond in kind? Does
she seek judicial intervention? How does she protect her client's
interest?
September 19, 1996. Time: 9:00 a.m.
MS. DAVIS: Good morning, doctor. My name is Corinne
Davis, and I represent PharTech in this action. You've been
sworn, and I assume your attorney has reviewed deposition
procedures with you. So we'll cut right to the chase. Dr. Fos-
ter, how many medical malpractice claims have you had filed
against you?
MR. DRIZOLLI: That's not relevant, Miss. I object. It's your
client's product that's gotten us into this mess. My client is a
well-respected doctor and leader in the community.
MS. DAVIS: Doctor, please answer my question.
DR. FOSTER: Only one other suit has ever been filed
against me. I won a summary judgment in that case and was
totally vindicated.
MS. DAVIS: What were the allegations in that case?
MR. DRIZOLLI: Look, Miss. Let me help you out. Move
on. No court will allow this information into evidence.
MS. DAVIS: [To Mr. Drizolli] Do you have an objection? If
so, please state it for the record. If not, I would appreciate it
if you would stop commenting on my questions. You talk
about me needing help-you're the one who needs help. If
you continue, you're going to force me to call the court for
an immediate ruling.
transcript was "riddled with frivolous objections... and... improper instructions not to
answer questions." Id.
481. Id.
482. Cf Cholfin v. Gordon, No. CA943623, 1995 WL 809916, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Mar. 22, 1995) (mem.) (reminding attorneys that a deposition is an extension of ajudicial
proceeding and should be conducted "with the same sense of solemnity... that would be
required were the parties in the courtroom itself").
483. See supra note 159 and accompanying text (describing the "Rambo" attorney).
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MR. DRIZOLLI: I've been in this business for a long time,
and I'll talk whenever I want to. I'm friends with all the
judges downtown. You're fighting a losing battle.
MS. DAVIS: [To Mr. Drizolli] Are you instructing your wit-
ness not to answer?
MR. DRIZOLLI: You can waste your time if you want to, but
my client is a busy doctor with a lot of patients to see. Her
time is valuable and I'm not going to let you waste it. Ask
her something relevant.
MS. DAVIS: I did. I want an answer to my question.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Lady, where did you get your law degree?
J.C. Penney? You're acting like this is your first deposition.
Oh well-I guess I'll humor you. At least you're pleasant to
look at. Dr. Foster, answer the pretty lady's question.
DR. FOSTER: It involved a situation in which I prescribed
the patient some medication. The patient did not follow the
instructions on the bottle and had some complications. He
sued saying I didn't explain the instructions to him. But I
had written everything down, and the pharmacy had put
those instructions on the bottle, and he just did not follow
them. When he admitted the truth, the judge threw out his
case.
MR. DRIZOLLI: [To Ms. Davis] Are you happy now? What a
waste of time. I hope your next questions are better than the
last couple. Otherwise, this is going to be a really long day.
MS. DAVIS: Mr. Drizolli, please keep your commentary to
yourself. When you're taking a deposition, you can talk. But
you need to keep your big, fat mouth shut during my exami-
nation. You can ask all the questions you want once I'm
finished.
MR. DRIZOLLI: Don't tell me what to do. You're really pis-
sing me off. If you don't like how I represent my client, then
you can just leave.
MS. DAVIS: I might just do that. And when I resume, I'll be
back with a video camera so I can record your antics for the
judge. I'm sure he'll be horrified.
MR. DRIZOLLI: You leave and you're not going to get to
depose my client for a very long time. She's busy and
doesn't have time for your nonsense.
MS. DAVIS: Well, I guess your threat will just force me to call
the court for an immediate ruling.
MR. DRIZOLLI: I would caution you not to use any phone
in this office unless you have my permission.
MS. DAVIS: Are you actually saying I can't use the phone?
MR. DRIZOLLI: You touch the phone and you'll be sorry.
1998]
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MS. DAVIS: Then you leave me no choice. I'll see you
before the judge.
Complete fiction? Unfortunately not.4 84 Extreme incivility is a
form of discovery abuse4 5 that occurs all too frequently. Here, the
entire exchange is replete with uncivil exchanges-some more blatant
than others.
484. Mr. Drizolli's last two remarks are based on Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Insur-
ance Co., 828 F. Supp. 594, 597 (C.D. Ill. 1992), in which the following exchange occurred
between two attorneys when one suggested that an impasse be resolved by an immediate
telephone conference with the judge:
[Attorney 1]: I would caution you not to use any telephones in this office unless
you are invited to do so, counsel.
[Attorney 2]: You're telling me I can't use your telephones?
[Attorney 1]: ... [Ylou step outside this room and touch the telephone, and I'll
take care of that in the way one does who has possessory rights.
Id. The J.C. Penney comment was based on an incident in which an older male attorney
posed that question to the author early in the author's practice, and on Unique Concepts,
Inc. v. Brown, 115 F.R.D. 292, 293 (S.D.N.Y. 1987), in which the defending counsel told the
examining counsel, "I would almost agree to make a contribution of cash to you if you
would promise to use it to take a course in how to ask questions in a deposition." Other
cases and articles are replete with incidents involving attorneys' uncivil conduct during
depositions. See, e.g., Carroll v. Jaques, 926 F. Supp. 1282, 1286 (E.D. Tex. 1996) (explain-
ing that defendant's attorney, among other things, called plaintiff's counsel an "idiot" and
an "ass," and indicated that he "ought to be punched in the goddamn nose"), affd sub nom.
Carroll v. Jacques Admiralty Law Firm, 110 F.3d 290 (5th Cir. 1997); Mercer v. Gerry Baby
Prods. Co., 160 F.R.D. 576, 577 (S.D. Iowa 1995) (discussing how one lawyer told another
to "[s] tick it in your ear"); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637
A.2d 34, 53-55 (Del. 1994) (discussed at supra notes 114-125 and accompanying text);
Cholfin v. Gordon, No. CA943623, 1995 WL 809916, at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1995)
(mem.) (explaining that one attorney called the defendant a "liar," an "animal," and a
"son-of-a-bitch" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Corsini v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 630
N.Y.S.2d 45, 46 (App. Div. 1995) (describing how one attorney mimicked another's speech
in a manner suggesting an ethnic slur and how the same attorney called the same person a
"slime bag"); William Grady et al., And Your Client Wears Combat Boots, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 12,
1993, § 3, at 3, available in LEXIS, News Library, Chtrib File (reporting that, during a depo-
sition, one attorney said to the other, "You look like a slob the way you're dressed, but you
don't have to act like a slob"); see also Cary, supra note 159, app. (containing excerpts from
abusive depositions). One news account reports that during one deposition, Houston at-
torney Joseph D. Jamail called another attorney "Fat Boy" and a "big fat tub of shit"; the
other attorney calledJamail "Mr. Hairpiece." Let's Work Together for a Lawyers' Civility Rights
Act, IND. LAw., Aug. 23, 1995, at 7, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Inlawr File [herein-
after Let's Work Together]. In another deposition,Jamail stated, "You could gag a maggot off
a meatwagon." Id.
485. See Corsini, 630 N.Y.S.2d at 47 (explaining that "[d]iscovery abuse, .. in the form
of extreme incivility by an attorney with respect to an adversary, prior to and during a deposi-
tion, is not to be tolerated" (emphasis added)).
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A. Gender Bias as Deposition Abuse
One subtle form of incivility concerns the issue of gender bias.4 86
A tactic used by some attorneys to shake or frustrate opposing counsel
is to refer to them in a manner that strips them of their professional
status. 48 7 Often, this tactic is used by older males when the opponent
is a younger female.488 Here, for example, Mr. Drizolli twice referred
to Ms. Davis as "Miss." He also referenced Ms. Davis's appearance.
These types of statements are unprofessional and should be
avoided.489
Attorneys should refer to each other as "Mr." or "Ms.," 490 or they
should call all participating attorneys by their first names. Distinctions
should not be based on gender, age, or other characteristics, and cer-
tainly should not be used as a weapon to disrupt a deposition. Fur-
ther, "[a]ny behavior that focuses attention away from the
professional stature of an attorney and toward the personal serves to
undermine the effectiveness of the recipient. Even assuming such be-
haviors are well-intentioned, the suggestion is that counsel's profes-
sional expertise is less important than, for instance, [his or her]
physical appearance." '491
In addition to being unprofessional, Mr. Drizolli's method of ad-
dressing Ms. Davis might actually constitute an ethical violation in
some jurisdictions. For example, Rule 6.5 of the Michigan Rules of
Professional Conduct provides: "A lawyer shall treat with courtesy and
respect all persons involved in the legal process. A lawyer shall take
particular care to avoid treating such a person discourteously or disre-
spectfully because of the person's race, gender, or other protected
486. See generally Lorraine H. Weber, Professionalism and Gender: A Practical Guide, 69
MICH. B.J. 898 (1990) (discussing the need for non-biased professionalism among lawyers).
487. Cf supra note 484.
488. See Cary, supra note 159, at 574 ("Rambo lawyers appear to take particular delight
in demeaning inexperienced young women attorneys.").
489. Lorraine H. Weber explains:
One of the ways that a lack of respect or status is conveyed is through the use
of differential forms of address. Drawing distinctions in forms of address always
runs the risk of creating the appearance that one side is disadvantaged. No indi-
vidual should be addressed by their [sic] first name within a professional context.
The use of "Mr." and "Ms." is the preferred form of address.
All professional titles . . . should be used regardless of the gender of the
individual. Under no circumstances should any terms of endearment such as
"sweetie," "honey," or "dear," be used when speaking to a man or woman within
the professional environment .... The use of familiar terms affects both a per-
son's credibility and stature.
Weber, supra note 486, at 900.
490. See id.
491. Id.
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personal characteristic. "492 Similarly, in a 1992 New York case, the
court found that an attorney's reference to opposing counsel as "little
lady" and "little girl" violated the state disciplinary code.493
B. Incivility Violates Procedural and Ethical Rules
Most attorneys would probably-and indeed, hopefully-agree
that Mr. Drizolli's behavior in defending Dr. Foster's deposition was
uncivil and unprofessional. However, did his conduct, beyond that
discussed in the gender bias subpart, violate procedural and ethical
rules? The answer, unequivocally, is yes.
Mr. Drizolli's conduct hindered, delayed, and disrupted the dep-
osition. Therefore, Mr. Drizolli's conduct violated Rule 30(c) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that the examination
of a witness during a deposition "may proceed as permitted at the
trial."494 His obnoxious behavior would not have been tolerated at
trial, and it should not be tolerated in the deposition setting. One
court explained this ground for imposing sanctions for deposition
misconduct:
Although the deposition was not held in a courtroom, and
there was no judge present, it was, nonetheless, part of ajudi-
cial proceeding .... A lawyer's duty to refrain from uncivil
and abusive behavior is not diminished because the site of
492. MICH. R. PROF. CONDUCT 6.5(a); accord COLO. R. PROF. CONDUCT 1.2(f) (indicating
that discrimination against those involved in the litigation process is a disciplinary viola-
tion); MINN. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(h) (prohibiting attorneys from committing "a discrimi-
natory act, prohibited by federal, state or local statute or ordinance, that reflects adversely
on the lawyer's fitness as a lawyer"); NJ. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4 (g) (making it professional
misconduct for a lawyer to "engage, in a professional capacity, in conduct involving dis-
crimination ... because of race, color, religion, age, sex, sexual orientation, national ori-
gin, language, marital status, socioeconomic status, or handicap where the conduct is
intended or likely to cause harm"); R.I. Sup. CT. R. PROF. CONDUCT 8.4(d) (banning dis-
crimination based on race, nationality, or sex against litigants, jurors, lawyers, and other
individuals involved in the judicial process); Janis E. Clark, Gender Bias Issues in the Legal
Profession: Do the Kentucky Rules of Professional Conduct and the KBA Code of Professional Cour-
tesy Help?, Ky. BENCH & B., Winter 1995, at 25 (discussing gender bias in the context of
rules of professional conduct).
493. Principe v. Assay Partners, 586 N.Y.S.2d 182, 184-85 (Sup. Ct. 1992). Racial slurs
also have been held unethical. See, e.g., In re Williams, 414 N.W.2d 394, 399 (Minn. 1987)
(per curiam) (adopting a referee's recommendation for the public reprimand of an attor-
ney who intentionally used a racial slur in a deposition). See generally Annotation, Attorney's
VerbalAbuse of Another Attorney as BasisforDisciplinay Action, 87 A.L.R30 351 (1978) (analyz-
ing cases regarding whether an attorney's verbal abuse of another attorney constitutes a
basis for disciplinary action).
494. FED. R. CIv. P. 30(c).
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the proceeding is a deposition room, or law office, rather
than a courtroom.9 5
Mr. Drizolli's conduct also violated Federal Rule 30(d) (2), which
permits a court to sanction an attorney who impedes or delays an ex-
amination.4 9 6 Additionally, his tactics ran afoul of Federal Rule 1,
which states that the Federal Rules should be "construed and adminis-
tered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."4
97
Even further, Mr. Drizolli's conduct violated ethical duties he
owed to the court, opposing counsel, and his client. How many rules
did he break? Let us count the ways.498 Using the Model Rules and
the Model Code as guides,4 99 he violated the following:
" Rule 3.2 and DR 7-102(A) (1), because his tactics hin-
dered, not expedited, the litigation; 00
* Rule 3.4, because he obstructed Ms. Davis's access to
evidence;50 1
" Rule 3.5, because he engaged in conduct "intended to
disrupt a tribunal";50 2
* Rule 4.4 and DR 7-102(A)(1), because he made state-
ments for no purpose other than to embarrass or harass
Ms. Davis; 503
495. Corsini v. U-Haul Int'l, Inc., 630 N.Y.S.2d 45, 47 (App. Div. 1995).
496. FED. R. Crv. P. 30(d)(2).
497. FED. R CIV. P. 1.
498. Courts do take disciplinary actions against deposition misconduct. See, e.g., In re
Schiff, 599 N.Y.S.2d 242, 242-43 (App. Div. 1993) (per curiam) (publicly censuring an at-
torney for deposition conduct, which included intimidating defendant's counsel and di-
recting vulgar, obscene, and sexist comments at her, in violation of DR 1-102(A) (7) of the
Model Code); Office of Disciplinary Counsel v. Levin, 517 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ohio 1988)
(per curiam) (publicly reprimanding an attorney for deposition misconduct that violated
DRs 1-102(A) (5), 1-102(A) (6), 7-106(C) (2), 7-106(C) (5), 7-106(C) (6), and 7-106(C) (7) of
the Model Code), reinstatement granted, 635 N.E.2d 380 (Ohio 1994).
499. Only mandatory disciplinary rules are listed in the text accompanying infra notes
500-506. At the least, however, his conduct also ran afoul of EC 7-1, 7-4, 7-10, 7-19, 7-24,
7-25, 7-37, 7-38, 7-39 of the Model Code. See supra Part I.B.
500. See MODEL RuLEs OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1994) ("A lawyer shall make
reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests of the client."); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1) (1982) (proscribing a lawyer from
"delay[ing] a trial").
501. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.4(a) (prohibiting a lawyer from
unlawfully obstruct[ing] another party's access to evidence").
502. Id. Rule 3.5(c).
503. See id Rule 4.4 ("In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no
substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person . . .");
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A) (1) (directing a lawyer not to
take action on behalf of his client "when he knows or when it is obvious that such action
would serve merely to harass or maliciously injure another").
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" DR 7-106(C)(6), because his conduct was discourteous
and degraded the tribunal;
50 4
* Rule 8.4(d) and DR 1-102(A) (5), because his conduct was
"prejudicial to the administration of justice" ;505 and
* DR 7-101(A)(1), because his "zealous advocacy" violated
controlling procedural rules.
50 6
In addition, he arguably violated Model Rule 1.5 and DR 2-106, be-
cause his tactics needlessly increased the costs of litigation-his client
had to pay more than a truly fair fee.50 7
C. Responding to Incivility
How should an attorney react when faced with an obstreperous
opponent? Some attorneys' first reaction would be to respond in
kind.50 ' This approach-retaliation-has some appeal. No attorney
504. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(C) (6) ("In appearing
in his professional capacity before a tribunal, a lawyer shall not ... [e]ngage in undignified
or discourteous conduct which is degrading to a tribunal.").
505. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 8.4(d); MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 1-102(A) (5); accord Cholfin v. Gordon, No. CA943623, 1995 WL
809916, at *12 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1995) (mem.) (warning that "unchecked conduct
... risks dissolving the entire litigation process in the acid of public disgust").
506. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101 (A) (1) (indicating that a
lawyer may use only the "means permitted by law and the Disciplinary Rules" in pursuing
the objectives of his client (footnote omitted)). One court stated:
"An attorney does not have the duty to do all and whatever he can that may en-
able him to win his client's cause or to further his client's interest. His duty and
efforts in these respects, although they should be prompted by his 'entire devo-
tion' to the interest of his client, must be within and not without the bounds of
the law."
In re Wines, 370 S.W.2d 328, 333 (Mo. 1963) (quoting a commissioner of a professional
misconduct hearing); accord Richard M. Hunt, Rude Lauryering Hurts Only the Client, TEX.
LAw., Apr. 4, 1994, at 4, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Txlawr File ("Standards of
courtesy are not an addition to, but are rather implied in the concept of zealous advocacy,
for zealous advocacy sees beyond the immediate moment to the long-term effects of every
behavior on the conduct of the case as a whole . . . ." (emphasis added)).
507. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr Rule 1.5 ("A lawyer's fee shall be rea-
sonable."); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-106 ("A lawyer shall not...
charge . . . an illegal or clearly excessive fee."); cf Cary, supra note 159, at 576-77 ("If the
attorney is charging... by the hour, then the parties are paying for the additional time it
takes the attorneys to resolve disputes at the deposition. In addition, the party is usually
paying for the extra transcript pages needed to cover the arguments and name-calling
among counsel."); Let's Work Together, supra note 484 (referencing remarks by Justice San-
dra Day O'Connor that abusive discovery tactics make the litigation process more
expensive).
508. One commentator observed:
Professional civility and courtesy rests on the understanding that what goes
around comes around, not only over the course of a career, but even in the
course of a single lawsuit. A lawyer who is rude and abusive to an opposing party
in a deposition must expect that his client, when deposed, will also be abused. A
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wants to appear weak in front of a client. In addition, responding in
kind somewhat resembles the deterrence strategies employed during
the "Cold War," when the first to launch was threatened with com-
plete annihilation in a counterattack. °9 However, retaliation is not
the best response, because retaliation may very well result in the same
rule and ethics violations committed by opposing counsel.510
What then, should an aggrieved attorney do? When the im-
proper conduct first occurs, the defending attorney might try ignor-
ing it. Some attorneys will stop if their conduct does not draw the
desired reaction.5 11 Another technique is to employ a flexible ques-
tioning format. If opposing counsel objects to a question, consider
moving to another area and returning to the contested area later, with
a slightly different question. This method may save valuable deposi-
lawyer who makes absurd objections in an attempt to pervert the legal process
must understand that similar objections will be made to his efforts at discovery.
Hunt, supra note 506; accord Cary, supra note 159, at 575-76 (noting that one of the conse-
quences of employing Rambo tactics "is the creation of a revenge motive in the oppo-
nent"); Eugene A. Cook, Professionalism and the Practice of Law, 23 TEX. TECH L. REv. 955,
971 (1992) ("A Rambo attitude only evokes retaliation from the other lawyers, making the
problem even worse.").
509. See John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of Cooperation, Nuclear
Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REv. 569, 575-79 (1989) (comparing discovery
abuse to the "Prisoner's Dilemma"); cf Judith L. Maute, Sporting Theory of Justice: Taming
Adversary Zeal with a Logical Sanctions Doctrine, 20 CoNN. L. REv. 7, 41-50 (1987) (analogizing
discovery to competitive sports, where only one side can win).
510. See Ethicon Endo-Surgery v. United States Surgical Corp., 160 F.R.D. 98, 100 (S.D.
Ohio 1995) ("Where either counsel engages in improper conduct, such as hurling accusa-
tions, arguing, or lecturing witnesses or attorneys, it is not proper for opposing counsel to
respond in kind."); Castillo v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 828 F. Supp. 594, 600 (C.D.
Ill. 1992) (cautioning that it is not permissible to engage in unprofessional conduct just
because other attorneys are acting unprofessionally). As one judge explained, engaging in
unprofessional conduct may also adversely affect a lawyer's credibility with the judiciary:
Just like you in this room have a book on everyjudge that you've practiced before
and you tell war stories about that judge, we judges do the same thing. When a
lawyer is involved in outrageous conduct or unprofessional conduct before me,
when I'm sitting around having lunch with my colleagues, we talk about it. ...
Now, what does that mean? That means... that when that lawyer appears before
me or some other judge in my building, and there's a contest of credibility among
lawyers, whether it's conscious or subconscious, that lawyer is on the short end of
the stick. And in the long run, that lawyer hurts himself or herself or their clients.
Tenth Annual Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, 146 F.RD. 205, 229 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Aspen, J., panelist, commenting).
511. It has been observed:
Ignoring an SOB's outburst will often discourage him because it is hard to main-
tain a one-way argument. All you need do is ask the reporter to read the question
back and then politely ask the witness to answer it. This tactic will often wear the
SOB down and allow you to control the deposition.
Steven H. Wright & PamelaJ. Coveney, Bursting an SOB Litigator's Bubble During a Deposition,
MAss. LAw. WKLv., Dec. 9, 1991, at $1, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Malawr File.
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tion time.5 12 In addition, because attention spans tend to wane at the
end of a deposition, the deponent's attorney may not object to the
question if posed at a later time and in a slightly different way.
If the misconduct continues, make a record. As one attorney
commented: "[Don't] try to win the argument, just make a rec-
ord. '51 3 If the misconduct prevents a fair examination of the depo-
nent, then stronger action might be needed, such as contacting the
judge by phone or terminating the deposition to obtain a protective
order or order compelling testimony.514 If an attorney delivers such
an ultimatum, she must keep her word or risk the opponent's escalat-
ing his obnoxious conduct.
5 15
In the Sawyer case, Ms. Davis initially attempted to ignore Mr.
Drizolli's improper interruptions. When the misconduct continued,
she started to build the record. But she did not keep her cool en-
tirely. On two occasions, she directed barbs at him. Fortunately, she
regained her composure. As the interruptions persisted, she first con-
512. Id.
513. How to Protect Your Client at a Deposition from a Badgering Lawyer, FED. DISCOVERY
NEWS, Sept. 1996, at 2, available in LEXIS, Legnew Library, Lrpfd File (quoting New York
City attorney Elizabeth S. Strong); accord supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing
the need to build a record of opposing counsel's misconduct); cf Tenth Annual Judicial
Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 146 F.R.D. 205,
227 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (Professor Michael E. Tigar, panelist, commenting) ("If the abusive
behavior continues, I shut the deposition down and go to the judge and-after a fair warn-
ing on the record-in big cities, we have a two four-letter word rule .... [T]he second
four-letter word the opposing counsel uses, then we go to the district judge."). However,
one should never lose sight of the bigger objective:
Often, the SOB litigator becomes most obstreperous at critical junctures in the
testimony, when the deponent is divulging damaging information. This is the
time, when it is essential, to keep your eye on the ball. If you allow the record to
become clouded with arguments between counsel, then the SOB litigator has
succeeded.
Wright & Coveney, supra note 511.
514. See supra note 268 and accompanying text (discussing telephone conferences with
the court to resolve deposition disputes); supra notes 275-277 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing protective orders and standing orders that address deposition conduct); see also
supra notes 278-279 and accompanying text (advising how to handle prospectively an oppo-
nent who in the past has acted unprofessionally). However, one should keep in mind the
fact that courts are loathe to resolve discovery disputes:
Asking a court to resolve the conflict is an absolute last resort.
Motions to compel discovery are among a judge's least favorite motions.
Many judges view discovery disputes between attorneys in much the same manner
that they view disputes between children on a playground. Judges generally be-
lieve that attorneys can, and should, resolve these disputes without involving the
court.
Wright & Coveney, supra note 511.
515. See IMWINKELRIED & BLUMOFF, supra note 38, § 5:41, at 87 (noting that an attorney
loses credibility by not following through with a threat to involve the court).
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sidered terminating the deposition and resuming on video,516 then
indicated she would seek an immediate resolution via telephone, and
finally was forced to terminate the deposition to seek judicial interven-
tion. All in all, Ms. Davis acted appropriately under the circum-
stances, with her only transgressions being two sharp remarks to her
opponent. She did not attempt to escalate the situation, and she dili-
gently attempted to make a record and proceed with her questioning.
When the matter is presented to the court, she will be in a good posi-
tion to defend her conduct while condemning her opponent's.
Judges have shown little tolerance for incivility among members
of the bar.5 17 In fact, some have been fairly creative in punishing
those who cross the line. For example, a Massachusetts state court
barred an offending attorney from taking further depositions and pro-
hibited her from attending oral depositions in the future, unless she
was accompanied by another licensed attorney who would be permit-
ted to speak on her behalf while any deposition was in progress.51 8
Another court adopted a local rule that would refer offending attor-
neys to peer counseling. 19
516. Cf supra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing use of videotaping to control
an unruly opponent).
517. In one case, the court rebuked the attorneys at length for their incivility:
The conduct this disgraceful record contains is the antithesis of the profes-
sional manner with which discovery... must proceed. To engage in the practice
of law is to engage in a noble profession. It is to approach the resolution of
disputes with a spirit of high mindedness and with knowledge that the client's
problems and antagonisms are not the lawyer's. By providing professional assist-
ance to those who cannot resolve disputes without outside intervention and by
championing their causes and interests in a professional manner, lawyers daily
perform services of great social utility.... Behavior of the type this record reveals
demeans the participants, demeans the witnesses and demeans the very system
and essence of justice itself. It simply cannot be tolerated. A deposition is an
extension of ajudicial proceeding. It should be attended and conducted with the
same sense of solemnity and the same rules of etiquette that would be required
were the parties in the courtroom itself. The lawyer conducting the examination
must ask questions and obtain answers-not demean, insult or hurl epithets at
the opposing witness or counsel. The lawyer representing a witness must make
objections, when objections are required, succinctly and with the same brief pre-
cision required during the trial itself.
Cholfin v. Gordon, No. CA943623, 1995 WL 809916, at *9 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 22, 1995)
(mem.); accord Macario v. Pratt & Whitney Can., Inc., Civ. A. No. 90-3906, 1990 WL 187049,
at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 27, 1990) ("When the discovery process succumbs to nothing more
than vituperative tirades between opposing counsel, nothing of substance can ever be ac-
complished other than the three sanctions motions now before the Court for its
consideration.").
518. Cholfin, 1995 WL 809916, at *11.
519. See D.D.C. L.R. 711 (referring attorneys for counseling on matters of ethics).
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Lawyers must treat each other as colleagues and professionals.520
Incivility merely increases the costs of litigation,521 prevents early set-
tlements due to hard feelings,5 22 and tarnishes the public images of
lawyers.523 Attorneys must always remember that they are hired to re-
solve disputes, not perpetuate or escalate them.524
CONCLUSION: THE BALANCING ACT REVISITED
Litigators inevitably must walk the tightrope between clients and
the court. They must diligently represent their clients while uphold-
ing the integrity of the judicial system. Although this is a difficult feat,
it is far from impossible. To succeed, lawyers must be familiar with all
controlling and aspirational rules, must understand how these rules
interrelate, and must be willing to abide by them. In addition, lawyers
must realize that they can more effectively represent clients by follow-
ing the rules than by flouting them. For example, an attorney will
have little need to call a private conference while a question is pend-
ing if she has properly prepared her deponent to testify. Further, the
client will benefit more from proper preparation than from an im-
promptu conference: The client will give more accurate testimony
and will appear more credible.525
Some lawyers, however, will undoubtedly want to continue their
obstructionist tactics, unpersuaded by the argument that following the
rules benefits all involved. When faced with such Rambo opponents,
attorneys must set the ethical example and resist the temptation to
fight fire with fire.526 The ethical attorney, however, is not without a
substantial arsenal. With the rules on his side, the ethical attorney can
use ethical and procedural rules as a shield, and if necessary, as a
sword. If he cannot persuade the opponent to behave professionally
520. See Cook, supra note 508, at 958-59 ("Professionalism is a necessary element of the
legal system.").
521. See supra note 507 and accompanying text.
522. But see Cary, supra note 159, at 577 (observing that Rambo tactics may encourage
parties to settle).
523. See Cook, supra note 508, at 976 (noting that Rambo litigators "do nothing but
lower the esteem in which the legal profession is held by members of the general public");
see also supra note 505 and accompanying text.
524. See supra note 517.
525. See supra notes 198-199 and accompanying text.
526. Cf Cary, supra note 159, at 572-78 (discussing how Rambo tactics harm all involved
with the judicial process).
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by requests to follow the rules, then he can seek protective orders and
sanctions under controlling rules.527
When controlling rules seem to conflict, the attorney must at-
tempt to reconcile the differences in a way that permits him to serve
both the court and the client. Attorneys in the hypothetical illustrated
ways to achieve this balance. For instance, in the private consultation
section, when the defending attorney wanted to protect his client by
determining whether a privilege should be asserted, he called a con-
ference but acted courteously and expressly assured opposing counsel
he was not taking a break to delay or interrupt the proceedings. Thus,
he acted legally, professionally, and ethically by preserving a possible
privilege, interacting civilly with opposing counsel, and not unduly de-
laying or hindering the examination.528
Courts can help attorneys walk the ethical-legal tightrope by en-
acting more specific rules concerning deposition conduct and by en-
forcing court rules concerning deposition procedure. Local and
national ethics committees can help by providing more guidance con-
cerning the interplay between legal and ethical duties and competing
ethical duties. Law schools can help by offering courses on pretrial
procedure and litigation ethics, during which students can simulate
difficult situations and begin to learn why it pays to follow the rules
instead of finding the loopholes.529
Finally, lawyers can help themselves, their clients, and the legal
profession by treating depositions more like trials. Attorneys should
act at depositions the way they would act at a trial before a judge and a
jury. Few attorneys would hurl personal insults at opposing counsel
during trial; few attorneys would attempt to call private conferences
during their client's trial testimony; and few attorneys would instruct a
client not to answer a question at trial. Because a deposition is ajudi-
cial proceeding, and because Rule 30(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure contemplates that a deposition examination should, except
in limited ways, proceed like an examination at trial, attorneys should
not engage in shenanigans simply because ajudicial authority figure is
not physically present.
527. See, e.g., FED. R CIv. P. 26(c) (protective orders); FED. R. CIv. P. 30(d)(2) (sanc-
tions for impeding or delaying a deposition); FED. R. Civ. P. 37 (sanctions for discovery
abuse).
528. It is important to remember that even the ethical rules concerning zealous and
diligent client-representation demand that the representation comport with controlling
law and court rules. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RsPONSImLrrv DR 7-101 (1982);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr pmbl. 2 (1994).
529. See Cary, supra note 159, at 593-601 (suggesting steps for the bench, the bar, and
law schools to take to control Rambo litigators).
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